Martin Armstrong on economic collapse, EU fragmentation, and geopolitical dysfunction
Glenn Diesen interviews economist and forecaster Martin Armstrong on the converging crises facing the global economy and geopolitical order.
Summary
Glenn Diesen interviews Martin Armstrong, founder of Armstrong Economics, on the interconnected crises facing the global economy and geopolitical order. Armstrong argues that the EU is structurally flawed due to its failure to consolidate member-state debts at its founding, and predicts the bloc will break up around 2029. He contends that Western sanctions regimes — against Russia, Iran, and others — are historically ineffective and are actively destroying the architecture of world trade. Armstrong also reveals that he was privately asked by the Trump administration to write a peace plan for Russia and to use back channels to get it to Putin, which he did, receiving a thank-you letter from Trump approximately three weeks later. He argues that the bombing campaign against Iran has failed, that switching to sanctions is an implicit admission of that failure, and that the broader incompetence of Western leadership — in geopolitics, economics, and long-term planning — is driving the world toward a systemic crisis that his models project will peak around 2032.
Key Takeaways
FULL TRANSCRIPT
Introduction and the geopolitical landscape
Glenn Diesen: Welcome back, everyone. Today we are joined by Martin Armstrong, an economist, founder of Armstrong Economics, and one of the great economic forecasters. One of the things that makes Armstrong especially interesting is that he doesn't look at markets in isolation, but rather as it should be seen — economics together with government debts, monetary policy, fiscal policy, geopolitics, and social unrest — to try to make sensible forecasts and identify cycles that link them all together. Thank you for coming back on. It's been a few months now, I think.
Martin Armstrong: Well, thank you for inviting me. Yes, we have to look at everything because everything is connected. I've said plenty of times, you don't see war when everybody's fat and happy. You have to turn the economy down and then you get the tensions — civil unrest or war, whatever. When everybody's fat and happy, there's no problem.
Glenn Diesen: Can I ask, as a first question — what is it that's attracting your attention these days, or keeping you awake at night? There's a lot of things happening at once. We see the unraveling of geopolitics, the unraveling of the international economic system, what seems like a complete absence of diplomacy, and problems in society. Where do you see the market and geopolitics headed?
Martin Armstrong: Basically, you're looking at what I think are two really rogue heads of state — Netanyahu and Zelensky. What I mean by that is they don't really care about the rest of the world. It's what they want, period. You had Trump lift some of the sanctions on Russia to try to ease oil prices, and Zelensky says, "No way," and starts attacking all the refineries. So we have these conflicts. That's not what I want. We're not on a unified level.
Here in the States, it's pretty much understood — the press may not want to say it — but this is Netanyahu's war in Iran. He was the only head of state ever ushered into the situation room. When you look at that war, it's classic Netanyahu. His strategy has always been to assassinate the head of state or head of a party and assume he automatically wins. So it was sold to Trump that he knew where the Ayatollah was — we kill him on day one and we win. It was equated to something like Venezuela. But Netanyahu has been pitching that since 1996 to just about every president up to this point. I question whether the advice Trump was given was sound, in all honesty. I've had some arguments with some people about this. I said I would have secured the Strait of Hormuz before the first bomb fell. The response was, "Well, how did you know?" I said, "How did you not know?" Every war game I ever heard of in the ten years prior had Iran going and taking the Strait of Hormuz. So I question the competency here.
Now the problem, I think, with Trump is that he doesn't want to admit he's made a mistake. So backing off on the bombing and going to sanctions is really admitting that the bombing didn't work. And sanctions don't work either. There's no evidence of anybody imposing a sanction that actually functioned. We put sanctions on Cuba in 1960 — they're still there. We've got sanctions on Russia, on Iran. Obviously they don't work. They may make some people feel better — a kind of bravado that they've done something — but there's no real evidence that sanctions have ever actually resulted in bringing down a government. Particularly because when you do that, take Russia for example, the people don't blame Putin. They know who's doing it.
And they also don't want to admit why Putin was so popular — he had over 70% approval. Mainly because when Yeltsin turned to him, Yeltsin was being attacked by neocons in the United States trying to install Berezovsky and engineer a regime change, while inside Russia the old communists had filed a motion for impeachment. So they were trying to take things back the other way. That's why Yeltsin turned to Putin — he wasn't an oligarch and he wasn't a communist, and that's why people cheered. But in the West, because he basically shut down their attempted regime change, all we've gotten is that he's evil, he's this, he's that.
And they continue to say he wants to invade Europe, as if this is still Khrushchev. Back then it was a philosophical war — communism is better than capitalism, "we will bury you." That failed in '91. There's nothing in Europe for Putin to actually take. When Japan went into Manchuria, it was for natural resources. There has to be some sort of benefit. Even if you go back to ancient times, you can't find where Alexander the Great said, "Let's go take this city — what are we going to get out of it? Nothing. Let's just go do it." They did it for the spoils. When there's no economic benefit, I don't see where that scenario is realistic.
The Ukraine conflict and the failure of Western strategy
Martin Armstrong: My concern is the whole propaganda around this. Putin called it a special operation, and it was basically to defend the Russians in the Donbas. We had offices in Kyiv and in Donetsk, so I can tell you that the people on both sides wouldn't even talk to each other. The hatred there was just systemic.
Zelensky started attacking refineries and commerce in Russia, and he's openly said he's trying to influence the September elections in Russia. Why? Do you think attacking them means they're going to raise the white flag and say, "Oh, sorry, we quit, we give up"? Not going to happen. This is like expecting Iran to call Netanyahu and say, "Come on over for dinner." Not realistic. And that's what gives me concern, because it's more likely that the hardliners — like Medvedev — are going to gain seats. You can already see the pressure. The Kremlin changed the definition a few weeks ago from a special operation to "we are at war with Ukraine." That's significant. That's the result of Zelensky's attacking commerce and infrastructure.
When you look at the geopolitics of things, no government can simply raise the white flag and say, "Okay, sorry." These warmongers never look beyond the end of their nose. You can look up Tony Blair's apology for the Iraq war — it's on YouTube. He says, "We thought we were freeing the people from the evil of Saddam. We didn't realize we would be subjecting them to sectarian violence." This is what I mean. They don't think beyond one step forward. We take out the Ayatollah — what comes next? Nobody seems to think about that. They took out Saddam and ended up with ISIS cutting off people's heads. They don't go forward.
I really question the competency of these people. Oh, they hate Putin — you remove Putin, what do you get? Maybe Medvedev. It gets worse, not better. I just don't see a coherent strategy beyond step one from a lot of these people in the geopolitical world.
Europe's economic model and structural problems
Glenn Diesen: I'm wondering — do you ever hear from any European leaders or experts who discuss what the economic model is moving forward? It looked as if, during the hegemonic era after the Cold War, the European plan was essentially to be the junior partner of the United States. This defined its geopolitical role, its economic model, and its relations with Russia. Even though Russia is the largest country in Europe, it shouldn't have a seat at the table — it should still look to the West for leadership and follow decisions. But now that the US is shifting its focus to the Western Hemisphere and East Asia, Europe isn't really that important anymore. We see this manifest in a geopolitical crisis, and it's not clear what the economic model is anymore for the Europeans. They don't have technological sovereignty. Their economies are not doing well. Their industries aren't really prepared for digitalization. And when war predictably broke out with Russia, the only economic plan seems to be to steal Russian assets while the Russians pivot to China. The assumption was that a war with Russia would pull the Americans back closer into Europe and restore the old model. But the US instead seems to be trying very fast to outsource the whole war to the Europeans and distance itself from it. How do you see the economic model for the Europeans moving forward?
Martin Armstrong: As you know, I was called in when they were forming the euro, and I told them: you have to consolidate the debts. At the time it was Helmut Kohl who didn't allow the German people to vote, because he assumed they would object to consolidating the debts — essentially a bailout for Greece or Italy. I warned them this wasn't going to work, that they wouldn't be able to compete with the dollar. They told me they just had to get the euro through and would worry about the debt later.
The problem is that as a trader, I can pick up the phone and say, "Buy me $10 billion worth of US Treasuries." With Europe, I still have to make the same decision as if the euro doesn't exist. I still have to say, do I want Germany? Do I want France? Do I want Belgium? Do I want Italy? It's the same as if the euro didn't exist, because you never consolidated the debt. That's probably at the core of the problem for Europe.
As an example, in the US we have a single currency but 50 states, and each state pays a different credit rating according to its policies. What you saw in 2010 when Greece got in trouble was a contagion — traders immediately said, "Who's next? Spain." That would happen in the United States too. If California went down, traders would say, "What's the next state? Illinois." But they wouldn't go after the federal government. I suggest reading Herbert Hoover's memoirs, the chapter on 1931 when most of Europe defaulted and Britain even suspended its payments. He describes exactly what I'm saying. He says capital acted like a loose cannon on the deck of a ship, shooting off in every direction as if in a hurricane — moving so quickly they couldn't figure out where it was going next. That's the real risk with Europe: if one country gets in trouble, it creates a contagion because there is no consolidated debt.
As you say, you can go back to ancient historians. Sallust, who was a historian in Rome, said the same thing — once Rome conquered Carthage, they no longer had a major external enemy, and groups started fighting among themselves, creating disunity. I think that's in part why Brussels needs to keep saying Russia wants to invade — to maintain that unity. This goes back to ancient times. Governments respond in the same way always. Human nature doesn't really change; our technology might, but human nature is still the same.
I think the only way to really save Europe is going to be monetary reform — recognizing the mistakes, consolidating the debt, and moving away from these sanctions and tariffs. Even what Trump is doing, I disagree with. This is still Marxism. I believe more in David Ricardo — that every country should look at its comparative advantage. You don't grow a head of lettuce in Saudi Arabia in the desert. It's going to cost you $10 a head when you can buy it for 50 cents from somebody else. Everybody has their own comparative advantage. Once you put tariffs on, you're reducing living standards because you're saying the consumer now has to pay for people who are being overpaid. You're subsidizing labour, which raises the cost of living for the average person. These are serious economic issues that you have to separate from politics. Politics tends to be more political than economic science.
US debt, capital flows, and safe-haven dynamics
Glenn Diesen: If you look towards the United States, they now have a $40 trillion debt and the situation isn't going well in the bond market. Where do you see this headed? Is the US going into a major economic crisis? And where does the smart money go during these times?
Martin Armstrong: The US tends to be a safe haven in times of geopolitical problems. A lot of people have been calling for a crash in the stock market — the worst in 150 years and all that — and they've been wrong for over a year. Why? We have offices around the world — in Dubai, in China — so we get to see why people really move money. When Switzerland started confiscating assets of anyone who was Russian, claiming they knew Putin, that was a serious violation of international law. The smart money left Switzerland and went to Dubai and Singapore.
Iran sent more missiles and drones at Dubai than they did at Israel. Why? Because it's the financial capital. They had an AI facility there that cost about $30 billion to create — Amazon, OpenAI, everybody's there. Iran attacked it. They didn't destroy it, but they took it offline for about a week. We couldn't even get wire transfers to our staff there. The banking system went down.
Most people don't realize that during COVID, oil went down to $6.50. The Gulf States couldn't function at that price, so they borrowed extensively. They all now have national debts. Iran is playing 3D chess here. They know shutting the Strait of Hormuz may push energy prices up, but it's not going to undermine the United States the way it did in the 1970s. What it would do is put economic pressure on the Gulf States. If they can't sell oil, the risk rises that they end up defaulting on their sovereign debts.
The US has a $40 trillion national debt. However, I like to look at it differently — I take the capitalization of the stock market versus the national debt, rather than debt to GDP, because every country uses different formulas. What you end up with is that the debt relative to the stock market has fallen from close to 70–80% in 1980 down to around 50%. That's showing that capital is going into equities. Back in 1929, the problem was the private sector. This time, the problem is the government sector. So the smart money tends to go away from governments and sovereign debts. In war, you get the risk of who's going to default — commerce declines, taxes go down, and that's when you get sovereign defaults.
If you look at the three indexes in the United States: the NASDAQ is more retail; the S&P is more domestically institutional; and the Dow tends to be more international. When the Dow is leading everything else and is the first to rise, that's showing you foreign capital is coming in. When you get the NASDAQ going, that's the retail speculative bubble. That's why these people have been wrong. As geopolitical crises increase — from the Middle East, Ukraine and Russia — capital flows into the United States.
I've warned that we have war on four fronts: the Middle East, Ukraine and Russia, Korea kicking up again, and China versus Taiwan. These are not like World War I or II where it's one group against another. These are separate individual conflicts. Our computer has been forecasting that yes, we're heading into a world war, but it's more like brush fires — not one giant conflagration. This has been sending capital into the United States. But then you have the $40 trillion debt on one side, and the problem tends to be government.
Trump is losing confidence even among his own people with his tariffs. That's what we were all taught in school years ago — Marxist and Keynesian economics — and it has failed. But he's still influenced by those old ideas. Putting tariffs on to make America great again only increases inflation and the cost of living, and that's why you see his popularity declining. I just don't know who the hell is advising him. They certainly do not seem to be very competent — geopolitically, economically, you name it.
Armstrong's back-channel peace plan for Russia
Martin Armstrong: I will say this. I was called and asked to come in — they said they wanted to brief me on Russia. I went in and took my assistant with me, thinking it was just going to be a briefing. When I got there, I was told she had to leave the room. This was national security. Then I was asked to write the peace plan for Putin. Then they asked me to use my back channels to get a communication through. I said, "You really want me to do this?" I asked, "Is this sanctioned?" They said yes. So I did. I got it on Putin's desk. And then I did get a letter from Trump about three weeks later saying, "Thank you."
My question was: why are you calling me in to do something that the State Department should be doing? Is there a division in competency? Was it that Rubio has always been a neocon and against Russia, and they wouldn't accept it if it came from him? I don't know. All I can say is — we put the peace plan on our site, so you can download it for free. Trump did pretty much everything I put in it. Europeans who viewed it said that calling me in showed that Trump really did want peace.
As I said, I think switching to sanctions on Iran is admitting the bombing didn't work. I think they won't say it publicly, but that is raising the white flag.
Then we have the other problem of the tariffs and this war with Canada, which doesn't make a lot of sense. At the same time, Carney is not the one to really negotiate with either — he tends to be a globalist, not looking at it from the best interest of the Canadian view. These leaders — I don't know where the hell they came from. Bottom of a Cracker Jack box, I guess.
This is the stress level that's building globally. All of a sudden you see the same thing in Korea — South Korea is saying they want to take over their own military because they don't trust Trump. On Taiwan: a drone flew over before Trump went to China, and the message delivered was that Europe will no longer participate in a war outside of their own territory — limiting it to Russia, basically carving out the Middle East. But he also told Xi Jinping that they would not come to the defense of Taiwan. So when Trump got there, Xi put that on the table: "Where do you stand?" You can see Trump's statements after that meeting — he said to the chip companies, "I recommend you move to the United States."
I've spoken to a number of people on Capitol Hill and they were at least agreeing with me that we wouldn't be in a war with Russia — they said it would be with China. They see China as actually trying to expand its empire. They do not see that coming from Russia. China is rebuilding its Silk Road, lending money to countries for strategic purposes — they see that as expansion. They don't see that same expansion coming from Putin.
NATO's relevance and the case for free trade as a peace model
Martin Armstrong: The problem with NATO is that it was there because of the Warsaw Pact. When that fell, they really should have been dissolved. But to keep their jobs and pensions, they have to say Putin wants to come in — otherwise why do you need them? I've seen internal memos after that, and after climate change, asking: "How do we remain relevant?" They're not interested in peace. They're always going to say there's a risk of war so they keep their jobs. Any government agency does that.
What I have said in meetings is that the model for world peace already exists — it was the Roman Empire. It lasted for a thousand years. It was more economically beneficial to be inside than outside. You could make a vase in France and sell it to somebody in Syria. It was free trade, with trade routes connecting everything. When you start carving everything up, that's when you create disunity. If you want peace with Russia, you should basically say free trade — because then you're going to have a Russian company making money, and they're going to tell their government, "What are you doing? We're going to lose." It's more of a check and balance. The answer is really just looking at the Roman Empire: free trade, and everybody could participate if they were inside. But we've got people who just want power — that's the problem.
The Minsk Agreement and the roots of the Ukraine war
Glenn Diesen: When you were asked to write the peace plan for ending the war with Russia, what were the main components, and what is it that you think the US administration would not go along with?
Martin Armstrong: Actually, they accepted everything I said. The Minsk Agreement, which was negotiated, was to allow the Donbas to vote and separate. Then you had Merkel come out — I think it was in Der Spiegel — and they asked her why she didn't enforce it. She said, "Well, we never intended to. We just wanted to buy time for Ukraine to build an army." That was a statement that they wanted war.
What I explained was that the Donbas should be separated off. That was the same solution as when Yugoslavia broke up — it broke up according to ethnic lines. The Donbas is Russian. They've been there for hundreds of years. You had Zelensky coming in trying to outlaw their language, outlaw their religion — you can no longer be Orthodox under Moscow, you have to be under the church in Kyiv. That's kind of like the old Ottoman Empire coming in and saying, "You're Christian, you can no longer be Christian, you have to be Muslim now." These are not things you do to people. You can't tell people they can no longer speak their language. This is not conducive to peace.
I basically said the Minsk Agreement had to be honored. If it had been honored, there would have been no war. And they agreed. I think that's one of the things Trump told Zelensky — give up the Donbas. And Zelensky said no way.
If you go back to 2014, what started all this? They massacred a bunch of Russians in Odessa in 2014. They were killing them on the streets, chased them into the trade union building, set it on fire, and burned them. That's what started the whole separation issue. I can tell you that because I've dealt with Ukraine for a long time. We even had a conference in Athens, and the staff from Kyiv wouldn't fly back the quickest way because the plane stopped in Moscow. The hatred is just systemic. I've tried to talk to them. They just hate Russians. I said, "Do you realize that Stalin was from Georgia? He wasn't Russian." And the man who took all the food from Ukraine — his name was Kaganovich, and he was born in Kyiv. He was Jewish, and he was getting back at them for killing Jews. He wasn't Russian. But they don't want to hear that. They've been indoctrinated in school — it was Russia, Russia, Russia. The facts don't support it, but they've been brainwashed to that point.
I've got videos on my site of Zelensky on stage before he was president, basically making jokes about confiscating assets from Jews and Russians. He pretended to be like Soros. He pretended to be Christian — he married a Christian girl, his children are baptized. Only after he became president did he suddenly say he's Jewish. I think that was largely to hide the fact that he was part of the neo-Nazi element. I have friends in Israel and they say he's no Jew.
Intractable conflicts and the limits of negotiation
Martin Armstrong: These conflicts — how do you resolve all this stuff? It doesn't make one side right and the other side wrong. I just don't see where you're ever going to get a solution. Take Iran and Israel — it's religious. It's my God against your God. With Ukraine, you can't talk to them. If you went to Kyiv and brought a bottle of Russian vodka, you'd be lucky if they didn't smash it over your head. These are just systemic biases and hatreds that go back a long time.
I was called in when Yugoslavia was going to break up. I'll never forget — they said, "Oh, you know, they killed 600 of us and threw us in a common grave." I thought I'd missed something on the news. I said, "Oh my God, really? When did this happen?" "About 700 years ago." These things, particularly in the Balkans, linger because the area has been Orthodox, Western Christian, Muslim — all these groups have conquered that area at one point or another. So you have all these pockets of different ethnicities that remain and remember what they did to each other.
I think it was Bismarck who forecast World War I. He said a major war was going to come for Europe, and it was going to come from the Balkans. He was right. So it's hard to say, but I just don't think those two wars are stoppable. The same with China and Taiwan — it's more of a psychological issue. North Korea versus the South is still the old communist versus capitalism dynamic. These are not disputes that are easily negotiated.
Russia, China, gold, and the breakdown of global trade architecture
Glenn Diesen: How do you see Russia and China adjusting their economies from here on? They're obviously concerned about the unsustainable debt across the West and the weaponization of economic dependence. They don't trust the financial system anymore. Are they going to switch more to gold and their own financial architecture? Are they going to move closer together or remain competitors?
Martin Armstrong: They set up their own chip payment system once the Biden administration made the decision to take Russia out of SWIFT. And you're seeing that same nonsense right now with Bessent threatening anybody that deals with Iran — "We'll take you out of the dollar system." You're destroying the world economy. Going in the exact opposite direction of where you should be going.
The main reason China has been selling off US and European debt and moving to gold is this: gold does not earn interest, and it costs money to store it. But what they're doing is not for the sake of making money or because they think gold is going to go up. The issue is that when you have everyone beating these war drums, you don't want to own the debt of your adversary. Why would they pay you interest while you're holding that debt? They won't. They will default. That's how it historically always works. If the US and China went to war, the US would just default on whatever debt China holds. Moving to gold is neutral — it's not advantageous because they don't earn income from it and it has carrying costs, but it changes the economic balance sheet from that perspective.
This is what I argue against — they're going in the exact opposite direction of what the Roman Empire showed is the way to go. You take all these countries out of the dollar system, then what? There is no world trade. The whole economy breaks down. My experience with these guys is like I said with Tony Blair — they don't think past the end of their nose. "I've got to stop them from helping Iran." What comes after that? They don't know. They have no Plan B. This is the real danger — total incompetency in a lot of these governments. They're only concerned about the next election and what's immediately in front of them. No long-term planning.
I remember one of the first meetings I had, back in '81, with the US Treasury when Volcker had interest rates at 14%. I said, "Guys, the national debt is going to double by the end of the decade." Very calmly, they said to me, "Yes, Marty, but we'll be paying it back with cheaper dollars." I just looked at them and said, "All right, I guess you guys know what you're doing." Ever since then, I just don't see any long-term planning for anything. Governments have been borrowing since World War II with no intention of paying anything back. I've warned them this eventually collapses — the interest expenditures will exceed everything else and push it all out. In the US, the interest this year has exceeded military spending. And they just look at you like you're coming from Mars. The excuse I've heard is, "Yes, but we're the government — people always buy our stuff." I say history says you're on the wrong side here.
The 2032 crisis, EU breakup, and the path to political reform
Martin Armstrong: I think it does have to come to a head. Our computer pretty much shows that by 2032. What you're seeing now is the stress. The EU will probably end up breaking up by around 2029, because you're seeing the stress between the member states. Italy has been saying they should be issuing more centralized bonds. The EU has interfered in elections in Romania and Hungary. They even threatened that if the AfD won in Germany, they'd overthrow it. They did the same thing in Italy. It's all about retaining their power. They deliberately designed a system in Brussels to make sure the people have no right to actually change those policies. The people in the back room who make those decisions don't stand for election. Ursula von der Leyen isn't elected by the people.
The old resentments are still there. I was in Athens when Merkel refused to bail out the Greek banks, and they were protesting, walking down the street in Nazi uniforms. They remember things. They don't go away. I think it's language that does that. I saw a documentary about when Roosevelt was trying to get into World War II. They went to Boston — mostly Irish — and said, "You really expect us to send our boys to go defend Britain? After what they did to Ireland?" They couldn't get them in. They needed Pearl Harbor to do that. These resentments between countries — I think language is probably the number one issue that keeps people apart, and secondly ethnic differences between countries.
Glenn Diesen: I wasn't expecting any optimistic views on the future. Your forecast does show where we're headed. The economic collapse must be difficult to predict the political consequences of, because if the EU is not able to provide economic benefits anymore for its member states and interests become too divergent, yes, it will break up. But there are so many economic developments at the moment.
Martin Armstrong: I think it's also cultural — trying to force, as Ursula was doing to Hungary, a one-size-fits-all approach. They don't want to change their culture, and you're saying they have to. One size does not fit all. That's the whole problem with a centralized government like that. We have the same problem in the United States — a Democrat gets in and Republicans are all upset; a Republican gets in and California says it wants to separate. There are groups in Europe and in America where the economic situation is causing this tension, and it's becoming systemic everywhere. It's not just limited to Europe or the United States.
The optimistic thing is that we go through these periods of political reform. But you don't get to the political reform unless you get the pain. The average person has to say, "This doesn't work." Then you get the change. They're not going to change just because it sounds good. Republican forms of government historically are always the worst because they don't really represent you. In the United States, I can run for Congress and tell you whatever you want to hear — I'll save the whales, it won't rain on Sunday, whatever you want. But then I get there, and day one there's a meeting: "Congratulations. This is how it works." If you just look at the votes, they're down party lines. The guys in the back room make the decisions. The speaker of the house decides what committee you go on. If you're not a good boy, you don't get the committee you want. You want to play ball, you do what they ask, and then you get on the committee you want. This is politics.
Unfortunately, that's the reality we have to deal with. The light at the end of the tunnel is that we get to reform all this. If you examine what the mistakes are, then we get to reset it. We go through these things roughly every 300 years or so. Before, it was overthrowing monarchy — they made the mistake of going into republics. I think a direct democracy is better, where we make the real decisions. Shall we go to war with Iran? Yes or no? We decide that. Not some guy in the back room.
Glenn Diesen: And where can people find your work?
Martin Armstrong: ArmstrongEconomics.com. It's completely free. You don't have to put in any email. We don't send you 50 emails trying to sell you swamp land in Florida. We try to keep it as an open forum for the entire world. We have offices everywhere, clients on every continent. We try to listen to what everybody's view is. We're all in this together, no matter where we're at.
Glenn Diesen: I'll leave a link in the description. Thank you so much for taking the time.
Martin Armstrong: Well, thank you for inviting me, and I hope things are okay over there.