Fyodor Lukyanov discusses Russia's strategic position as the global order fragments
Glenn Diesen interviews Fyodor Lukyanov, editor-in-chief of Russia in Global Affairs journal and chairman of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy.
Summary
Fyodor Lukyanov, editor-in-chief of Russia in Global Affairs and chairman of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, joins Glenn Diesen to assess the trajectory of the Ukraine war, European strategic behavior, the Iran conflict, and the collapse of the post-Cold War international order. He argues that the Anchorage summit between Putin and Trump one year ago produced false optimism, and that the subsequent Ukrainian and European strategy of escalation has pushed any diplomatic settlement further away rather than closer. He contends that European leaders have made permanent confrontation with Russia the organizing principle of EU unity, a posture he finds cynically rational but strategically self-defeating on the world stage. On Iran, he argues the conflict demonstrates that a smaller power can effectively resist a vastly stronger aggressor, a lesson he sees as significant for Russia and for the broader reshaping of global order. He also argues that the simultaneous conflicts in Ukraine, the Middle East, and potentially East Asia reflect a single underlying global contest — something he likens to a new kind of world war fought in a diversified rather than frontal manner. He closes with a sobering assessment that no new institutional framework — including the United Nations — is likely to emerge to replace what is being destroyed, and that he does not expect to see a stable new world order within his professional lifetime.
Key Takeaways
FULL TRANSCRIPT
Introduction
Glenn Diesen: Welcome back. Today we're joined by Fyodor Lukyanov, the editor-in-chief of Russia in Global Affairs journal, and also the chairman of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, as well as a research professor at the Higher School of Economics. Thank you for coming back on the program.
Fyodor Lukyanov: Thank you very much for inviting me. Hi, Glenn.
The Ukraine War One Year After Anchorage
Glenn Diesen: I've been wanting to ask you about both the Ukraine war and the Iran war — how the world looks from Russia, and how the Iran war in particular affects Russia. But I thought a good place to start would be the Ukraine war, as this war has changed a lot over the past four and a half years: how it's been fought, the degree to which different participants have been involved, and the participants themselves have changed. The positions of European leaders and Russia are especially hardening, and there's more willingness to take risks. Where do you see this war heading now, because it seems to be escalating?
Fyodor Lukyanov: First of all, as we speak today, it is one day before the anniversary of the so-called Anchorage meeting — the Alaska summit between Putin and Trump — which produced a lot of hopes and, I would even say, exaltation about the possibility of stopping this war and achieving a diplomatic and political solution. So, a year after that conversation, we see that it failed. Basically, it did not produce anything like an end to hostilities. More than that, the result of that attempt was actually the conclusion, on the side of Ukraine and Europe — which supports Ukraine now one hundred percent and is de facto part of this military confrontation — that there should be escalation in order to convince the American side, President Trump in particular, that his idea, his conclusion at that time — that Ukraine is bound to lose this war and therefore should compromise as quickly as possible and give up Donbas and fulfill Russia's minimal demands — was wrong. The goal was to convince him that Ukraine is able to resist and even to win, maybe.
What we saw during all this year, especially starting from this spring, is a steady escalation on the Ukrainian side supported by Europeans. At this point they partially succeeded. They managed not to change the mind of President Trump, but at least to influence it, because I think Trump's position at this point is: okay, if they can fight, let them fight. It's not that he suddenly decided to support Ukraine — certainly not. He is simply indifferent. But if they can, why not? Let them try.
Coming back to your question — what we see now is escalation on the Ukrainian side, which started because of the increased ability to deliver long-range strikes deep into Russian territory. This escalation produced another escalation by the Russian side. We see now that Russia is delivering strikes which Russia did not want to deliver before — targeting critical infrastructure in Ukraine on a massive scale. And of course Russia suffers as well, because as I said, Ukraine's ability is quite strong now. But what does it mean for the course of this war? I'm afraid we are now much further from a political solution and from any kind of ceasefire than we were a year ago when Anchorage was in place.
Glenn Diesen: What have I heard about Anchorage? Again, we don't know exactly what the deal was, but it was mainly based on an American proposal. Donbas obviously had to go to Russia, but there were rumors that in terms of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, this could end up just freezing the front lines where they were. The text was never revealed. There were Americans who proposed it, but also Americans who eventually walked away. And now we see this idea that if they just do some deep strikes into Russia, they put pressure on Russian society and thus also the Kremlin, so Russia would be more flexible and make more concessions. But it's unclear to me what they actually want Russia to do — besides accepting the idea of an unconditional ceasefire, which seems like it would be a non-starter. So what are the possible paths now, in your opinion, to put an end to this war through diplomacy? Or are those paths exhausted?
Fyodor Lukyanov: Maybe not exhausted. Sooner or later there will be some kind of path to diplomacy, to political negotiations, and then a settlement. But if we recall the Anchorage meeting again, I think many of us — including myself — were too optimistic, while we forgot that this kind of conflict cannot be ended just in one serious, one important meeting. Remember Vietnam. Remember that after the moment when the American administration made the decision that there should be an end to that war, negotiations took years — not just months. From 1968 to 1973, 1974, until 1975. I hope very much that that is not the model for the Ukrainian conflict. But to expect that such controversies can be settled in one meeting — that was absolutely unrealistic.
As far as the current trajectory is concerned, I think that for the next immediate period — maybe the next month or couple of months to come — we should not expect anything but increasing fighting and sharpening escalation. Unfortunately, on the Ukrainian side there is a very clear understanding that they will be able to keep going as long as they sustain this war through engagement with Europeans — ideally with Americans, but at least with Europeans — against Russia. And this, from my point of view, is the basis, the foundation, for the whole political machinery of this war.
Paradoxically, in the case of Ukraine, I can even understand it. I have absolutely zero sympathies with them, but I understand that it might be rational for Zelensky and the whole team. What looks to me less rational is the behavior of Europeans, because they have voluntarily made Ukraine and the war with Russia the core of the whole idea of the newly emerging European Union. So it should be permanent confrontation with Russia, based on Ukraine's capacity to fight and European capacity to support that fight financially and technically — maybe indefinitely.
Europeans are certainly not eager to get engaged directly in this war. I hope so. But at the same time, when I hear some statements from European politicians — in particular from German politicians — I doubt. Maybe they are preparing for a real war as well. I don't know. Hopefully not. But nothing is sure anymore.
European unity, from my point of view, at this point is very much based on the existence of the Russian threat — which is no longer a general one. This is a very concrete one. And they try to present it to the public as an immediate, looming threat of a direct attack by Putin against Europe, against the European part of NATO. That means this logic — the longer we support Ukraine, the longer Putin is occupied with this and probably will not attack us — is very much widespread.
At the end of the day, what we have is a situation where neither Kyiv nor European capitals — in particular Brussels — are interested in anything but a continued, protracted war. Which of course, no doubt about it, creates an increasing amount of problems for Russia. It would be stupid to deny that Russia is not happy to continue this war. But there is no path being offered to try to negotiate seriously. Because whatever European politicians are saying now — some of them, like Finland's president or some other politicians from not the biggest countries in Europe, start to at least mention the idea that probably we need to have negotiations with Russia — but again, what kind of negotiations? They mean that Russia should engage in diplomatic talks with Europeans about how Russia will give up. And unfortunately, that is a non-starter.
European Obstruction and the Logic of Confrontation
Glenn Diesen: Yeah, this is interesting — there's no talk about peace, only defeating Russia. I find this interesting especially coming from the Germans. But what you're saying is what I also hear from American sources, which is that the European leaders have become the main obstruction to any settlement. Not only have they boycotted diplomacy for the past four and a half years, but the only path to peace they envision is an unconditional ceasefire — which they're quite open they would use to replenish Ukrainian troops, possibly send in their own as peacekeepers. They don't want to take NATO expansion off the table, which means there's no foundation for peace. American sources also make the point that the Europeans are fueling Zelensky's maximalist demands. And there are comments about what happened when Trump opened up diplomacy with the Russians — that was essentially panic. They all boarded flights to Washington and tried to convince Trump that the only peace that can work is a ceasefire, that you can't trust anything the Russians say, and that you should try to bomb the Russians a little bit first to pressure them into a better deal. So essentially for Trump to do what Biden did.
But it's hard to understand this position from the Europeans. Is it only that their unity has become completely dependent on a Russian threat? Or is it a reluctance to reconsider the European security architecture? I can understand the Russian position — they see this as an existential threat. I think the Ukrainians also reasonably see this as an existential threat. But for the Europeans, I don't really get it. The Americans want to either outsource the war to the Europeans or put an end to it so they can focus elsewhere — that also makes sense. But the European position I struggle with. Is it only this aspect — that they need Russia for unity?
Fyodor Lukyanov: As a person banned from entering the European Union, I cannot feel the atmosphere there, but looking from the outside I would say there are two reasons. One reason we already discussed — this necessity to have something which unifies. To some extent, Europeans tried to reconstitute the model of the Cold War, when the Soviet threat — which was real — created a very strong impetus for European integration. I think Stalin and other Soviet leaders after him should be awarded something like a Charlemagne Prize for contributing to European unity. So now I think Europeans are trying to get something like that again.
The difference is that the Soviet Union was part of a global confrontation, and Europe was the centerpiece of that confrontation. In that regard, I don't believe that the Soviet Union at any point in its history really wanted to invade Western Europe — of course — but at least strategically it was reasonable to believe that some kind of war which would devastate Europe could happen between the Soviet Union and the United States on European soil. Whereas now, the whole reasoning around the Russian threat is very much contradictory. On the one hand, Russia is being presented as an extremely weak, declining power which cannot even defeat Ukraine. At the same time, Russia is a terrible threat which will invade Europe immediately after Ukraine, or maybe even during the Ukrainian conflict. That is really absolutely absurd. But anyway — this is the internal reason.
The external reason I would suggest is a little bit more complicated. Looking at the international constellation today, and especially in the years to come, we can assume that the role of Europe will decline objectively. It's not about liking or disliking Europe — it is objectively the case that the general international situation is changing towards something completely different from what it was in the twentieth century or the beginning of the twenty-first century, when Europe played a significant role internationally, geopolitically, and economically above all. And there are no obvious means, no obvious ways, by which Europe could be able to reverse this trend.
The only issue where Europeans can demonstrate — or at least pretend to — a big international role is confrontation with Russia. Confrontation with Russia which is being fueled through the Ukrainian conflict. If the calculation is such, I can understand it cynically, maybe. I think it would especially reflect the possible approach of the United Kingdom, because after the British Empire collapsed and the UK became little England — as we remember from that syndrome in the 1960s and 1970s — they managed to find ways to imitate an international role: with Europeans, with Americans, with the former empire, and so on. They are very skillful at that. And now I think Europeans at large are in fact trying to repeat these British tactics. Whether they will be successful or not, I doubt — for one reason. Whatever Europeans do, European politicians might be successful — I doubt it, but they might be — in convincing their own public of the terrible Russian threat. But globally, at the world stage in general, the Ukrainian conflict and the confrontation between Europe and Russia is not something that actually interests the great majority of people in the world. They see it as another strange conflict between those white former colonial powers. Okay, let them do what they want there. It's not a global game. It's not a big game. It's actually a very much local game. And while Europeans believe that through this they might return to a central position in international affairs, they will not. It's impossible.
Russia's Hardening Position and the Global Reshuffle
Glenn Diesen: Well, the idea of going back to the Cold War as almost a golden era for the political West in terms of unity — there are two problems with that. First, the Soviet Union isn't there and doesn't pose the same kind of threat as the Russian Federation would. But second, in this multipolar world, not only are the Russians shifting focus to the east, but the Americans as well. I think this is the first time in US history when Europe is not at the top of the priorities in terms of foreign partners. So it's going to be hard to convince the Americans to devote their resources when they're in relative decline and need to focus on East Asia and the Western Hemisphere.
I did want to ask about your feel in Moscow regarding Russia's position hardening. Over the past four and a half years we've seen NATO's deepening involvement — especially the Europeans are more open about this, though the Americans are still also very much involved. But there's a sense that Russia's deterrence has been weakening. One gets the impression sometimes that they've reached the conclusion in Moscow that restraint is now dangerous — that it's dangerous appeasement of NATO, given that NATO no longer fears Russia as it did before. So it's time to harden the position against the NATO countries, especially the Europeans. Do you see any of this thinking? Does it manifest itself beyond rhetoric? Do you see any actions shifting?
Fyodor Lukyanov: Yes, you're right. To be very frank, if we would imagine that the war ends now, stops now, and the freezing is according to the current configuration — both on the battlefield and geopolitically in Europe at large — then it will be a failure for Russia. Because it's no big secret that compared to the situation in, say, 2021, the strategic landscape in Europe has changed significantly and not to Russia's favor. That's obvious. NATO has been revitalized, new member states joined, and Ukraine became de facto part of NATO. They basically don't need formal membership anymore. So I think people in Moscow are realistic about that — symbolically it's important, but in real terms not anymore.
So we are in the middle of a very profound reshuffle of the whole European security situation. I would even say Eurasian security situation. We should not make a distinction between Europe and the rest of Eurasia anymore, because at the end of the day the conflicts we see now — be it in Ukraine, be it around Iran, be it theoretically and hypothetically in East Asia around Taiwan or wherever a conflict might erupt — each of those spots is very much different. They have their own genesis, history, and reasons. But at the end of the day it doesn't matter, because in a way the actors are the same. If we think that the actors are the West — which is trying to revive its dominance in the world — and the rest, which includes Iran, Russia, China, in very different ways — there is no comparison between Russia and China, between China and Iran, between Russia and Iran, and many other countries. But to put it in a more global picture: I hate this notion, but there is something in it when people talk about a third world war being fought in a diversified way. It's not the frontal collision of the biggest powers as in the twentieth century, but something else — and also a world war, a new one.
That means — coming back to your question — if we look at this from this perspective, then the decision to launch the special military operation four and a half years ago can be seen differently than it looked at the beginning. At the beginning, many people, including myself, did doubt whether it was necessary, whether it was so imminent, whether we could have done things differently. And I still believe that many things which happened at that time should be carefully studied afterwards, so as not to repeat mistakes made by all sides, including the Russian side. But having said that, now as we see this is part of a global reshuffle conducted by very violent means, without any rules of the game — from this point of view, Russia's task is to strengthen its position by all possible means available. And it is not about defeating Ukraine or even defeating Europe. It's about the future positioning of Russia on the international stage.
Whether we are successful or not, I cannot answer yet. Unfortunately, it's a very long and very hard struggle. But now, as an initial skeptic, I see much more reason in what started in 2022. I think that now we might be dissatisfied with how the situation in Europe has changed, but we shouldn't look at this through European lenses only. This is an element of a very large international reshuffle, and the whole reshuffle — not just the European part — will have an impact on Russian interests. Russia should demonstrate, first of all, its resilience, and secondly, its strength.
Glenn Diesen: Well, if you would have argued a few years ago about how a world war would start, you would look at the distribution of power. What defines our era is the decline of US hegemony. You would then expect the most predictable conflict to come from the US trying to protect its hegemonic position by pushing back on rival powers. That means an economic war on China, a proxy war against Russia, possibly a direct war against Iran. Well, we're kind of seeing all of this, and then we see some of these wars merging a little bit. It looked for a short time that Zelensky might look to merge the Ukraine war with the Iran war. We see NATO involved in attacks on civilian infrastructure in Russia. Freedom of navigation is shutting down. We see North Koreans fighting in Europe. Only recently Putin was near Japan — he shows up in the southern Kuril Islands and the Japanese are upset. And of course with the war on Iran, almost all the countries in the Middle East are somehow involved. So it does look like a world war, if you assume how it would begin and how it would play out. It's more or less following the script, it seems. That's the source of concern, of course.
The Iran War and Its Consequences for Russia
Glenn Diesen: I did want to pivot a bit towards Iran. The Iran war obviously diverted much of the American focus and military assets away from not just Europe but East Asia, towards the Middle East. Instead of being used against Russia, those assets are being used against Iran — so this has one impact I would put in the column of advantage for Russia. However, I don't want to oversimplify either. How do you see the consequences of this war in Iran for Russia, especially the long-term consequences? When this is over, the world will not look the same.
Fyodor Lukyanov: First of all, beyond the immediate impact you mentioned — that the United States is very much occupied with this conflict and has started to count what it can give Ukrainians, what it can sell to other countries, whether it has enough ammunition and so on — that's obvious, but I would guess that's a pretty much short-term issue. I trust the American military-industrial complex. They will make big efforts to catch up, and they will just use this to get more work and more money.
In a long-term perspective, that's an interesting question. Iran is a very close partner of Russia, but I wouldn't say it is an ally, because Iran has a very special way of conducting foreign policy — very concrete interests which are not necessarily the same as Russian interests, or which operate at different levels and in different areas.
I guess that the main lesson from Iran is that a country which is by far weaker than the opponent, than the aggressor, can effectively resist and deliver significant harm if it is committed to an immediate and inevitable response. We see that whatever Trump is saying — and he has said so many things starting from the first day of this war, and he has declared victory I don't know how many times, maybe fifty or something — he cannot achieve what he wants, still now. And Iran, which in terms of military capacity is absolutely no comparison to the US plus Israel, they cannot do anything to Iran — at least not now. I think Iran will suffer enormous problems and damages anyway, but at this point this is a war of survival and they are fighting it and winning it so far.
And of course, for any big power including Russia, this is a lesson to learn: you cannot expect an easy — or even a difficult — military win over a country, a power which is much smaller than you, by default. Maybe even more so in the contemporary world, with all those very complicated new ways of warfare. It probably favors smaller states despite the discrepancy and imbalance in military force.
Whether Americans at the end of the day will succeed or not, I don't know. The political price paid by Trump is huge — in terms of how much this non-victory has catalyzed other countries' desire to be prepared for this kind of pressure and to resist in the same effective way as Iran does. I think that's a big thing. That's something which will make a greater impact in the years to come. The Iranian war demonstrated that you are absolutely not bound to fail if you are attacked by a much stronger enemy. And I think that's a very important lesson.
In concrete terms, what does it mean for Russia? I think that if Iran survives and continues as a strengthened part of the geopolitics in the Middle East, Russia will be able to use its special ties with Iran to regain some influence in the region — which Russia of course partially lost during the Ukrainian war because of concentration on a different issue. And the support which Russia gave to Iran — I think Iranians are not easy counterparts, but they remember good things which were done to them, as well as they remember bad things very much.
The Collapse of the International Order
Glenn Diesen: Sounds about right. Well, as we see the old system dying off — the hegemonic order which manifested itself in NATO expansion — this is being balanced. You see the US being balanced in the Middle East. But as the distribution of power shifts, you would have hoped that some of the rules would remain even though institutions would have to change. But it seems that nothing is being preserved. As you suggested before, the rules and the institutions that everyone essentially benefited from — it's all being burned down. International law, freedom of navigation, not stealing sovereign assets, the informal rules of proxy wars, basic diplomacy — all of this is going away.
Sometimes I think of Friedrich Nietzsche, because he always made the point that for something new to be created, the old must die first. But if the old dies and nothing replaces it, you essentially have anarchy. And that's kind of where we seem to be drifting now. Do you see any potential to replace what is being lost? If we look towards Europe, for instance — since the end of the Cold War and especially after the Soviet Union dissolved, the Russians were pushing hard for a common European security architecture: first with the OSCE, then Yeltsin and Putin suggesting they could join NATO, in 2008 there was a proposal for a pan-European security architecture, later Putin suggested a Euro-Russia union. Well, all the goals of a common European home, if you will, are now more or less out the window. Do you see any institutional framework or something that can reorganize the world as everything is falling apart?
Fyodor Lukyanov: I'm afraid not. I don't see it. When it comes to Europe, we should probably, as scholars and commentators, dedicate a lot of our efforts and time to studying what happened after the end of the Cold War — analytically understanding why it failed. Because unfortunately at this point we are very much emotional on both sides about this period. Sooner or later the time should come to carefully study what happened. But whatever conclusion those studies arrive at, I don't think that period can be used as a model for anything in the future, because that was a very unique moment in history and that moment will never come again. It's done.
To what extent can we expect a new framework to emerge in Europe? Probably not. Because at this point we can only conclude that the hatred and confrontational mood between Russia and the rest of Europe is enormous. And I simply don't see from which ground anything can rise that would be a prototype for a new agreement or framework.
We know from history that European orders emerge after big wars — otherwise it's absolutely senseless to try. No one will follow rules. Whether we will need a big war again — I hope not, simply for one reason: the European framework is in fact much less important than it used to be in history, because Europe is much less important than it used to be in history. And the new constellation should emerge globally, not locally.
Whether it can emerge globally — sooner or later, probably yes, but rather later than sooner. And what we see now — I read yesterday, I think it was in the Financial Times, an interview with the person who wants to become the next Secretary-General of the United Nations, and he directly said that the United Nations is slowly dying. And I think he is unfortunately right. Because what we discussed for quite a long time — starting from the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the twenty-first century — was that we need to change some procedures, some forms inside the UN to make it efficient again, to keep the idea, to keep the UN Charter, and then to change some procedures to catch up with efficiency. I'm afraid that now the mood is slowly changing towards something else. It's not about procedures — it's about the essence. The essence of the UN Charter, the UN idea, might be outdated, obsolete. It sounds terrible. I'm not happy to say it, but I'm afraid we are already there. It's the beginning of the realization that all the institutions, including the UN, cannot be seen as a framework for the next world order or the next world institutions.
Whether and when we will arrive at a new constellation — when the UN might be preserved but changed, not formally but essentially — I frankly don't know. At my age, and I'm almost sixty, I don't expect to see it in my active professional life.
Glenn Diesen: I was going to say that was a depressing way to end this.
Fyodor Lukyanov: I'm sorry.
Glenn Diesen: Well, hopefully you're totally wrong.
Fyodor Lukyanov: Hopefully I'm totally wrong.
Glenn Diesen: Yeah. Hopefully. I suspect you're right, though. It's hard to imagine, as you said, such a shift in world order — from a hegemonic system, not even towards a multipolar but towards something we haven't really seen before: a global multipolar one where the leading power will likely be China, which isn't even a Western country. It's something we haven't really seen before. The idea that politicians can adjust to such a new order and institutionalize it without a great war — there's not much historical precedent for this. Usually we do need a big war before countries are ready to sit down and reorganize the world. And I don't see it happening, at least not when we can't even pick up the phone and talk to each other. It looks very grim. Anyways, thank you so much. I know you're on holiday, so I'm sorry to disturb you, but I appreciate you taking the time.
Fyodor Lukyanov: Thank you very much, Glenn. Bye-bye.