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Larry Johnson: End of War? U.S. & Iran Close to a Deal? | Glenn Diesen Transcript

Polished transcript · Glenn Diesen · 12 Jun 2026 · @diesel

Glenn Diesen interviews Larry Johnson on the US-Iran negotiations and possible deal

Glenn Diesen speaks with former CIA analyst Larry Johnson about the state of US-Iran negotiations and the prospects for a peace deal.

Summary

Glenn Diesen hosts Larry Johnson, a former CIA analyst, to discuss the emerging US-Iran negotiations and whether a genuine peace deal is within reach. Johnson describes a memorandum of understanding brokered largely by Pakistan, with Qatar and the UAE playing supporting roles, built around a 14-point document Iran introduced in early April. He outlines Iran's core demands — lifting of sanctions, recognition of sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz, an end to the US naval blockade, and a permanent ceasefire with Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon and Gaza — and argues that while early signs are more credible than previous false starts, the Zionist lobby's domestic pressure on Trump remains the most likely cause of eventual collapse. Johnson also details Iran's improving military capabilities, including upgraded air defenses reportedly assisted by China and Russia, and places the Iran conflict within a broader pattern of US military overextension that includes the failed Ukraine proxy war and the unsuccessful Operation Prosperity Guardian against the Houthis.

Key Takeaways

  • Pakistan is the central broker of the negotiations, acting with the full backing of China and, secondarily, Russia — framing this not merely as a bilateral US-Iran deal but as part of a broader effort to construct a new international economic order outside Western sanctions pressure.
  • The UAE's transfer of approximately $3 billion — reportedly the first tranche of a total $20 billion — represents a concrete act of good faith toward Iran's demand for unfreezing of assets, and is significant because it creates a financial sunk cost that makes it harder for the US to walk away cleanly.
  • Iran's four core demands remain non-negotiable: full lifting of sanctions, recognition of sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz, lifting of the US naval blockade, and a permanent ceasefire with Israeli withdrawal from both Lebanon and Gaza. Johnson believes the Israel withdrawal demand is where the deal is most likely to collapse.
  • Iran's military capabilities have measurably improved during the conflict, with Johnson citing the interception of five Tomahawk missiles and the targeting of an F-16 during recent strikes, as well as precision retaliatory strikes on high-value US strategic assets in Bahrain — capabilities Johnson attributes to Chinese and Russian assistance.
  • The US has demonstrated consistent military limitations across multiple recent conflicts: failure to shift the balance in Ukraine, the costly and unsuccessful Operation Prosperity Guardian against the Houthis (with 25 MQ-9 Reaper drones destroyed at roughly $60 million each), and now the Iran campaign — pointing to a broader pattern of overextension.
  • The Zionist lobby — both in Israel and domestically within the US — is identified as the most likely force to derail any agreement, through direct pressure on Trump, social media influence operations, and Israel's potential use of false flag operations or continued military action in Lebanon and Gaza to sabotage the process.
  • A China-backed regional defensive alliance is reportedly being discussed among Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Iran — a NATO-style organization for the region — which, combined with Israel's escalating verbal confrontation with Turkey, signals a significant potential realignment of regional security architecture.
  • The Strait of Hormuz cannot be reopened by military force, as the conflict has demonstrated. Johnson argues it can only reopen when Iran explicitly agrees to allow passage, making Iranian consent — not US military pressure — the decisive factor in restoring global energy flows through the waterway.
  • FULL TRANSCRIPT

    Opening: The State of US-Iran Negotiations

    Glenn Diesen: Welcome back. We are joined today by Larry Johnson, a former CIA analyst, to discuss what is happening now in the war against Iran. Thank you for coming back on the program.

    Larry Johnson: I'm just checking into a hotel on the road, so bear with me on the light. I'm not sure where to start here because there are so many times we've heard Trump, after every bombing raid, essentially come out and say, "Well, this time we're very close to a deal." We heard this story many, many times, only to see him beat the drums of war again the next day. But this appears to be something different. We hear from the Iranians as well that there are big movements — not a deal, but at least an agreement on a shared understanding and a plan to move forward, given how far apart the sides are. This is quite remarkable. So what is going on? What does this mean?

    Glenn Diesen: I'm fully empathetic with how you're feeling.

    Larry Johnson: I was on Garland Nixon's podcast yesterday. I put on a neck brace — you know, the things people wear when they have whiplash from a car accident. I put one of those on because it was symbolic of what we're going through. One moment Trump says he's going to quote "bomb the hell out of Iran," and then the next moment he's like, "Hey, all we're saying is give peace a chance." He goes from being Dr. Strangelove to becoming John Lennon.

    This process has been shepherded by Pakistan. They've been at the center of it, and the information that Pepe Escobar and Ike were given is turning out to prove true. The Pakistanis the other day were talking about walking away, but they didn't. Qatar got involved. So it looks like what they have produced is based on the 14-point document that Iran introduced back on April 8th, and they've come up with a memorandum of understanding — a framework for how they're going to work this. It doesn't mean they've actually got agreements on each of the issues, but apparently one of the key acts of good faith has been carried out by the United Arab Emirates, who reportedly turned over three billion dollars the other day. When I first heard that report I was skeptical, but there's another report out now saying they're going to turn over a total of $20 billion, and this three billion was the first of that tranche.

    So Iran is starting to see some money, because one of their red line demands was the unfreezing of assets. Their other more fundamental demands that they absolutely insist on are: the lifting of sanctions, recognition of Iran's sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz, lifting the blockade by the United States, and a permanent ceasefire in Lebanon — getting the Israeli troops out — and also withdrawing Israeli forces from Gaza. There's no sign that Iran has backed off any of that. It's just now a question of at what point in the process those demands come to the forefront.

    Iran's Demands and the Memorandum of Understanding

    Glenn Diesen: I saw from the Iranian side that Foreign Minister Araghchi came out and made the point that the memorandum of understanding will lay this out in different steps — first step we'll do this, once it has been achieved we'll move to the next step. The first step apparently would be signing this memorandum of understanding, and once it's signed, all of Iran's assets will be released and will not be frozen again. That's the deal for step one, and once this is done they can move on to the next step. This is quite significant. Releasing the sanctions is not the most difficult thing to do compared to the other tasks, but it is a show of goodwill, because there have been so many nonsensical negotiations. And once you get this out of the way, it's going to essentially be a cost for the US to go back on what has been promised. So it's a good first move. But what are the other things that have to be included in this deal?

    Larry Johnson: Well, again, lifting all the sanctions — not just on oil. Part of the initial gesture will be lifting sanctions on oil, which benefits Trump as well. It helps get more oil into the market. But ultimately all of the sanctions need to be lifted, the US blockade needs to be lifted, and then I think the real stumbling block is going to be Israel. Israel is going to have to leave Lebanon and leave Gaza. If left up to them, they are not going to do it. But Trump has the leverage to say, "Okay, we're going to cut off all aid to you and you're going to be on your own." That will motivate Israel to come around. But I candidly don't think Trump is willing to play that hard with them. I think Trump will lose his nerve. But hey, I'm prepared to be surprised and very much mistaken on that.

    The other issues with respect to the nuclear side — that's for down the road. Israel is complaining that this doesn't begin to address the ballistic missiles. And candidly, I don't think Iran is going to allow ballistic missiles to even be put on the agenda, because apart from controlling the Strait of Hormuz, that's their other ace in the hole — their other trump card, so to speak.

    Glenn Diesen: On the Strait of Hormuz, I saw Araghchi make the point that while Iran may not impose tolls in a punitive way, he said living tolls would not be acceptable, but that they reserve the right to charge for services, given that it's not international waters — the Strait of Hormuz falls entirely within either Iran's or Oman's national waters.

    On the nuclear deal, once Trump begins to make the point that we'll get a deal so Iran can't have a nuclear weapon, this introduces some optimism for me, because if he frames the conflict as preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, then a deal can be made — Iran has made it clear it doesn't need a nuclear weapon. So at least in that area there's some flexibility. If Trump wants to claim victory, this is essentially what he can gamble on. My concern is what you hinted at, which is the ceasefire in Lebanon and Gaza — that has to be included. And Israel will do anything and everything in its power to disrupt this peace negotiation.

    Larry Johnson: Glenn, are you a cynic?

    Glenn Diesen: Lightly. But this isn't the courtyard for the Israelis. I mean, Lebanon, Gaza — by having this in the deal, they can essentially veto it anytime they want by massacring people there.

    Larry Johnson: Or don't forget false flags. Israel could carry out something to make it look like Iran violated the agreement, that Iran attacked one of its neighbors.

    Iran's Upgraded Military Capabilities

    Larry Johnson: It's been fascinating this week watching Iranian restraint. I don't know if you've picked this up, but on what I think was the Tuesday or Wednesday strikes by the United States, we saw the first evidence of Iran's upgraded air defense system — they reportedly took down five Tomahawk missiles during the strike on Bandar Abbas. They hadn't done that before. They also engaged what I think was an F-16 with their ground-based air defense system. The F-16 knew it was going to be engaged and bailed out quickly. That is clear assistance from China and Russia, who have upgraded Iran's capabilities.

    Their retaliatory strikes were not massive, but they were incredibly precise. I have some information with respect to one of those strikes — it was extremely damaging to US strategic capabilities. In other words, whatever was taken out in Bahrain was a critical, uber-expensive component, and the feeling on the US side was that the only way it could have been targeted was with Chinese and Russian assistance. Similarly, in the very last strike, they hit another radar in Bahrain and took it out. They were also hitting precise targets — F-15s and F-16s, as well as possibly an EA-18G Growler.

    Iran has to be feeling a little more confident from a military standpoint — that they were not just getting beaten up with no response. And right now, we're not seeing any of the signature activities you would expect to see from the United States militarily if they were planning additional air strikes. It's about 1:00 or 1:30 in the morning over in Iran, and usually this is the time when US military strikes are lighting off, and we're not seeing anything. That says that these talks are real and the negotiations are genuine — they're not just a facade. Now, whether they can hold up is a whole other issue.

    Skepticism About Trump's Intentions

    Glenn Diesen: I know skeptics — and I would put myself in that category — would question whether Trump actually wants an end to the war. I think the deception in the past is because they want to defeat the Iranians, not have a peace agreement and live side by side. But they must be sinking in that they can't achieve their objectives, they can't defeat the Iranians, and the longer this drags on, the more pain Iran is going to bring to them. So why wait until the bitter end? It looks as if this is the realization that they have to throw in the towel. But what do you make of the retaliatory strikes? Because when the Iranians struck back, they appeared to focus on Bahrain, Jordan, and Kuwait. I had assumed any retaliatory strike would prioritize the UAE for destruction. Do you think this is linked to the deal — the Iranians showing they will cease all hostilities if there's some reciprocity?

    Larry Johnson: Yeah. The UAE is like the most obnoxious relative at the table — you want to punch them in the face. They have been consistently siding with Israel until recently, and they were quick to come out and condemn Iran for retaliating after having been attacked. However, on Monday a delegation from the UAE went to Tehran, and I think for the UAE it's an economic calculation. They've really taken a beating over the course of this war — now 105, 106 days old. They've suffered significant economic damage and are looking to get back into business. They've got that free trade zone, Jebel Ali, that has just been shut down dead for the entire duration of this war.

    So reportedly they're playing a critical role in returning some of the frozen assets. The day after the UAE delegation went Monday, the Qatari delegation showed up on Tuesday. Many thought they would leave Tuesday afternoon and as soon as they left the United States would start up the attacks again. But apparently they stuck around — they stayed overnight, so they were there during one of the attacks. Even though it didn't really hit Tehran, it was close. Qatar apparently played a role with the Pakistanis in working out a document that all sides agreed to.

    Pakistan, China, and the Broader Regional Realignment

    Larry Johnson: The other thing going on behind the scenes — and Pepe Escobar and I have been told this, and I believe it's true — is that Pakistan is also negotiating with Qatar and Saudi Arabia, helping them plan their escape from being under the control of the United States, or at least separating themselves from hosting US military personnel. That's interesting in the context of the 14-point document Iran presented to the United States, one point of which was that the United States withdraw its military personnel from around Iran. Whether they'll get that or not remains to be seen, but we have seen no enthusiasm on the part of the Saudis or Qataris to allow their bases to be used by the United States — and specifically, they're not allowing Israel to overfly their territory at all. That has put some brakes on what the Israelis could do militarily.

    This is a pretty complex diplomatic effort, and Pakistan is not doing this on its own. Pakistan is doing it with the full support and encouragement of China primarily, and Russia secondarily. This actually comes down to constructing a BRICS order — a new international economic order that's going to be free of Western pressure and sanctions. Scott Bessent can threaten to seize dollars, and Iran is just going to say, "Well, we're selling our oil in yuan, so screw your dollars."

    Glenn Diesen: What will the region look like after this war? We don't know exactly what's in this memorandum of understanding, we don't know the different steps or whether they'll be followed. But we do know what's important for the Iranians. If they're willing to show some flexibility on the Strait of Hormuz, it indicates that the Gulf states have perhaps made some commitments to limit the presence of US troops — because the whole purpose of holding the Strait of Hormuz is as an instrument to decouple the US a bit from the region. This objective will stand, but what areas do you think they might be flexible on?

    Larry Johnson: I think the toll and how much you charge on ships going through — all of that is a means to an end. The end would be to have a tool to encourage the countries of the region to remove sanctions and expel US bases, as favorable terms for access if they go along with this.

    The Gulf States and a New Regional Security Architecture

    Glenn Diesen: How do you see the region forming after this war? A lot of things have changed. Iran has extended its deterrence to Lebanon. The US would be out of its mind to try to attack Iran again — this has been a very painful experience. How much do you think Iran's position in the region will change as a result of this?

    Larry Johnson: I think Iran would actually be a bit of a moderating influence. Let's be candid about the Gulf Arabs — they're like a bunch of nasty high school girls. Seven years ago, you had Saudi Arabia and the UAE mad at Qatar, trying to impose an embargo. Why? Because Qatar was having relations with Turkey and was supporting Hamas. Then two years ago, all of a sudden it's the Saudis mad at the Emiratis, threatening to go to war. These so-called Gulf Arabs are not united at all. They've been getting angry at each other over some of the most ridiculous things. And the irony is that when the Saudis and Emiratis were going after Qatar, the one country that came to Qatar's aid was Iran.

    Iran has been careful in its diplomatic efforts, with strong encouragement from both Russia and China. It was now two or three years ago that Saudi Arabia and Tehran basically repaired their relationship — they had been at odds, fighting a proxy war in Yemen, with Iran backing the Houthis and the Saudis backing the government. But they bridged that gap.

    What Pakistan is also doing, again with the encouragement of China — and we can't ignore China as the hidden hand here — is talking to Egypt, the Saudis, Iran, and with Pakistan forming a new NATO-style military organization for that region. This has gotten especially interesting this week with Israel's verbal attacks and threats on Turkey. Israel got into a proverbial pissing match with Erdoğan, and the only one who's got as big an ego as Donald Trump is Erdoğan. He didn't take kindly to that. I'm sitting there trying to figure out what these Israelis are thinking — this man controls a major source of their oil. He could cut it off in a heartbeat, and instead they're threatening to attack and destroy him.

    So I think this proposal from China, through Pakistan, for these countries to come together to form a defensive alliance against Israel is something that's starting to resonate. Israel's position, at least from the standpoint of public support in the United States, will be much more vulnerable. They're not going to have the reflexive support. And even if they succeed in getting themselves completely insinuated into the National Defense Authorization Act — sections 224 and 622 — trying to embed themselves in the host like a parasite so they'll never be subject to political controversy, I see military cooperation increasing among those countries, as well as levels of economic cooperation.

    Iran frankly has years of rebuilding to do ahead of itself because of the damage it suffered early on in this war. I'm not sure how much physical damage the Saudis took. Bahrain will probably become part of Iran again, and Kuwait could see itself get folded back into Iraq. So there'll be some changes, I think.

    Glenn Diesen: I've been looking at Kuwait as well. Its continued independence is highly questionable. One of the reasons we don't know too much about this memorandum of understanding and the possible deal that will follow is there's been encouragement to keep the media quiet. How do you read this? Is this to prevent people from overselling the story, or is it to avoid creating wrong expectations that could sabotage it? The concern for sabotage is on all sides — many on the American side do not want this deal, the Israelis are obviously eager to sabotage it, but also within Iran there are hawks who say, with good reason, that they are in a strong position now and this is the time to put an end to their enemies, not to accept a deal. So is this why there's so much secrecy?

    Domestic Pressure on Trump and the Risk of Collapse

    Larry Johnson: On the Trump side of the house, they are trying to prevent a further firestorm. All the social media influencers paid for by the Israeli government went on a blistering attack on Trump starting Sunday. He was getting phone calls from people like Lindsey Graham and Sheldon Adelson's widow. He does succumb to that pressure.

    But there's another element I meant to mention earlier: oil company executives reportedly went in to brief Trump, and they said, "Oh my god, this is going to be terrible." The headline was that they were desperately trying to warn the White House about major fuel disruption that is imminent. The potential for real economic chaos in the United States is scaring Trump as well.

    So he's caught between: if he gets this war at least to some sort of peace with Iran and can take credit for saying Iran's promised they're not going to have a nuke — which has been Iran's position all along — then he can take a victory lap without people pointing out he got something weaker than the JCPOA. He can then try to get the world — and it's not just oil, it's liquid natural gas, uranium, sulfur, and helium — get all of that back into some sort of order, hoping to restore it. It's going to take a minimum of three months, maybe much longer, even if they get an agreement within the next three or four days.

    But you're correct, Glenn. There are already headlines about Republican senators criticizing Trump for what they're reading as the nature of the agreement, and they're going to be calling the White House saying, "What the hell are you thinking?" This remains to be seen — whether Trump can put up with this kind of pressure. That's why I think ultimately the deal is going to collapse, because I don't see Trump having the stamina or the strength to resist the intense domestic pressure that's going to come from the Zionist lobby.

    Glenn Diesen: The Iranian foreign minister Araghchi was making the point that the media should not speculate about what's in this deal, because that could be a pathway towards derailing it. He could have added — but I'm glad he didn't — keep Trump away from the media as well, because every time he's in the media he has to sell the strongman image. He has to go through the same talking points: Iran is begging for a deal, we're dictating the terms, they're going to get not a dollar of the frozen assets, they will give up all nuclear material, the Strait of Hormuz will be open and our ships are going through. Once you start locking yourself into this maximalist position, it's very difficult to then commit to a memorandum of understanding which, compared to Trump's previous statements, would seem like a capitulation.

    So I think — keep Trump away from the media and at least get the ball rolling. If they can get through that first step of releasing the Iranian funds, then it would be very painful for the US to step back and lose what it has already put into this deal. I had the same thought as you — I assume it will fall apart at some point. But where do you think it's going to crack first?

    Larry Johnson: I think it's going to crack on Israel. Israel will refuse to leave Lebanon, and Trump will refuse to use the leverage he has to force them out. We had the experience with Ronald Reagan back in 1982 — Ariel Sharon was the general rampaging in southern Lebanon, and Reagan called up the Israeli prime minister and said, "Get the hell out or else we're cutting you off," and they left. Eisenhower did it to the British and the Israelis back during the Suez Crisis in 1956. So there is precedent for it. It's just a matter of whether Trump is willing to do that now.

    According to Robert Barnes, there was a session a week or week and a half ago at the White House with a pollster, Rich Baris, who is an outstanding pollster, and he basically told Trump, "Look, the majority of the American public is looking at you like you are Netanyahu's personal valet — basically his errand boy." And Trump recoiled at that. Nobody's going to — I'm not going to be anybody's anything. Okay. Prove it now. And the orders that will have to be given to Israel are: pull out now, get back inside your borders. The opposite side of that is Hezbollah then has to end its attacks, but I think they will do so as part of this broader peace deal and in support of Iran.

    So this thing is not impossible, but there are a lot of pitfalls and booby traps that could derail it very quickly.

    US Military Overextension: Ukraine, the Houthis, and Iran

    Glenn Diesen: Overall, the Trump presidency looks like it's in a difficult spot, because he was elected on making America great again — putting an end to the forever wars, and through strength restoring the dominant position of the United States. Then he walked away from the no-wars position by essentially saying the strongman would, with great strength, defeat America's enemies. Now he has to make very painful concessions. The US does need this, but it's not easy to climb down from the position of the only world superpower and accept essentially a defeat to a country like Iran and accept a diminished position in the world.

    Larry Johnson: The problem, Glenn, is the United States has been in denial now for about four years. Let's go back to the start of the special military operation in Ukraine. From the outset, that was a proxy war with Russia, using Ukraine as the stand-in. The United States brought intelligence, weapons — starting with HIMARS, then attacks with F-16s, trying to resupply 152mm or 155mm artillery shells — and what happened? The United States failed to move the needle against Russia. Russia steadily beat down Ukraine.

    Then we come to Operation Prosperity Guardian. This is not just on Trump — Operation Prosperity Guardian started in December of 2023 under Joe Biden, with the stated goal of establishing freedom of navigation in the Red Sea. For about 15 months they failed. Donald Trump entered the picture in month 13 or 14, and in January, February, and the start of March, they announced, "By God, we're going to show those Houthis now who's boss." They put two aircraft carriers in the Red Sea and were actively bombing Houthi positions. Whereas in the previous 13 months the Houthis were shooting down an average of one MQ-9 Reaper drone per month, they now started shooting down one a week. The base price of that airframe is $35 million, and when you attach the optical pod for recording video and firing Hellfire missiles, that pushes the cost up to a minimum of $60 million apiece. The Houthis destroyed 25 of those — seven of them in the seven weeks Trump hung in there — which is roughly $2.4 billion. And Trump ended up declaring, "Oh, they've capitulated. We're out."

    Now here with this war with Iran, we're seeing a consistent theme: there are clear limits to US military power. It is not this behemoth, this Goliath that cannot be defeated. It's a Goliath with feet of clay. And it's not just the effectiveness of the weaponry. We've seen with the Patriot missiles, which were supposed to defeat all of these ballistic missiles — the United States has only produced roughly 6,500 of them. When you realize you have to fire two of those to take down one ballistic missile, that means you can shoot down about 3,200 missiles. Russia has fired over 14,000 missiles in the course of the war with Ukraine, and the number Iran has fired against Israel is probably up in the range of 3,000. So right there, if the United States had actually employed all of those assets, they would have exhausted them.

    And then to top it off, the Patriot PAC-3 goes between four and six million dollars each. The supply chain for it comes out of China. The Tomahawk cruise missile, for example, requires 18 different rare earth minerals, plus tungsten — and that supply chain also comes out of China. So the United States has this offensive weapon that's basically dependent upon supply chains from China and Russia. You put all that together and you realize: maybe the United States is not as much of a superpower as we thought.

    Outlook: What a Deal Would Mean for China, Russia, and the World

    Glenn Diesen: It's hard to argue that the US didn't overextend itself. The best thing for the US would be to scale back a bit and prioritize, because attempting to do everything is a terrible plan. Let me ask a last question: how do you see this changing the wider world? If we're moving toward an Iranian victory regardless, how does this change the position of China or Russia?

    Larry Johnson: It'll boost their prestige. For China, it's taken the biggest hit of the BRICS countries from the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, in part because it had actually invested in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. So it's going to want to recover some of that money. But this is going to be touch and go for at least two weeks, because we haven't got the details of this process. It's going to hinge on continued meetings and continued diplomacy. As you recall, the JCPOA took what — 18 months, almost two years to negotiate. So we could actually find ourselves in a prolonged negotiation process. The good news there is that they're not going to be shooting at each other, and that will reduce the risk in the Strait of Hormuz.

    Because the only way you can fully open the Strait of Hormuz is for Iran to say, "Okay, it's open. We're not going to be shooting at any ships" — that they do have to pay the toll or the user's fee, but we're not going to be shooting. At that point the insurance companies say, "Okay, good. We can go back in there." But there's no way it can be opened militarily. That was the lesson demonstrated over the last two weeks with all these different air attacks by the United States.

    If they get into the negotiation track, the potential for the Zionist lobby — both from Israel's standpoint and then within the United States from both the Christian Zionists and the Jewish Zionists — will put enormous pressure on Trump to back out of this deal and go back to war.

    Glenn Diesen: That's why I'm hoping the first step of releasing the Iranian funds will essentially be the sunk cost — something that incentivizes them to actually stick with this.

    Larry Johnson: Yeah. To summarize: cautiously optimistic. This is the best sign I've seen since February. I think it actually could come to an end. But not convinced just yet. Any final thoughts before we wrap up?

    Glenn Diesen: Well, there's the old saying about third time being the charm, except Donald Trump has predicted this 39 times. So we'll have to adjust that saying — 39 times is the charm.

    Larry Johnson: Yeah. To be honest, when he first mentioned it, I didn't think twice — I just assumed it was more nonsense. But when the Iranians confirmed on their side, then yeah. At some point it would have to be the real deal. So let's hope this is it.


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