Pepe Escobar discusses the Iran-US memorandum of understanding and the rise of Greater Eurasia
Glenn Diesen interviews journalist and author Pepe Escobar on the emerging Iran-US diplomatic agreement and its broader geopolitical implications.
Summary
Glenn Diesen interviews Pepe Escobar about the memorandum of understanding (MOU) being negotiated between the United States and Iran, drawing on direct access to the Pakistani mediators at the negotiating table. Escobar reveals that Iran threatened direct strikes on Israel over the bombing of Dahiyeh in southern Beirut, which he argues was the final pressure that pushed the White House to announce the MOU on June 14th. He argues that the agreement represents a major strategic defeat for the US and Israel, which Trump is attempting to sell domestically as a victory by claiming credit for restoring oil flow through the Strait of Hormuz. Escobar also details Pakistan's pivotal and largely unexpected role as mediator, backed by China, and argues this signals a broader reorganisation of West Asian geopolitics — including the potential erosion of the petrodollar alliance between the US and the Gulf states. Both speakers assess that the US is being incrementally expelled from Eurasia, with profound consequences for the AI race, the petrodollar system, and the broader contest with China.
Key Takeaways
FULL TRANSCRIPT
Introduction and the Memorandum of Understanding
Glenn Diesen: Welcome back. We are joined again by Pepe Escobar, a prolific author and journalist, to discuss the memorandum of understanding which is supposed to be signed on Friday between the United States and Iran. Thank you for coming on.
Pepe Escobar: Always a pleasure to be here again with you.
Glenn Diesen: Well, thanks again. There's a lot to discuss here. A good place to start would be all the secrecy around this memorandum of understanding. The Iranians have made some of the information available, while the Americans seem to be not showing their cards at this point. So why the secrecy, and what do we actually know about what's in this memorandum of understanding?
Pepe Escobar: Okay. I broke this before, but now I'm breaking it to you and your audience. Larry Johnson and I have direct access to the negotiating table via the Pakistani mediators. This has been going on for a few weeks now.
A few weeks ago — three weeks ago — Larry and I broke two stories back-to-back. The first was a crucial phone call by Pezeshkian to Shahbaz Sharif, Prime Minister of Pakistan. Basically, it was a sort of ultimatum to the Americans: "Behave. And if you keep overstepping all the thresholds — and some of them you know very well — we're going to have to do a demonstration." And you can imagine what sort of demonstration that would be. No more nuclear ambiguity. The Americans read that and were very, very angry.
Three days later, we broke another story about the Islamabad Accord. It was practically — I wouldn't say signed, sealed, delivered — but it was about to be signed. One of our American sources confirmed to us that Trump had a similar deal in front of him ready to be signed six times, and he always backed off.
This breaking news explained how the memorandum was being articulated, and this came from the Pakistanis who were at the table — the actual negotiators. Three days later, our channel was erased from YouTube by a direct order of the US government. It was the kind of phone call that goes straight to Google: yank these people off. So now we are back with a very small channel picking up what we managed to build in three weeks. It's called Transition Protocol. The difference with the countless other channels on YouTube is that we have our intel directly from people who are actually bridging gaps with the intel. So it's not only the Pakistani mediators between Iran and the US, but this can be confirmed with sources in the US and also with sources in Iran, Russia, and China — or at least people in China who have access to privileged information.
The Israeli Attack on Dahiyeh and the Final Push for the MOU
Pepe Escobar: What we knew this weekend was essential, and this is something we were discussing earlier this week. Abbas Araghchi was in Islamabad throughout the weekend. He flew from Tehran specially to Islamabad to discuss the finer points and the final points of the MOU. Then there was the Israeli attack on Dahiyeh, the Shiite suburb south of Beirut. The Iranians, via the Pakistanis — and they were actually in Islamabad together discussing — Araghchi told the Pakistanis, "Look, send a warning to the Americans now. If Israel doesn't stop doing what they're doing against Dahiyeh and against the rest of Lebanon, we are ready — we have our fingers on the trigger literally now — against Israel."
The response from the White House this time was practically immediate. And we were told they would sign the MOU and, obviously, tell the Israelis to back off. So this is what was happening on Sunday night. That's why there was the announcement on Trump's birthday, June 14th — the day of that absolutely ghastly series of cage matches on the White House lawn, which passes for a cultural exhibition in the minds of the Trumpists. That's why we had the announcement by the US on June 14th about the MOU.
And obviously, immediately afterwards, you can imagine the crossfire all across the Beltway — the despair from the Zionist International, the Neocon International, the military-industrial complex, everybody — about the MOU. But of course, no details. Even the claim that Trump and Vance had already electronically signed the MOU — we have not seen evidence of that anywhere.
On the Iranian side, it's a much more complex and sophisticated process. It's not Ayatollah Khamenei, the leader, who is giving the green light for the MOU. He delegated the final decision to the Supreme National Security Council — 13 members, only two of them so-called reformists, including President Pezeshkian, and the others much more hardcore. Basically, Khamenei instructed them: "If you reach a solid majority among yourselves — the 13 — if you have, say, 9, 10, 11 — you are authorized to sign the MOU." That's why we don't have, as of today — Wednesday — an official confirmation from Tehran that Tehran has already signed the MOU. So probably it's going to be left to the last minute in Geneva on Friday, with probably Ghalibaf himself signing in Geneva. This is where we are at the moment.
As you can see, the back and forth is absolutely frantic, but the Iranians are keeping their cool, as they did throughout the past two weeks. They made it clear to the Americans that they are not in a hurry. They exasperated Trump to the point where he was completely out of himself. And when they saw that there was a possibility of signing — and they were ready to sign, which was Sunday — there was the Israeli incident. And then, once again, they sent the message: "It's up to you, because Lebanon is part of the MOU, and you know it. We have been negotiating about it for weeks. If Israel interferes with it, we are going after Israel ourselves now." So this was the last straw that convinced the Americans to actually play the game.
But we all know we don't know what this is going to lead to from now on. This is nothing. This is just a promise to start talking.
Trump's Narrative Strategy and the Question of Defeat
Glenn Diesen: Yeah, that's a great point. It is often portrayed as a deal, as if it will bring peace, but it would usher in two months of negotiations. I'm curious about one of the main things that could derail this whole thing. It's very difficult in the US for Trump to sell to his people even the start of a ceasefire — especially when it was based on the premise of the Iranians' 10-point plan as a point of departure. As soon as the ceasefire was in place, Trump walked that back because there was no way for him to show this to his own people as anything other than a defeat.
How about this memorandum of understanding? The peace that Trump is speaking of, which sounds like a victory, is very different from reality. At some point, the actual text will have to come out, and it's going to be very hard for Trump to be the strong man — the one who mocked Obama for the JCPOA — when by every metric this is a huge setback for the US. None of his objectives have been achieved, and the Iranians will definitely come out on top in a big way. So how can Trump go to his hawks and essentially say the war was a massive failure — that they bled out their inventory, they're in a much weaker position now than before, and the Iranians will be significantly strengthened? He's been describing this war as a big success ever since day one.
Pepe Escobar: He does that by twisting narratives. By inventing narratives. By forgetting previous narratives. By even forgetting what he said before he changed the narrative. That's his modus operandi.
There are three stages for him to declare this a victory. He's basically saying that oil will start to flow again through the Strait of Hormuz on Friday — which was the situation three months before he started the war on February 28th. So he's selling this as a victory: "Now we have no problems with the oil anymore. The oil markets are satisfied. The bond markets are satisfied. Thanks to me." He said that yesterday again in Évian, not far from where I am. He actually said, "I ended 10 wars." No, it's not a joke. He actually said that in front of everybody, including the guests. It's absolutely fascinating that there are four BRICS nations at the G7 as guests — India, Brazil, Egypt, and the UAE. The G7 are desperate. They need to invite the BRICS to their summit, otherwise they'd be even more irrelevant than they already are.
Anyway, he also said, "I am the boss." And there was no irony. He entered the room, everybody was looking at him, and he said, "I am the boss." And they laughed nervously because they know he is the boss.
So what is the boss selling? Number one: I liberated the free flow of oil in the Strait of Hormuz — which is something we all had before the war. Number two: the oil markets and bond markets are going back to normal. Mission accomplished — even without climbing on top of an aircraft carrier like George W. Bush. Number three, and most importantly: he's playing for time. Nobody knows exactly for what, but essentially to rearm the US, because the war can be resumed anytime after the midterms. There will be no resumption of war before the midterms. He wants to do damage control on his political capital in the run-up to the midterms so he can sell this as a victory.
The real nitty-gritty is not now. The real nitty-gritty will start in the second stage after the MOU. The first stage is the first 30 days. Then negotiations begin over a period established as 60 days, possibly extended. So this will be around late July, early August. Then we're going to have August and September with these discussions going all over the place, and it's going to be very acrimonious. But he can always sell that: "Look, we want peace, and Iran doesn't want peace. They don't want to sign anything." He is absolutely convinced he can sell that to domestic public opinion as a victory and cut some of his losses in the midterms.
But the big picture — which is something that you and I and many others study — the big war in Eurasia or against Eurasia — it's not going to change. It's going to be slowed down a little bit. Because obviously this is a massive strategic defeat of the US and Israel against Iran. You cannot disguise that. You can only sell this as a victory to absolute imbeciles. But he's going to try very, very hard. And a lot of people, even inside the US, won't be convinced. The Zionists and the military-industrial complex are already in total fury against it.
But playing for time in the next two, three, four months suits him very well. The Iranians have no illusions about it. Everybody from Ghalibaf to the IRGC commanders is saying, "Look, we're paying attention to every move. And if they try anything, we have our finger on the trigger." Which is absolutely correct. They haven't changed their position.
If in the first 30 days of the MOU — and probably in the first part of the 60-day negotiation — they get some sanctions relief, they actually get the $12 billion which is supposed to be paid in the next few days out of a total of $24 billion, they get some extra money from Qatar, from the UAE — they already got $2 billion from the UAE. That famous Emirati flight that landed in Tehran was carrying $2 billion in cash, organized by the Pakistanis, who were the middlemen between Abu Dhabi and Tehran. If they can get these funds, and of course the end of the American blockade of Hormuz, and they continue to sell to their Asian clients — for Iran, in the short term, excellent. Much better than it was until today. But they have no illusions long-term, and no illusions about the negotiations.
Iran's Red Lines and the Lebanon Question
Glenn Diesen: So this is a problem for the United States. Again, if it's buying time — a strategic pause to prepare for war — the problem is that even after a pause, they still don't have a viable war plan for how to defeat the Iranians. They couldn't do it the first time around.
But I find it interesting that the Iranians demanded that even this buying of time — if the US can restart the war later — at least they have to kick in this money now at the beginning to essentially buy themselves two months. But even this memorandum of understanding, this two months of peace which might drag on — how would the Israelis respond to this? Because as you said, the Iranians are very clear that they consider Lebanon to be part of this. They're not going to have a peace deal which essentially allows Israel and the United States to finish off Lebanon and then return to war with Iran later. They know the sequencing the other side would ideally have. So how will Trump control the Israelis here? Because I'm following some of the Israeli media, and neither the political class nor the media seem very happy about the idea that they have to walk back from Lebanon. Some are suggesting, "Well, perhaps we'll bomb Beirut less, but under no circumstance will we depart Lebanon." How exactly is this going to work?
Pepe Escobar: If you look at the message that the Iranians delivered to the Americans on Sunday, this is how they're going to react. Essentially, they're telling the Americans: "Look — Lebanon, Hezbollah, everything is part of the MOU. You know it. We know it. If Israel breaks it, and if you don't rein in Israel — which you should, because they are breaking something you agreed to, which is Lebanon as an integral part of the MOU — we are going to deal with them directly."
The answer is built into this attitude. The Iranians know, and the mediators know — we heard this from the Pakistanis at the table, and also from other players they were talking to, especially Qatar and Saudi Arabia — that Israel can break this thing at any time they see fit, which is always. And they are ready for it, and they have no illusions. But the Iranians have already told the Americans how they're going to react: "If they break it, we're going to bomb Israel really, really hard, and there's nothing you can do about it. And if you intervene, then you break the MOU. If you break the MOU, we will also break the MOU."
So that's the basic difference between now and the recent past in US-Iran relations. If commitments are broken, now it's not unilateral anymore. It's bilateral. And the Iranians have been sending this message to the Americans virtually every day.
I don't know if anybody in that ultra-mediocre circle around Trump actually understands what that means. I don't think they understand it yet. So they're going to have to see it live. If the bombing of Dahiyeh continues — and the Israeli plan for Dahiyeh is Gaza 2.0, make no mistake about it; they want to occupy southern Lebanon permanently and turn Dahiyeh into a new Gaza — if that continues, the Iranians have already said, "No way." So how is the Trump administration going to react to that? Is Trump willing to bomb his own MOU, which he is selling as a victory, as we speak?
Pakistan's Diplomatic Role and the New Eurasian Architecture
Glenn Diesen: I did want to ask about another aspect of this whole war — the role of Pakistan. I remember being interviewed by some Indian TV networks when Pakistan began to take on this role as mediator, because they were asking essentially why not India. Well, there are a variety of reasons, but putting that aside — how do you see this diplomatic role of Pakistan? Because it's given Pakistan quite an important diplomatic status in the region, and given that it's also a key player in a region undergoing so much change, how do you see this shifting the dynamics?
Pepe Escobar: They played it very, very well. In fact, none of us were expecting that they would pull it off. And of course, many of us independent analysts have deep reservations about the current government in Pakistan — that's another story. But if you look at the realpolitik and the facts on the ground, and the facts they managed to establish as mediators, it's immensely impressive. We heard that the whole top level of the Pakistani government is involved in the mediation — literally everybody that matters. Not only the Prime Minister, but General Asim Munir, Foreign Minister Dar, everybody.
Why did they manage to do that? For several reasons. Very good relations with Iran. Very good relations — even more important — with China, because China was backing what Pakistan was doing all the way. Remember the first meeting of the four Sunni states in Islamabad: Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt. The next morning, Dar hopped on a plane and went to Beijing to talk to Wang Yi and explain what they had done. And Wang Yi gave new directives: "Guys, you have to try harder. You're not going anywhere." So China was always behind them. Even further behind, but in concert with China, was Russia — because everybody agreed: let's work together for a deal, because none of us want this war, because we know the war is against all of us. It's a war against Eurasian integration by definition, and against a full BRICS and SCO member. So this member has to be defended by other BRICS and SCO members. More than obvious.
Why not India? That's the key question, which the people who interviewed me could never properly formulate because they know the answer. Two days before the February 28th decapitation attack against Ayatollah Khamenei and the leadership, Modi and Netanyahu were exchanging kisses — an unbreakable relationship. So from the beginning, India was aligned with Israel. They could never be a mediator between Iran and the US, even though they need Iran for their version of the new Silk Roads — the International North-South Transportation Corridor, which involves three BRICS nations: Russia, Iran, and India. India needs it badly because this is their new Silk Road towards Afghanistan and Central Asia using the port of Chabahar. So they betrayed themselves once again — and the Indians are specialists in doing that.
Meanwhile, with the full backing of China, Pakistan was very busy organizing an alignment between Iran, Pakistan, and China — not only geopolitically and diplomatically, but also geo-economically. And that's where the new Silk Roads and Eurasian integration come into the picture once again. It's our favorite theme in your line of work and my line of work for almost two decades.
The shortest overland route between Iran and China for trade is not via Central Asia — it's via Pakistan. Very simple. Pakistan is part of the New Silk Roads: the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, from Kashgar to Islamabad, across Baluchistan, to Gwadar Port. Iran is part of the International North-South Transportation Corridor using Chabahar as the key port going to India. But Chinese tankers — as I saw for myself last year when I went to Chabahar — also stop at Chabahar, not only at Bandar Abbas.
And now — something none of us could have imagined three months ago — the port of Chabahar and the port of Gwadar are now sister ports. There are only 80 km between them. Chabahar is in Sistan-Baluchestan, Gwadar is in Pakistani Baluchistan on the Arabian Sea. When the American blockade started, Iran began using Gwadar as a sister port to Chabahar. And sooner or later, depending on how things evolve, the Chinese are already looking at Chabahar and saying, "Maybe we can get another Iranian import hub." And then the Indians will once again be sidelined because they did not bet on the right horse.
When the Pakistanis announced a few weeks ago that six border crossings between Iran and Pakistan were open for trade 24/7, this was also a Chinese suggestion: "You have all these border trade routes with Iran. They're being suffocated by the maritime blockade. Give them overland passes." That's exactly what happened. And also, of course, the very important railway from Xinjiang across Central Asia, crossing from Turkmenistan into Iran — which was, by the way, built and paid for by the Chinese. Another corridor of the new Silk Roads.
Everything is interconnected. And everything explains why Pakistan, positioned between Iran and China, would have to be the mediator from the Iranian side — plus the very good relations between Pakistan and the GCC, especially with Qatar, and in the case of Saudi Arabia, even more so because they have a military pact. And of course, the fact that a Field Marshal in Islamabad can pick up the phone and have Donald Trump answer immediately. Very few people can do that.
So they had goodwill from all the major players. In terms of facilitating a measure of dialogue between Washington and Tehran, they managed to pull it off. And this is an outstanding achievement. But never forget — they could do this because they had China in the back overseeing everything.
Glenn Diesen: Yeah, I remember — a decade ago I wrote a book on Russia's geo-economic strategy for Greater Eurasia. I was pointing out how this dynamic was working, with the Chinese connecting not just with Pakistan but also toward Iran, and this being complemented by what the Russians were doing in that region as well. But even back then I hadn't expected Pakistan to play such an active role. I thought it would be more shaped by its external environment rather than taking this more autonomous, independent role. So this is what surprised me as well.
Pepe Escobar: We were all stunned. Absolutely stunned. So we have to give them credit for it. And of course they have their own reasons. They want to pacify Balochistan, which is very complicated with the Balochistan Liberation Movement separatists and all that, along the border with Iran. They want more energy from Iran — very, very important. And this leads to a story that many of us were following at least 15 years ago: the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline, which the Americans never allowed to proceed. Now the coast is clear. The Iranian part of the pipeline is already built. The Iranians offered a few years ago to pay for the Pakistani stretch. So now this is inevitable. We're going to have the IP pipeline finally. This is one of those pipeline soap operas that never end — this time we're going to have a happy ending.
They need Iran. And of course the geo-economic integration of West Asia and South Asia favors Pakistan as well, with the backing of China and interlocking with the New Silk Roads.
The US Strategic Retreat and the Future of the Gulf Alliance
Glenn Diesen: Well, if you take a step back — what does this mean for how the United States has to adjust? They're not going to like it. They'll probably fight it tooth and nail. But at some point, ignoring reality comes at a high cost. We're currently seeing the US draw down its forces in Europe and, to a lesser extent, in the Middle East — some of it forced, of course, by its bases being bombed out in the Gulf states, but also some of the fronts they were building up against Iran seemingly drawing down now. Do you see the United States pulling back from Europe and the Middle East? In my ideal scenario for the US — ideal being defined as how it would optimally adjust to the new international distribution of power — it can't be everywhere. The optimal move would be to prioritize the Western Hemisphere and East Asia, where China is. In other words, it would have to draw down in the Middle East and Europe. It didn't seem like it wanted to do this at first, but now it seems it's being forced to. Or do you read the situation differently?
Pepe Escobar: They are being forced to do that because they are being — slowly, and now not so slowly — surely expelled from Eurasia. Period. This is the key point. It's a strategic defeat against Iran. So this is a huge step towards expelling the US from Eurasia. And it's no wonder that the National Security Strategy privileges the Western Hemisphere. So we can expect a lot of trouble for Latin America from now on — that's out of the question. Starting with the elections in Brazil later this year, which will be heavily interfered with. Did you see that Trump didn't even shake hands with Lula at the G7? The situation is very, very tense.
And of course, the strategic threat number one, according to the plutocracy that rules the US, is China. So it is East Asia. Absolutely. It is Taiwan and the South China Sea. Everything. So obviously, compared to these two fronts, West Asia is not so essential. But how they are going to digest this massive strategic geopolitical defeat — that's another story. This is going to enrage the people at the top, the elites in the back, the plutocrats, all of them. And there will be revenge. There will be blood. It's a revengeful nation. The logic of revenge always predominates. Maybe they will back off for a while, regroup, but they will go after Iran again. There's no question about that. Maybe not this year, but starting next year.
Glenn Diesen: Yeah, it's hard to avoid that. I just have a hard time imagining the US calling it a day. I remember all the talking heads on US TV networks — they all had the same slogan when things started to go poorly in the war against Iran. They were all saying in unison: "This is short-term pain for long-term gain." But it's turning out to be very short-term pain for a long-term strategic defeat. This is looking quite terrible. But again, no one wants to take political ownership of this, and nobody wants to adjust to this new diminished role in the world — especially with Israel in the picture, which makes it very politically sensitive. They can't accept this defeat, but on the other hand, there's not much they can do.
But meanwhile, let's say they wait the whole year before they restart this war. The world will look like a very different place a year from now — not even a whole year, even by 2027. Which takes me to my last question, which is about the Gulf states. How are they going to look after this? Because if the Americans are telling them to sit idly by while they might try to do this over again in a year — the Gulf states will have to adjust to realities if they want to survive. They don't have to like Iran. They can hate it with all their heart. But at some point you have to bet on the winning horse. You have to adjust to the reality that Iran is now administrating the Strait of Hormuz, and the US probably won't be able to defeat them.
Pepe Escobar: Absolutely. And that's where Pakistan comes in again, because they are already working on it. They have very good channels of communication with all the GCC petro-monarchies. And they are proving to them: "Look, we worked hard on your concerns, your recommendations, your suggestions to get the MOU and to get the negotiations going. We were listening not only to Iran but to all of you at the same time." And obviously they understand that. Qatar understands this very well. MBS understands this very well. The relationship between MBS and Islamabad is very, very close — the military pact, etc. Apparently there are already 8,000 Pakistani soldiers at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia, with lots of fighter jets.
So Pakistan is working to convince, especially the Saudis but also other GCC players: "Look, there's going to be a new protective umbrella here. We offer our services to be your umbrella. And we're going to have a very special guest in the background supporting everything we're doing — China." Can you imagine the GCC saying no to this arrangement? Not going to happen.
And obviously they saw for themselves that their petrodollar alliance with the US is worth nothing. When push came to shove, the US was defending its own aircraft carrier in West Asia, not the GCC petro-monarchies. So they learned their lesson. At least we assume they learned their lesson — some more than others, of course.
The Pakistani negotiators told Larry and me something about a month ago that stuck. They said: "Wait a while — wait like three months. The UAE will see which way the wind is blowing and will want to have an accommodation as well." I kept this in the back of my mind all the time. Because it's already happening, sort of. They are not as antagonistic toward Iran as they were a month ago. And of course they're going to have to live with Iran as the number one power in that part of West Asia. They cannot escape that. Otherwise — very simple — the Iranians sent the message: "Look, we already destroyed the Dubai business model. For us to destroy the Abu Dhabi energy model is very, very easy. Just a few strikes. We can do it anytime we want." So — negotiating table again. Now between the GCC and Iran, with Pakistan in the middle as the go-between.
Will the West admit that this is the new reality, the new rules of the game regionally? They will never admit it, but what can they do? Can they seduce the GCC petro-monarchies back? No. Can they bribe them? No. Can they promise to deal with Iran? They cannot. Can they promise to give them as much relevance as they give to Israel? They cannot. There you go.
So the Pakistanis and the Chinese are once again looking long-term. This protective umbrella will change things. Iran is looking at it and, because China is involved, they can feel relatively comfortable, because they can see this will not turn against them in the long run. The role of China in the back of it all is absolutely essential.
But this is a very complicated case. As foreigners, we cannot have an in-depth conversation in China about these matters because they consider it a matter of national security. They will never discuss this with foreigners. So the next time I go there, I can talk to some of my former military connections, and they will have a few nuggets. But this is going to take a little while.
Once again — they are absolute masters of applying Sun Tzu. They don't have to raise a finger or fire a shot at anything, and in the end they get what they want. With their connections, and of course, playing Go. They were playing Go in West Asia with the Americans. They were encircling the Americans in a way the Americans didn't even see coming.
The Petrodollar, the AI Race, and the Unravelling
Glenn Diesen: Well, that's the thing — when they went to war against Iran, the Americans were expecting a quick victory. I think there were not many people who realized they were also gambling on the entire Gulf States alliance. Not just their US bases being bombed out, but of course the security guarantees seeming much less convincing. And if the Gulf State alliance begins to crumble, that means the petrodollar system begins to crumble. If this goes away, the AI bubble can't sustain itself, which means the entire AI war and economic war with China takes a very dark turn for the Americans. There's a massive potential unravelling here that looks more and more likely. Again, I don't want to make any predictions because this is a horrible time for predictions. Too many things are happening too fast. With none of the variables remaining constant, it's not a great time to make predictions. But you do see this coming apart at the seams. This isn't going to go very well, I think. Any final words?
Pepe Escobar: We are all very curious to see if there are going to be actual solid negotiations even in this first 30-day phase of the memorandum of understanding. This is where we are at the moment. I think after a few days all of us will have a clearer idea of whether the Americans are serious about discussing all 14 points, or if this is just a crude play for time. In terms of predictions, this is as far as we can go at the moment.
Glenn Diesen: Yeah. I kind of thought myself — I almost took for granted — that this defeat would be too much for the Americans to swallow, that they would essentially seek some kind of negotiation to buy time, regroup, and then have another go at it. But this isn't your average defeat. This is going to be very painful. So I could be wrong. It could be that Trump recognized they bit off more than they could chew and he just wants to get away from this. I'm very cautious about making predictions these days.
Pepe Escobar: Absolutely correct. All of us. To be very Chinese about it, we're just watching at the margins as the body floats by the river.
Glenn Diesen: That's where we are at the moment. Well, Pepe, thank you so much for taking the time.
Pepe Escobar: Always a pleasure, Glenn. Let's catch up again soon. Cheers. Thank you. Bye-bye.