Glenn Diesen interviews Larry Johnson on Trump's options regarding Iran, the global economic fallout, and the Russia-Ukraine war
Glenn Diesen interviews former CIA analyst and State Department counterterrorism official Larry Johnson on the rapidly deteriorating US position in both the Iran conflict and the Ukraine war.
Summary
Larry Johnson, a former CIA analyst and former employee at the US State Department's Office of Counterterrorism, joins Glenn Diesen to argue that the US has no viable military options remaining against Iran and that the economic damage from the conflict — spanning oil, LNG, helium, urea, and sulfur shortages — is pushing the global economy toward depression, not merely recession. He contends that Trump may attempt to "declare victory and walk away" from Iran without a real deal, but that even this path is complicated by Iran's hardened negotiating position and the ongoing naval blockade. Johnson also addresses the Russia-Ukraine war, arguing that Russia has abandoned its previous restraint and is now pursuing a strategy of total pressure — closing the Black Sea, blockading Odessa, and intensifying strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure — with no intention of offering concessions.
Key Takeaways
FULL TRANSCRIPT
Trump's Claims About the Strait of Hormuz and Scott Bessent's Pipeline Argument
Glenn Diesen: I see now that Trump argues that not only is the Strait of Hormuz wide open, but it's also under US control. I'm not sure — I guess everyone spins these days, but this is starting to be a bit over the top. On a different note, though, we see the US Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent arguing that the Strait of Hormuz itself will be irrelevant in two years as all oil will be rerouted through pipelines. How feasible is this, and what is he not accounting for? And just to widen the question a bit more — what is the point of this statement? Is this intended to pretend the Strait of Hormuz is not significant anymore? Does that make it easier for the US to pull away? What should we make of this?
Larry Johnson: It would be one thing if we were simply observing Donald Trump's detachment from reality. There have been some funny memes created out of this over the last couple of months. Remember the one where he's lying on a psychiatrist's couch and the psychiatrist is sitting there talking to him — at the time Trump was claiming that he was talking to the Iranians — and the psychiatrist says to him, "Mr. President, these Iranians that you're talking to, are they here in the room with us now?" — implying that he's dealing with mythical, fantastical personalities that don't exist. Now he says, "Oh, the Strait of Hormuz is wide open. We control it." Okay, well, if it's open and you control it, why is there a battle with Iran? There shouldn't be any issue. Why are you blockading Iran? Is that for some other reason? Because ostensibly you initially said you were blockading Iran because they were shutting down the Strait of Hormuz.
Now, it would be one thing if it was just Donald Trump off into this delusional nonsense. But then Scott Bessent weighs in. As Secretary of the Treasury, you would think he'd be fully briefed on the economic parameters that govern the Persian Gulf. Yes, 20 to 25% of the world's supply of oil comes out of the Persian Gulf — that's significant. But that's not all. You've got liquid natural gas, urea, sulfur, and helium. All critical commodities, inputs into the industrial process around the world. None of those can be transported via pipeline. Impossible. So it's like Bessent is saying, "Yeah, as long as we're shipping the oil around, we don't care about that other stuff."
And people say, "Well, why do we care about helium, for example?" Helium — and I'm updating Ambrose Bierce here, a Civil War veteran from the 19th century in the United States who was a journalist renowned for his very acerbic, misanthropic view of humanity — he said, "War was God's way of teaching Americans geography." Well, out of this war I've now learned about LNG, urea, sulfur, helium, oil, sweet crude, sour crude. With helium, I didn't realize it's essential for making not only computer chips but sealing hard drives on computers. And Qatar was producing something like 40% of the world's supply of helium — some say 30%, but I think 40% is more accurate. That gets cut off, and all of a sudden the people making computer chips, hard drives, and MRI machinery have to pay more, and the prices of all that start going up dramatically.
So again, that gets back to Bessent — he's only focused on the oil, and he's ignoring urea and sulfur as well, which are critical for fertilizer among other things. And sulfur plays a big role in other industrial processes. So what are you people thinking? They actually believe they can blockade Iran for another year or two and then Iran's going to surrender. The Western economy will not survive that long. What they're looking at right now is that we are in the midst of a global recession. It's just that the numbers produced sometimes lag two or three months. By the time we get those numbers, we're going to be on the cusp of a depression, not just a recession.
Economic Pressure, the MOU, and the Option of Walking Away
Glenn Diesen: I read a report that Washington might switch from military actions to economic pressures, but as you point out, the economic pressures are mounting on the United States and its allies as well — indeed the entire global economy. So I'm not sure if there's time for this kind of prolonged economic pressure either. And the additional pressure also entails use of the military, for example through this blockade. So it's going to be hard to pull through with that plan.
That kind of goes back to what I was thinking — there are not many good options anymore for the United States here. There's no convincing military option, and the path to peace must to some extent go through the MOU. But this is now, I think, too painful for Trump. He was the one blasting Obama for years over the JCPOA, which now looks like a dream deal — especially Obama unfreezing some Iranian assets. Well, if Trump's going to go with peace here, he's going to have to end the sanctions. It's about $300 billion in reconstruction for Iran. He has to end the other wars against Iranian allies. So there's no war option, and the peace also seems too difficult for Trump to swallow, especially before the election. Is there a third option — just for the US to walk away? Because when I heard Scott Bessent pointing out who cares about the Strait of Hormuz, this is what I would expect to hear if one is preparing to walk away. Do you think there's a possibility Trump could just do what he did with Yemen — declare victory over Iran and go home without an actual deal?
Larry Johnson: Yeah, absolutely. I do think that is at least one of the options on the table — that he'll just declare victory and walk away. He receives some encouragement on that front from James Carafano, a senior official at the Heritage Foundation, which is one of the preeminent Washington think tanks, or so-called think tanks. He wrote a piece praising Trump for his victory over Iran. So there it is — hey, you've won, congratulations — and then Trump gets to declare victory and walk away.
The problem with that is the United States is going to have to lift the blockade it has now imposed upon Iran. The United States doesn't have enough ships to do a 100% closure, but it does have enough that it can interfere with some of the Iranian oil coming out of the Gulf. And so the United States, ironically, by blocking the flow of Iranian oil from the Gulf, is exacerbating a global shortage of oil — particularly the oil that's high in sulfur, called sour crude, that comes out of the Persian Gulf and out of Iran.
The reason that's so important is that when you set up an oil refinery, you've got to make a decision at the outset: are we going to use this refinery to refine sour crude or sweet crude? Because depending on your answer, that determines how you actually build that refinery. The major refineries right now are in four areas of the globe: the Gulf Coast of the United States, India, China, and then Japan and South Korea. What makes Japan and South Korea so critical is they get 90% of their oil from the Persian Gulf. For India and China, it's about 50%. China is able to make up that 50% fairly easily with oil from Russia. But that said, the fact that you've got this cut-off of supply — it's not like Russia or some other country could just boost production and replace that. That didn't happen. So that means diesel and aviation fuel that come out of the middle distillate of that sour crude — we've got a global shortage of diesel and aviation fuel. And with each passing week, that shortage grows more acute.
The United States, up to this point, has tried to mitigate some of that shock by drawing down its strategic petroleum reserve, as have other countries, particularly Japan. But those reserves are running out around the globe. In fact, the United States is approaching a very critical level where if it tries to draw any more out, it could collapse the salt caverns that have been used for storing the oil. Because to get the oil out, you pump water into the salt caverns, and when you mix water with salt, the salt dissolves. So there are some real complexities here.
And then adding to this — even if the Strait of Hormuz is wide open tomorrow and any ship can come and go at its pleasure, the damage that has been done to the oil terminals, the LNG terminals, the processing facilities, and the petrochemical plants is so significant that the personnel who would normally be there to do the repair and maintenance on this equipment — US contractors — have all bailed out of the area because it was too dangerous. And the warehouses where they had their repair equipment and replacement parts stored have been destroyed. So even if you get back in and it's okay, what I'm saying is we're looking at months and potentially a year or longer before anything approaching normal flow is restored. That means this whole negative economic pressure — the shortages of diesel, aviation fuel, LNG, urea, sulfur, and helium — is going to persist. And that will continue to have a negative, depressing effect on the global economy, not just one country.
Iran's Conditions for Reopening the Strait of Hormuz
Glenn Diesen: I'm thinking though that if the US decides now to just walk away — that is, accept that they will leave the Strait of Hormuz with the Iranians — it would be bad, but it wouldn't be so bad if the Iranians allow it to stay open, so that international commerce can continue and the oil and other resources can come out. However, if Trump decides he wants to walk away but still keep some of the blockade on for pressure on Iran, it seems very unlikely that the situation would change at all, because any blockade is an act of war, which would then necessitate Iranian retaliation. So you would again continue more or less what you see now, but with lower intensity.
So if the US is to walk away, it also needs the Iranians to open up the Strait of Hormuz. But the Iranians have made it clear that the United States must behave before they will open the strait. Is that the same as implementing the MOU, or how do you interpret what "good behavior" means?
Larry Johnson: Yeah, it is actually an extension of the MOU — or let's call it an updating of the MOU. I've seen it reported — I can't quite verify it — but my understanding is that in the early days of the shutdown of the Strait of Hormuz, China made a behind-the-scenes deal with the United States to not go out and try to buy oil on the global market in order to reduce price pressure, because if China had done that, it would have spiked prices. But then after the United States walked away from the MOU, China said, "Well, screw that." And so China's been out buying up oil, which is leading to upward price pressure.
From the Iranian standpoint, they've gone back and said, "Look, if the United States wants to do this again, it's going to have to meet the following conditions: stop threatening us, get Israel to stop the war in Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, and Yemen — those wars have to be stopped, part of which is telling Saudi Arabia to stop — lift the blockade, lift the sanctions, immediately return frozen funds. Then the Strait of Hormuz is wide open for business." But again, under the constraints that Iran has stipulated in its Persian Gulf Strait Authority protocols — namely that ships must fill out a sort of application in order to pass through the strait.
Now, there are reports today — I saw both Reuters and the Wall Street Journal, I think — claiming that talks are heating back up with Islamabad playing the broker. I've seen that, and we've received some updates that there may be some truth to it, but Iran's position has hardened substantially. So this may be another effort by Trump — you know, his typical market manipulation: "Oh, peace is at hand," the stock market goes up, the price of oil goes down, and then all of a sudden we're carrying out air strikes. I think we're facing several more stages of up and down, back and forth. "Oh, we have a deal. No, we don't have a deal."
I think there was a statement out of Iran last night by one of the senior advisors to Ghalibaf, the speaker of the parliament, who said, "We just can't negotiate with Trump. It's a waste of time. We just have to wait till he's replaced as president" — whether that's because he's impeached or because the next election he can't run again. I think Iran has reached the point where they've said, "We're just wasting our time, wasting our breath." And the appointment of General Rezaee to the senior position as advisor to the Ayatollah for the Supreme National Security Council is a signal that Iran's patience with negotiations is running out.
The MOU's $300 Billion Clause and Iran's Diplomacy with Oman
Glenn Diesen: Some of the deals that the Iranians might be betting on are the ones that don't involve the United States, because as you said, they don't really trust them. I see Trump now going on social media claiming that Iran never actually mentioned any compensation in any of the negotiations or talks. This is so strange — that the Iranians would suddenly ask where this is coming from. But point six in the memorandum of understanding makes it clear that the US and its allies should make available $300 billion for the reconstruction of Iran. So it must have been mentioned in the negotiations, unless this was just a very generous gift from the United States.
The Iranians appear to be betting on diplomacy with Oman. And of course, Oman has some limitations in what it can agree to without US support. But the Iranians are now arguing that they are very close to a deal with Oman. How do you see this shifting? Will it make any changes, or will it essentially be as temporary as any of the other agreements?
Larry Johnson: It's not going to change anything immediately. What it will do is establish what the framework is going forward. I could see Iran saying, "Okay, we'll tax every ship that comes into the Persian Gulf." Every ship coming in is going to pay a tax. After that, if Oman wants to charge them going out, that's Oman's business — they'll go out through the Omani channel. I could see that happening. Iran may not insist on doing a double hit — getting them at the front and at the end.
The reality right now is that Iran has been positive in its remarks about the negotiations with Oman, and they very well could secure a deal. But the key player in this is what the United States is going to do. Is it going to continue to try to enforce this blockade?
Now let me add that while the United States is trying to enforce a blockade, the morale of the sailors on those ships is absolutely horrible. The food is poor. They're not getting the kind of support they need in terms of toiletries, days off, shower facilities, functioning toilets, functioning laundry rooms. I've had direct dealings with two different mothers — one the mother of a sailor, the other the mother of a Marine. They don't know each other. I came across them in different contexts in different places. But they both told the same story about how their sons had gone on these extended cruise missions, how they lost significant weight, how the food they were being given was terrible and inadequate.
And it's not just these two. We've got further evidence from the families of the crew members of the USS Abraham Lincoln — the aircraft carrier — who were in San Diego with the Secretary of the Navy last week. And they chewed his ass over the complaints about lack of proper food, lack of toiletries, lack of basic sanitary services. So here's the United States trying to run a naval blockade at a time when it's unable to properly care for its own sailors.
Trump's Nuclear Deal Ambitions and the Saudi Factor
Glenn Diesen: On the possibility of Trump simply walking away — one of the main reasons he wouldn't want to do this is because the last step in the MOU is negotiations over Iran's nuclear program. I assume he would want some deal, but of course he could just lean back into the old rhetoric that the whole program has been obliterated. But if he wants this done, is there any pathway anymore? I see that he also wants to make a deal now with the Saudis, which would be quite a deterrent to entering negotiations with Iran. How are you reading the situation?
Larry Johnson: It's quite confusing. If you listen to Trump, the Strait of Hormuz is open and the United States controls it. Okay. Then what's the issue with Iran? If the Strait of Hormuz is open and the US controls it, why is Iran even relevant? Well, we know the answer to that — Trump is lying.
When it comes to trying to end the war, trying to walk away, the only way that could ultimately happen is the United States is going to have to get in touch with reality and admit what is the actual case on the ground with respect to Iran and with the Saudis.
And we saw something fascinating last week. I call it METO — the Middle East Treaty Organization. This METO movement involves Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan. Those three, plus Egypt, previously met in June in Cairo. All of this came in the wake of statements out of China and out of Russia — Putin said it in Russia, Wang Yi, the foreign minister of China, said it — both of them, after they met with Foreign Minister Zarif of Iran, that there is a need for a new security architecture in the region. That was the purpose of the meeting in Cairo. Somehow out of that meeting, the other three decided not to invite Egypt, or Egypt decided not to want to participate right now — whatever the reason. But when they met in Mecca last week — Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan — that was symbolically, historically, and religiously significant.
Because if this was just regular government-to-government agreement, they would have signed it in Riyadh. They didn't have to go all the way to Mecca. The reason they went to Mecca is because of its spiritual significance within the Islamic world. And despite some initial criticism from some legislators in Iran, the Iranian leadership — Ghalibaf, Araqchi — embraced that pact.
While some speculated that this could have been intended to go after the Yemenis or even possibly against Iran, we've had clear evidence of Yemeni attacks on Saudi Arabia — after last September there was a bilateral agreement between the Saudis and Pakistan in which they said, "Hey, if someone attacks you, we've got your back." Well, even after Yemeni attacks on Saudi Arabia, Pakistan did not respond or involve itself at all. And then we saw renewed attacks after all three signed the agreement. In fact, Foreign Minister Fidan of Turkey has been pretty explicit about saying, "This isn't intended to go after other Muslim nations" — intimating that it has one or two targets: Israel and maybe the United States.
The Turkey-Saudi-Pakistan Pact and Its Implications for Israel
Glenn Diesen: Really? So you see this as even potentially targeting the United States? I thought that going after Iran seemed very unlikely simply because yes, the Saudis probably wouldn't mind some collective defense against Iran, but the Pakistanis — I don't see that happening, and Turkey as well has its own motivations. I thought to myself that ideally this would in the future be capable of including Iran, to make it essentially an inclusive security architecture that seeks security with its members instead of taking on bloc politics. That said, if they see the US position being weakened in the region, you don't want too much of a vacuum either. There could be an effort to allow something new to come in and fill the vacuum so you don't have instability. If this is the case — if it's something to replace a declining United States presence in the region — I wouldn't be surprised if the Iranians would welcome it. But do you think it could actually be used against Israel?
Larry Johnson: Yeah, I do, for this reason. Israel has directly threatened Turkey. They basically said, "When we're done with Iran, we're coming for you." I don't think that was an idle threat. I don't think that was just trash talking. Or at least the Turks have to take it into account as a serious threat. So now with this agreement, Turkey — which was otherwise left having to say, "Well, we're a NATO country, if we're attacked by Israel, surely Article 5 will kick in and other NATO countries will come to our aid" — looked around and realized, no, that's not going to happen at all. So we've got to secure our own support as a Muslim nation.
And so in signing this pact with Pakistan and with Saudi Arabia, Turkey gets in fact a sort of de facto nuclear capability vis-à-vis Pakistan. Pakistan has vowed to protect and to share and to defend Turkey on that front. So this has pushed things into a whole new arena.
China, Russia, and the Shifting Regional Order
Glenn Diesen: Certainly it would be a good idea for the region — you don't want to be frontline states of a declining hegemon. That's not an ideal position, and a very vulnerable one. But I did want to ask: if the United States now decides to have another go at the military option against Iran — Trump continues to threaten a big strike, going back and forth between "we're going to make a great deal" and "we're going to burn down this whole nation." If he would like to go back to the military option — I'm not saying it would make sense, but he's done it already, even after the MOU — the intentions of Trump are hard to assess, but the capabilities are easier to get a handle on. What is the ability now of the United States? We hear a lot about weapons stockpiles being depleted. Of course, Trump threatens to hunt down and jail anyone who makes this claim, which is not a source of confidence. But what is the situation now? Because this is not just affecting Iran — it's also affecting the war against Russia. And indeed, if the US has some need to fight a war that is not a war of choice but a war of necessity, it might need these weapons. What is left to fight Iran with?
Larry Johnson: That's the problem — the weapon shortage. I was picking up indications from current military people currently serving late last week that it looks like, even though they had stood down some of what were called the planning and execution cells, those were coming back online. People who thought they were going to have a long weekend off were going, "Oh my god, we're going back." So it looks like they were planning to launch new strikes. Now, today I would say that the risk of that has dissipated. It doesn't mean it can't come back quickly, but right now we're not seeing the kind of activity you'd normally see if military action were imminent.
But the US has a rare earth mineral problem. 78% of the weapons that the Department of Defense produces rely upon four specific rare earth minerals and tungsten. And it turns out that China controls those rare earth minerals and the tungsten. China has imposed restrictions on the export of those for military purposes. Which means that as much as the United States wants to build new weapons or replenish stores of existing weapon systems that have been exhausted, it can't — because China now controls the supply chain and has said, "Hey, you want to build weapons you're going to use against us? We're not suicidal. That's not going to happen." So they have shut that down.
This is the real disconnect — the United States has never secured its own supply chains. And now it's suffering the consequences. It's basically being held hostage by China.
Glenn Diesen: I'm glad you mentioned China, because if we now see the US position in the region weakened, there's no way for the US to restore its former position after all this is done. What will be the role of China and Russia? I know that both of them have tried to do a more balanced approach to the region — not to build any bloc politics. China pushed for improved relations between the Saudis and the Iranians simply so they could work with both sides with less friction. And Russia, after its military operations in Syria, sees some benefits in having that put to an end because it made their relations with a lot of the Gulf states more difficult. So now they hope to have more balance in the future — to work with both Iran and the Gulf states. Now that the US position is weakening, how do you see the Chinese and the Russians adjusting to this new environment?
Larry Johnson: Well, we've already seen Russia take a step in that direction. Yesterday — or the day before — Putin met in Moscow with Al-Jolani, formerly known as Al-Jilani, head of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, and the new president of Syria, in which the Syrians and Russians negotiated a new agreement about Russian presence and control over both naval and land bases. The meeting appeared to be quite amicable, very friendly. And Al-Jolani — who was perceived as a tool of the West, a tool of Turkey — is now branching out. He's not staying in one lane and doing only what the United States would request of him. So you've got that interesting development.
China remains strongly in Iran's camp and also with Russia. In fact, China just within the last hour or so came out with a very strong condemnation of the US government's threat to impose new tariffs on countries like China if they buy Russian oil. They're saying, "You can't do that, and if you do it, we're going to make you pay" — and they will retaliate.
So the United States is now rapidly coming up against the limits of its power by using sanctions and by thinking that via the petrodollar it can coerce these other countries. This is what China and Russia both saw clearly four years ago, right after the start of the special military operation and the imposition of additional Western sanctions — the freezing of assets, the stealing of money that was in Western banks. They realized they needed to build a system where they were insulated from that kind of pressure. And that's exactly what they've been doing.
And here is Iran now. The United States is trying to put economic pressure on it, except Iran has moved out of that sphere where it's totally dependent on US financial markets. It's buying with Chinese and Russian currency what it needs. It's accepting payment primarily in Chinese currency for goods that it's selling. Its trade relations with both Russia and China — who were on board for the JCPOA sanctions against Iran — have now firmly rejected all of that, and they're continuing to have robust economic relations with Iran. Russia comes through the Caspian Sea. China comes via the railroad through Tajikistan, air routes from China, as well as through the port in Pakistan, from which road routes run directly into Iran.
So while Scott Bessent is desperate to try to get Iran crippled economically, Iran has many more options available today than it did two years ago.
The Eurasian Alliance and Ukraine's Gamble
Glenn Diesen: Definitely. And I think that's the key mistake in both the war against Iran and Russia — that is, traditionally the interest of the maritime hegemon has been to keep the great powers on Eurasia divided. Historically, both the British and Americans wanted to keep the Germans and Russians apart to make sure that a central power wouldn't form capable of challenging the hegemon at the maritime periphery. And the same logic by Kissinger, who wanted the Soviets and the Chinese apart. But now you have these three key balancers of US power on the Eurasian continent — the Russians, the Chinese, and the Iranians — all coming closer together. It just seems like something that historians will write about for quite some time, how foolish this has been.
One country which appears to be pushing it even further has been Ukraine. For a while it looked — based on the rhetoric of Zelensky, but also his actions in terms of striking an Iranian ship and killing one of its sailors — like he might be gambling on linking the Ukraine war with the Iranian war. Yes, it would bring a lot more headaches for the Ukrainians to get on the bad side of Iran. On the other hand, if the key objective for Ukraine is to bring the United States deeper into the war, then essentially volunteering as an American proxy against Iran would be very much welcomed. And the corridor between Russia and Iran very much goes through the Caspian Sea as well, so Ukraine has some capabilities — this is the launching pad now of NATO against Russia. Do you think this will blow over, or is it still a risk that these two wars could merge into a bigger one?
Larry Johnson: In a way I'd say they've already merged — in terms of the application of US weapon systems to both theaters and the discovery that the United States has very limited weapon supply. I'm pretty sure that neither the Russians nor the Chinese anticipated that the US stockpile was so fragile, so vulnerable to being exhausted, which is in fact what has emerged. I think both the Russians and Chinese had assumed the United States had far more strategic depth than it does. So what the combination of the war in Ukraine and the war against Iran have exposed are the tremendous limitations of the United States militarily. It does not have the industrial capability that it once did — that Russia and China have — in order to replenish munitions. What has been exposed is that the United States is so vulnerable, so dependent upon China and to a lesser extent Russia, that it can't operate independently. It is a dependent power.
I think that has been one of the aspects that came as a surprise — where the two theaters integrated. But we've now seen on the Russian side that they have dramatically stepped up their offensive. They're attacking from the air with missiles, cruise missiles, drones, and bombs — hitting key targets in Kyiv and other parts of Ukraine. But now they've closed off the Black Sea and effectively blockaded Ukraine. That country's only access for key supplies will be overland through Hungary, Romania, and Poland. And frankly, that makes those shipments even more vulnerable from the Russian standpoint — using drones and short-range ballistic missiles if necessary. And then the Russians have opened up their ground offensive against Ukraine.
So in both situations — whether we're talking Ukraine or Iran — the United States doesn't have good, clear military options. There's no scenario where they can say, "We can do this and perhaps stop the Russians or stop the Iranians." In both cases they don't have any viable options. That, I think, has been the biggest shock to both the military establishment and the political leadership.
Russia's Blockade of Odessa and the End of Restraint
Glenn Diesen: On the topic of horrible miscalculations and the Russians now stepping up in a big way — it appeared that in the Kremlin there's been a lot of pressure on Putin for well over the past four and a half years to put a blockade on Ukraine, particularly on Odessa, which is so important to keeping Ukraine afloat and also extremely vulnerable. But as we know, India and other countries in the Global South put a lot of pressure on Putin not to disrupt international trade, especially the agricultural products that are very much dependent on being exported through Ukrainian ports.
And for a long time this caused a lot of frustration within Russia — why aren't you doing this? But Putin has to balance a lot of considerations. What is interesting now is that Ukraine, backed by NATO, started this massive 40-day campaign of deep strikes in Russia. I remember all our media was celebrating how Russian civilian vessels were being attacked in the Sea of Azov and in the Black Sea. Suddenly all this pressure and restraint on Putin is gone. Can you imagine the Foreign Minister of India calling Russia saying, "Oh no, don't retaliate"? No — there is no pressure anymore. And we now see this brutal response. The bombing of Kyiv is quite ruthless, and the blockade on Odessa is quite crippling — not just militarily, because they get a lot of their weapons through these ports, but also economically. This is going to be a disaster, and all of this is happening before winter comes with all the energy problems.
Now we see proposals coming out of Turkey — let's just have a ceasefire, or let's open another grain corridor, a route for the Russians and another one for the Ukrainians that we shouldn't attack. I notice there's always a call for diplomatic solutions when things are going badly for NATO. Do you think that's a possibility, because both the Ukrainians and Russians would benefit from having these routes open?
Larry Johnson: No. Russia's done being the nice guy. You know, rock musician Alice Cooper had a song — "No More Mr. Nice Guy." That'll be Russia's anthem. No more Mr. Nice Guy, no more Mr. Clean. They're not going to give Ukraine one ounce of easement. They are going to keep the pressure on with greater intensity with each passing day. They're going to destroy more and more infrastructure. They're going to make sure the power won't come on come winter.
There's a way to end this now. And frankly, the only reason they didn't move sooner against Odessa and shut down the Black Sea was because Putin's still old school with agreements — "Well, we agreed with the UN that we'd let them go." But now they've said, "No, we're done being the nice guy." And I think it's a threat that has terrified the Ukrainians. Because now they've genuinely lost a major outlet for both moving stolen money overseas and receiving foreign aid and weapon systems, as well as food from abroad. This is a game-changer.
Escalation Dominance and the Hardening of Iran and Russia
Glenn Diesen: If I was sitting in the Kremlin, my main worry after these four and a half years would have been the escalation dominance handed over effectively to NATO — that they can seemingly escalate without any retaliation from Russia. NATO obviously doesn't fear Russia now. And escalation dominance in terms of suddenly the suggestion is, "Okay, let's just do a 40-day campaign against Russia, bomb civilian targets in the deep rear every day." We look in the media and there's celebration that another Wildberries warehouse has been blown up. And then of course Russian retaliation begins, things go badly, and suddenly we hear, "Yeah, diplomacy — let's put an end to it. It didn't work out the way we wanted."
If the Russians accept this, they're essentially telling NATO and Ukraine, "Okay, you can escalate when you want, and then you can decide when we de-escalate." If you hand over this power to your opponent, why would they have any restraint? And I think the Iranians have reached the same conclusion — why should the Americans decide when we escalate and when we de-escalate? Do you think this is kind of the calculation? Because there's something changing in both Iran and Russia.
Larry Johnson: Yeah, in fact you can make the case that the harder-line elements are now driving the policy. Lavrov has been scathing in his criticism of the United States. Militarily, they're going to crush Ukraine. And they've warned the Americans: "Stay out. You get out of Kyiv. If you stick around Kyiv, you're potentially going to die."
And the same thing you're seeing with Iran — Rezaee, the major general, was one of the first and very youthful commanders of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard command back in 1981 and '82. He's quite firm about it: "We're not just going to negotiate for negotiation's sake, and if we negotiate, there better be concrete terms delivered by the United States, or we're wasting our time." And that's where Iran is now. They're ready for a fight if it comes. They're ready to negotiate if the United States is serious. But so far they've seen no indication that the United States is serious.
Trump's Midterm Calculations and the Economic Endgame
Glenn Diesen: I guess it's a problem also on the European part — they never talk about peace, they talk about defeating Russia, and that is essentially the new peace. But for the United States, do you see any new efforts to negotiate? Because the Europeans really wanted to shut down the whole talks after Anchorage, and they were selling the point very hard to Trump that we should change the battlefield — essentially, embrace your inner Biden, weaken the Russians, then we can get a better deal. That's how you pull the US deeper into this war. And it seems Trump bought into it — the whole media campaign. You even saw Marco Rubio arguing that the deep strikes in Russia have changed things and maybe Russia will be more flexible in the future.
Well, now that Ukraine is being devastated by this new ruthless Russian campaign, we suddenly hear that perhaps we should restart talks with the Russians again. It's time, apparently. How do you think the Russians will meet them this time? Because from what I get out of Moscow, they view all of the talks in Anchorage as about as serious as the MOU with Iran was — just nonsense, not actual diplomacy, just tactics.
Larry Johnson: There are reports out of Pakistan saying that the US and Iran have come to some kind of agreement. Okay, we'll see. I've heard that before, and it turns out to be a nothing burger. The sacrifices and concessions that Trump would have to make to get a deal with Iran are, in my view, too onerous, too costly to him — and for another reason, his own pride — that he'd find it very difficult to do that. But that's not to say that he won't do it.
I think one of the other elements — and we touched on it earlier — is the global economic picture. It's worsening. And as it worsens, the US prospects get worse. Trump's got an eye on the midterms that are coming up two and a half months away and can't afford to have an economic blowtorch going off in the United States, burning everything to the ground. But candidly, that potential sits there and I think has the White House and the Secretary of the Treasury worried about it.
So meanwhile, both in Russia and in Iran, the hardline voices are the ones being heard — not those who advocate some sort of concession or a go-slow approach. No concession. Drive it home. Deliver the victory.
Glenn Diesen: I keep seeing journalists being so surprised that the Iranians seem so hardline now. You would have thought they would have been more accommodating after all this bombing. You see the same rhetoric against Russia — "Oh, it doesn't look like Russia wants peace, look how brutally they're responding." It's as if they bought into their own propaganda — that if we just do enough deep strikes into Russia, somehow they will be more accommodating rather than less.
And I don't think they appreciate that all the talk about Iran being controlled by mullah radicals, or Putin being a dictator — I don't think they appreciate the internal dynamics in these states. As you suggest, the hawks, the ones who want more hardline policies against the US and the West, are being proven right over and over again. This is aggression. There's no diplomatic path. It's all deceit. The only thing that will bring peace is victory and humiliating the opponent. It's a horrible signal to send, but it seems that's what we're doing at the moment. Do you have any final thoughts before we finish off?
Larry Johnson: Just keep an eye on the economic news. I think that's really where the action's going to be — it'll either motivate a quick decision or lead to a renewed escalation in the fighting.