Seyed Marandi discusses Morocco's incursion into Spanish territory, US treatment of its allies, and the Iran conflict
Glenn Diesen interviews Seyed Marandi, professor at Tehran University and former adviser to Iran's nuclear negotiation team.
Summary
Glenn Diesen interviews Seyed Marandi about a coordinated crossing of 50,000–60,000 Moroccans into the Spanish territory of Ceuta in North Africa, which Marandi connects to US and Israeli pressure on Spain over its policies toward Gaza. The conversation broadens into a wider analysis of how the United States treats both its allies and its adversaries, with Marandi arguing that Israeli interests consistently override even American strategic self-interest. Marandi provides a detailed account of the ongoing conflict between Iran and the United States, explaining that Iran considers itself in an active, uninterrupted state of war with the US — with no ceasefire recognised — and that Iran's strikes on US assets in Jordan were an assertion of that right during ongoing hostilities, timed to signal confidence ahead of Trump-Netanyahu consultations and to neutralise assets that could have been used in an air campaign. He also addresses the blocking of a Qatari LNG tanker by the United States for using an Iranian-designated corridor established under the MOU, and the cascading miscalculations across the region involving Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq. A significant thread throughout is Marandi's account of the MOU between Iran and the US — including Iran's right to manage the Hormuz corridor during the MOU's implementation period — and how US violations of the MOU's articles directly caused the renewal of fighting.
Key Takeaways
FULL TRANSCRIPT
Morocco's Coordinated Incursion into Spanish Territory
Glenn Diesen: I want to start off with a bit of a different topic today, yet still related to what we usually discuss. We see that somewhere between 50,000 and 60,000 Moroccans stormed across the border into Spain — or more specifically, into Ceuta, the Spanish territory in North Africa. From the video footage, they're arriving in trucks, and it seems very much coordinated, as it would have to be. I was wondering how you make sense of this, because you see some EU diplomats saying that this was obviously organized by the Moroccan government, which is seen as a way of contesting the sovereignty of this territory. It does have huge political significance. It's not merely refugees, essentially.
Seyed Marandi: The issues between Morocco and Spain aside, the timing I think is very important — the threats made by Trump and Netanyahu against Spain, and how Spain will pay the price for its policies. The scenes that we've seen clearly show that this is something being done systematically and in a very organized manner. It just shows that this is not something that was natural. It had very much to do with the fact that Spain is pursuing policies that are a bit different from the rest of Europe and the rest of the countries that are called the collective West by some. Of course, others would say the Spanish government doesn't do nearly enough. But in any case, what it has done has created anger among senior pro-Israeli politicians in the West, and it is widely believed that this is a punishment for its policies.
Glenn Diesen: Yes. Earlier this year, people like Mario Díaz-Balart — one of Marco Rubio's top allies and an influential member of the US Congress who among other things oversees foreign assistance funding — he was making the point that this Spanish territory should not be considered geographically part of Spain but rather territory of Morocco. And this isn't his principled position on history or morality. It was accompanied by strong comments that Morocco is proving itself to be a loyal ally while Spain is not. It just seems that given the animosity toward Spain, and the desire to reward Morocco for its loyalty, this fits within a wider context — a way for the US to reward those who remain loyal, essentially making the alliance system more valuable.
Seyed Marandi: Well, first of all, Morocco — the regime, the king — is a very close ally of the Israeli regime. Throughout these last three years, where the world has turned against Netanyahu and Zionism and the Israeli regime, he has remained very close. Although all those countries in the region that had ties with Israel continue to have ties, in his case he's more like the UAE in that the relationship has not shown any signs of strain. The regime has not been trying to even distance itself. They continue to have military relations at a time when the Israeli military is carrying out these massacres.
So this is definitely — and I don't have proof, but it is widely believed — that this is to punish the Spanish government for its policies, which are much more in line with global public opinion and, I would imagine, European public opinion, in criticizing the Israeli regime. This is to hurt Spain, or the current Spanish government.
I think, though — and again I can't say for certain, because during the past few months my focus has been very much on Iran because of the war — the problem with this policy, or this behavior of the United States and the Israeli regime, is that it further exposes the Israeli regime for what it really is. Tucker Carlson, for example, has been saying — and he has huge influence, but also a lot of insider knowledge; he is not an ordinary journalist, he has access that we don't have — he says that the Israelis have been seeking the destruction of Europe. They have no love for the Europeans.
So this sort of behavior toward the Spanish government because of its policies, the language we're seeing from Netanyahu's son, from Israeli officials, from Trump, and the way in which this was carried out at this particular time — I think it shows that the Israeli regime and its supporters have no regard for European governments and European sovereignty. They will do what they feel is necessary to get their way. That's how they function in West Asia. That's how they behave in Lebanon, in Gaza, in the West Bank, toward Iran. They bomb countries. They slaughter leaders. They wipe out communities. So pursuing such a policy against Spain shouldn't surprise anyone.
US Rewarding Loyal Allies and Punishing Disloyal Ones
Glenn Diesen: Yes. I saw the comments by Tucker Carlson as well — that Europe is not just Spain but Europe in general is also a target. He's become very critical of Israel for very good reasons over the past years. But Trump has been very vocal in his desire to punish Spain — talking about kicking them out of NATO, putting a block on all trade. He hasn't made direct threats about stripping it of territory, but you see this idea that loyal allies should be elevated while disobedient ones should be punished. It seems like a wider issue now in that region, as the alliance system is fractured or weakened in the Middle East.
We also see the deal now being made with Saudi Arabia — a nuclear deal that is linked directly to Israel as well. They have to normalize relations with Israel, and then essentially they get to sideline all international rules and have a nuclear program without strict inspections and restrictions. I was wondering how you see this and how it affects Iran, because I saw a journalist ask during a press briefing: why should Saudi Arabia be allowed to have this program but not Iran? And the answer was quite straightforward — America will get preferential commercial deals out of this, and Saudi Arabia is an ally while Iran is not. So essentially this is how the world is structured: those who bow to the empire get special treatment, and those who do not will not even have the rights within the Non-Proliferation Treaty, such as having a civilian nuclear program. How do you see this impacting proliferation and the wider region?
Seyed Marandi: You're absolutely correct. In the case of Saudi Arabia, I think it's a combination of two things. One is this mentality that you rightly pointed out, but it's also the interests of the Israeli regime that prioritize even America First here. Because Trump ultimately — or the US government — is like a magician. First they negotiate the deal for many months if not years, and then at the last moment, after everything has been agreed upon, like a magician — now you see it, now you don't — you can't have this deal unless you recognize the Israeli regime. So even there, it's the Israeli regime's interests that take priority over those of the United States.
That aside, US policy has been like that everywhere. Greenland, Canada, the hostility that the United States has shown through its trade war with the Europeans — Trump does not view Europe with respect. And perhaps to a degree that is also in line with Israeli policy, because as Tucker Carlson points out, Israel hates the Europeans.
So when you look at how the Trump White House behaves toward Saudi Arabia — with these twin components, one America First but then Israel First above America First — I think it helps one better understand US policy toward Spain. It has to be obedient to the United States, but first and foremost it has to support the Israeli regime and its policies. And the United States and the Israelis are willing to go very far to harm countries. No country knows that better than Lebanon, Yemen, Iran, or Syria. They're willing to be very ruthless if you do not obey the demands of this class of people.
Glenn Diesen: Well, it's often pointed out, especially in political economy, that a hegemon which is very comfortable — where power is truly concentrated — can often be seen as a generous and even benign hegemon, because it can give collective benefits and be quite generous to allies. You saw this especially with the US toward the Europeans after World War II, building up its frontline states. However, there's always the warning that once the hegemon is declining, its main objective becomes holding on to hegemony, and it will take on a very different character — extracting more from its allies, using them as instruments, throwing out all the rules of the past. That's more or less what we're seeing now: the declining hegemon is getting uglier.
But it's also not just rewarding good allies but punishing disloyal ones. Spain is at the top of that list. But within the Middle East, we see how the US deals with its Gulf states — its proxy states — which no longer follow its rules. I saw a report of a Qatari LNG tanker going toward Pakistan being blocked by the US because it used the Iranian corridors. In other words, it was making deals independently of the United States. Even loyal allies who participate in attacks on Iran are now punished. How severe do you think this is, and will it have some effect on their calculations?
Seyed Marandi: Oh yes. You're absolutely correct, and in our region the United States is increasingly becoming intolerant. It's been like that for a very long period of time, especially under Trump. But the case of Qatar and Pakistan is very interesting. Iran has said it will not allow ships to travel through the Strait of Hormuz unless they go through the Iranian-designated corridor. That was something that was agreed upon in the MOU. The Iranians were supposed to manage the trade of Hormuz during the period when the MOU was being implemented. And of course the Americans then decided to violate the MOU and create their own corridor with the help of the Qatari, Saudi, and Kuwaiti governments. That's what led to the renewed fighting, because that was a violation of the deal. The Iranians for days warned them not to do this. They ignored Iran, and like all the other articles of the MOU, the United States continued to violate Article 5, and we are where we are now.
But it's interesting that all Qatar wanted to do was get its LNG ship out of the Persian Gulf and to Pakistan — both allies of the United States. Pakistan has been working closely with the United States. The Pakistani government was involved in Egypt when Trump declared that ceasefire with Gaza, despite the fact that it was a one-sided deal that benefited the Israeli regime. And Qatar, of course, has been hosting US forces and assisting the United States in bombing Iran. All they did was use the Iranian corridor. As far as I know, the Iranians are not receiving any fees from ships at the moment — until the two months finish, the Iranians have no plans to take fees. So all they did was use the Iranian-designated corridor to send the ship from Qatar to Pakistan, but the Americans blocked it, and now the ship is being held by the United States.
So the United States has punished Qatar, which has been faithful — Trump's plane was a gift from Qatar — and Pakistan, a faithful ally. But the United States behaves in a very ruthless manner toward allies, in line with what you were saying a few minutes ago.
Glenn Diesen: Yes. Several weeks ago we also saw Oman being in talks with Iran about finding some way of organizing or managing the Strait together to avoid conflict. And Trump's response was: well, if they make a deal with the Iranians, we will blow them up — meaning Oman. It is — it shouldn't be funny, but it kind of is. This is how you talk to friendly countries. And it shows that it's a difficult time for the US, because the whole world order was organized around their global primacy and it is slipping, and they're looking for new ways of shoring up that power.
The key problem with the MOU and the Iranians administering the Strait of Hormuz is that it would mean more power and administration over the international system that is now out of US control, and that's probably why they can't accept it. But now it appears they might be heading toward massive strikes. We see talk about shutting off all electricity across Iran. Trump has a big mouth and talks a lot, but it does appear from some of the force buildups and activities that this could be the direction they're going. How do you see the developments moving forward?
Iran's Position and the Threat of Major US Strikes
Seyed Marandi: Well, I think all of this makes sense when you look at it together. What the United States is doing to its European allies is not in the interest of the United States. Even as the United States is declining, its ruthlessness is only going to hurt the relationship in the long run. But also this policy is at least partially — in this case mostly — influenced by the Israeli regime. So the United States is sacrificing its relationship with at least part of Europe because the Israeli regime wants this. In other words, because Spain has been pursuing policies that, according to Trump, have to do with the US war against Iran and the Israeli regime's behavior in West Asia.
So the United States is willing to sacrifice for the Israeli regime also in the Persian Gulf — Qatar, which is a client regime and obedient to the United States. The United States has benefited from these countries in the Persian Gulf more than any other country by far. The wealth that comes from oil and gas — most of it goes to the United States. China is a distant second. When you include the amount of money these countries put into US stocks and bonds and the stock market, and the relationships and the support they give to the West, there's just no comparison. These countries are of great benefit to the United States, but the United States is willing to humiliate them and harm them.
Like with the Saudis and the nuclear deal, or when Trump said that Muhammad bin Salman could — in front of what I think was a large number of Saudis in the audience — all of these are harmful to the United States. But if you look at the broader picture, there's the Israeli element everywhere. Everywhere you look, there's Israel. With Pakistan too — Pakistan is in deep trouble, the economy is not doing well, the Pakistani government is a close ally of the United States, Trump and the leadership in Pakistan are friends. But the United States behaves like this simply because it is hostile toward Iran, and of course its hostility toward Iran is because of Israel.
So the Israel-first element in US foreign policy is hurting the United States at a time when the United States is on the decline, and it's only making things much worse. It prevents the United States from managing the decline. The United States could behave very differently and manage this decline in a way that still preserves a lot of its global influence in the face of its chief rival, China. But it chooses not to do so — to a very large degree because of the Israeli regime, across the Mediterranean and West Asia.
In the case of Iran, it's the same thing. The United States prioritizes Israel. You and I were supposed to speak last night, and I proposed to leave it for this morning to see if the United States would carry out those mass air strikes they've threatened. We've been told throughout the last few months that Iran would be wiped out, that the civilization would be wiped out, that Iran would be obliterated, that Iran would be sent back to the stone age. No doubt this is destroying the United States' image across the world, just like the genocide in Gaza, the genocide in southern Lebanon and the ethnic cleansing there, or the dirty war in Syria. All of this has to do with Israel.
If you remove the Israeli element from US foreign policy, the relationship between the United States and countries and populations across West Asia, North Africa, and Southern Europe would be very different from what it is today. The Israeli regime, regardless of what you think of the United States, has been nothing but a burden to the empire. It has done nothing but damage to the United States. It is not an asset. Whatever they may say, it has wrecked the United States financially, from an economic perspective, and from a soft power perspective. It has utterly demolished the United States. I see that in Iran, and I think when you look at polls taken by American institutes across the world, it's clear as day that this is the case.
Getting back to the threats of major strikes against Iran — from the very beginning, during the 40-day war, when things began to go south, the Americans and Trump in particular began making these threats against Iran. At first he thought he would win the war very easily. Unconditional surrender was the demand. Then after a week, maybe two weeks, it became clear that this was not going to happen, and then gradually it became clear that actually it was Iran that was winning the war. Back then, we have to remember, the United States did not have the shortages that we're hearing about today — the shortages of interceptors and missiles weren't being discussed. The United States was firing missiles and using interceptors without any fear of shortages, but they still lost the war. And that's why I think that today, when they speak about these shortages, that is significant — if this is an accurate assessment of the situation. But still, without the shortages, the United States failed against Iran.
So back then, Trump began threatening Iran, and that didn't force Iran to change its position — obliterating Iran, wiping it off the map, sending it back to the stone age, erasing the civilization. He couldn't make Iran budge. And as we saw over the past few days, the threats that have been made against Iran — to destroy its electrical grid, to destroy its bridges, repeatedly — these threats have been made, and then last night we were told they were very close to carrying out this operation. But it didn't shift the Iranian position.
That is because the Iranians are determined — no matter what happens, come what may — whether the United States starts bombing Iran's critical infrastructure. There was talk of destroying Tehran's electrical power plants, which means leaving a city of 14 to 15 million people without electricity, hospitals without electricity. That would mean many infants would die, children would die. That would create enormous hardship for ordinary Iranians — the same Iranians that, by the way, the Americans pretended they wanted to save from the so-called evil regime. But ultimately, the United States — the Iranians did not shift their policy. They remained committed to their position.
So even if the United States had carried out the strikes last night against Iran, Iran would have continued to fight. What it would have done was strike back at Kuwait, the Emirates, the Israeli regime, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and so on, for the role that they've played in this, and perhaps Oman and Jordan too for the role they played in this destructive war. That would of course have led to a global economic depression, because the shortages that have now accumulated in the global market — especially with regards to oil — have reached a point very close to a tipping point. But if people suddenly in the morning saw images of fires raging across the region, electrical power plants destroyed, desalination plants destroyed, oil and gas facilities destroyed, that would cause immediate panic on the markets. No amount of manipulation would work anymore. The markets would collapse, and I think a global economic depression would be inevitable and would come in and strike very swiftly.
In addition to that, we also have the image of the United States being further destroyed across the world because of the Israeli regime. To strike Iranian critical infrastructure, or to threaten to strike it, is something that has been normalized. People are hearing about it every day. That's not helping the United States — that's destroying the United States.
Whether one believed US hegemony was benign or not, the image of the United States under Obama, under Clinton, even under Bush or Reagan, was very different from what it is today. Back then, especially under Obama and Clinton, the United States was by many seen as a benign power. I didn't see it that way at all — I don't see any fundamental difference between Obama and Trump — but that's a different issue. But if you look at global public opinion and how the United States was viewed across the world, it was very different from what it is today. And that soft power was of immense importance to the United States, even when confronting Iran.
One of the achievements of the United States against Iran was being able to convince younger people — not all younger people, but a significant proportion — that the United States was not the problem, that the problem was Iran. That soft power reached its height with Obama. Bush came in and wrecked the US image — not like Trump, but wrecked it — and then Obama came to power and the US image was restored, and many young people, students of mine, acquaintances of mine, were impacted and believed that the United States was a benign hegemon. Trump has destroyed that. It has been utterly wrecked — and I see this not just among Iranians but across the world.
By destroying that soft power — and of course you have to include Gaza and all these other issues alongside this — the destruction of this soft power has enormous consequences for the United States. So again, all of this goes back to Israel and the Israeli regime. Regardless of what you think of the United States, the Israeli regime has been nothing but a burden to the empire. It is not an asset. Whatever they may say, it has wrecked the United States financially, from an economic perspective, and from a soft power perspective. It has utterly demolished the United States. And I think when you look at polls taken by American institutes across the world, it's clear as day that this is the case.
Soft Power, Vassals, and the Decline of the Hegemonic Alliance System
Glenn Diesen: The soft power issue is becoming evident already. What you say about Iranian youth — I heard similar comments from Russia. Many youth, or even liberals, often assumed that if just some of the problems in the ongoing tensions with the US were addressed — if Russia changed some of its ways — a lot of the conflicts would go away. I don't think anyone believes this anymore. It's not the internal character of the state. It is the hegemonic ambitions of the United States that puts very strong limitations on the ability to have a relationship with states that don't bow to everything.
At least in Russia, it's popular to make the point that America doesn't have allies — it has vassals. And it's making that point itself now, especially in the Middle East. On the soft power issue, you see what the US can do to leaders is one thing. You see Trump threatening Spain in front of people like Macron or Friedrich Merz and they say nothing. They will prioritize appeasing the United States. But the whole point of soft power is that yes, you can have an obedient political class, but below that you see something very different — you see these politicians collapsing in the polls, you see a population growing very skeptical of the United States. It's not sustainable. The US can even threaten to take Greenland and they will still show up to bow to Trump. It's quite incredible to see your own leaders not just ignoring national interest but all signs of dignity.
Seyed Marandi: Sorry to interrupt, Glenn, but it's like — if you're with the empire, you are going to go down with it. The Europeans — of course it's not just Trump, it was also Biden — the policies they pursued against Iran, against Russia, against China, have all served to weaken Europe during the past few years. And the decline of Europe is even faster than that of the United States.
But also look at our own region. The United States has sacrificed all these countries that it has been, as Trump would say, milking for all these years. Why? Because of their obedience. In other words, their obedience to the United States has served to weaken them and destroy them, as we're seeing in this war. And in East Asia as well, the United States uses Japan, Korea, and other countries as tools against China. Yet in the case of Korea, they forced the Koreans to purchase certain missiles — it was a very problematic and controversial policy pursued by the Korean government — and then once they were installed, the United States took them away and gave them to the Israelis. So the Koreans paid the political price and the financial price by obeying US policy, but they were harmed anyway.
So the United States shows that by being a US ally, you're not helped — you're harmed. And then the United States imposes laws with regards to the production of chips and policies with regards to industry that show no regard for allies like Korea or for Europeans. So it seems that if you stick with the empire, you're the loser. You get hurt. You suffer as a result. You're not benefiting from being subordinate to Trump or the United States.
Glenn Diesen: Well, yes. There's a problem with the declining hegemon — it has a strong impulse to use frontline states as instruments to take out its rivals, essentially pushing them into war. But it seems like the frontline states then have two possibilities and competing impulses of their own. One is to go closer to the US for protection for the conflicts they've been pushed into — you see this with the Ukraine war, where the US was the main instigator, yet the Europeans now lean completely into the US for protection. The alternative is to distance a bit from the United States as the source of the conflict. And these are mutually exclusive.
I was wondering how you see this now in West Asia, because you probably saw the open letter being signed by hundreds of Jordanian politicians and public figures making the point that they should distance themselves — or at least ask US troops to leave the country — because it's bringing havoc. And Jordan has demographics that suggest a revolution would be possible. Not everyone is happy with the government's policies. And then there's what's happening in Kuwait, where they're just looking the other way and could essentially be destroyed as a consequence, absorbed into Iraq. How do you see this, especially with Jordan, because it often doesn't pop up in the news as often as the Gulf States?
Fragility of US-Aligned Regimes Across the Region
Seyed Marandi: I think we're reaching a breaking point, and it's unclear when this is going to happen. But as time goes by, all of these governments that are loyal to the United States — allies of the United States across our region and North Africa — things are going to become increasingly difficult for many of them to continue with these policies. They are authoritarian. They are police states, and they have support from Western intelligence agencies to preserve power.
But when we go back to the so-called Arab Spring, or the awakening, that happened after an incident in Tunisia which led to uproar across the region — I think back then it was clear how fragile many of these regimes were. And of course the oil and gas rich countries in the Persian Gulf tried to manage this wave of popular discontent by destroying Libya and then destroying Syria, turning attention away from their own authoritarian regimes. And of course this was in line with the interests of the empire in the long run. But I think the situation today is far more fragile than it was back then.
While the United States and Western journalists and Western diplomats like to think that all is well in these countries, the amount of discontent is enormous. You can sort of tell — and this is not scientific — but you can tell from the comment sections in mainstream Arabic media owned by these dictatorships. Qatar has a huge media empire. The Saudis have a huge media empire. The Emiratis have a huge media empire. They may be different from one another, but they are all aligned with the United States and with broader Western interests. They have literally thousands of different types of media outlets, and cultural centers, or so-called religious centers, that they use to build their narrative.
But when you look at popular opinion in the Arab world, they are siding with the resistance. They side with the Iranians. They cheer the Iranians when the Iranians fire missiles at US assets in these countries. So obviously the sectarianism that these countries promote, the racism that these media empires — not just Al Jazeera or Al Arabiya or Sky News Arabic, but literally thousands of different types of outlets — use to build their narrative, it's still not working. The people are cheering for the resistance for the most part, and that is a huge sign of discontent.
That's going to be a major problem. For people in Jordan to make such statements under such a government shows how unhappy they are. And often things seem very normal on the surface, yet many things are happening underneath. Again, when the so-called Arab Spring happened, no one predicted it — or very few people did — but it was a time when things were moving forward apparently very normally, and then within a very short period of time you had chaos from the Arabian Peninsula to West Asia to North Africa. The Israelis were terrified, and they did manage it ultimately — the West did — but they only made the situation in the region worse. In other words, they kicked the can down the road by wrecking much of West Asia and North Africa, but they did not solve the problem for the empire.
I think today things are far more dangerous for the United States and the Israeli regime than they were back then, especially because they are increasingly on the decline, and therefore their ability to maintain hegemony is much more limited than before.
We saw this in this war. The war with Iran, I think, is clear in that it shows — for the first time — the United States has been seen as incapable of winning a war. We know that the United States failed in Iraq and in Afghanistan, largely due to General Soleimani and the policies of Iran, which supported the resistance in Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite the huge differences with the Taliban, the Iranians helped the Taliban expel the United States. And even some Tajiks — the Persian speakers — or the Shia, the Hazaras, the Uzbeks, and others, some of them became very angry with Iran. But Iran believes that the priority is to defeat the empire, just as its policy in Syria was to defeat the empire. Back in Syria, some of these people became very sectarian and believed that Iran was pursuing a sectarian policy, but it wasn't. They were supporting the United States and using a sectarian policy in their support of US policy. But in Syria and in Afghanistan, Iran was pushing back against the empire.
So the United States' failure in Afghanistan and Iraq was clear, and Iran played its role. But this defeat is very different from the defeat that the United States experienced there. Here, the United States never got anywhere near Tehran. The United States was never able to overthrow the government or take huge amounts of territory and then ultimately fail because of the costs or the difficulties it faced. The United States was defeated as a power on the battlefield — as we would read in wars of the past, where two countries fight against one another and the aggressor fails. This is another example of that, but in this case it's the superpower, the hyperpower, the country that everyone feared across the world. So I think this is going to weaken the United States enormously. It makes those regimes that the United States supports and backs much more vulnerable — not only because of the damage that has been done, but because these regimes lose confidence in the United States, and it's the United States that keeps them in power.
So when you see people in Jordan unhappy with policy, I think that's a very bad sign for the government, because the government has been weakened, people are angered by seeing the government supporting Israel, and on the other hand the government looks and sees that the United States — the hegemon — is not the power that it thought it was.
Iran's Strike on US Assets in Jordan
Glenn Diesen: On the topic of Jordan — one of the reasons Trump was angry and wanted to bomb Iran and take out its electricity was because of Iran's attack on the bases in Jordan. Trump framed it as: we were negotiating with the Iranians and they were not honest, they attacked us out of nowhere. I didn't know the negotiations were ongoing or serious at all. But it appears that the source of the anger was that Trump had decided, okay, now we're going to stop the bombing, so Iran also has to stop. The idea that Iran can only retaliate proportionally to what the US is doing. If I were Iranian, I would be worried about being too predictable in this way, because then you cede all escalation control to the Americans. How do you interpret that event?
Seyed Marandi: Well, in the West they say this was a surprise attack — and Trump was saying this — not that it was carried out in secret, but meaning it was something unexpected, something that shouldn't have happened, that was out of the ordinary. But that's not a meaningful assessment. The United States waged war against Iran. We are at war. The United States had restarted the war after violating all of its commitments in the MOU, attacked Iran for 30 days, and then suddenly stopped for three days. The United States doesn't dictate when there's a ceasefire and when war starts. There is no ceasefire between Iran and the United States. And of course, as we speak, the United States has imposed a siege on the Iranian ports and on the Strait of Hormuz. That's an act of war, and it's an act of war directed at ordinary Iranians.
So the Iranians have been very clear that when they struck the US assets in Jordan, it is their right, and that they will continue to do so whenever required. It came at a time when Trump and Netanyahu were to talk and take decisions with regards to war. So the Iranians were sending a message to the United States and the Israeli regime that: we are confident in our position, we will attack whenever we think it's appropriate, we're not intimidated by any means, and we will take the initiative whenever we think necessary.
Also, the United States had gathered troops in Jordan — assets there — which Iran saw as a threat, and so Iran struck them to deter that threat against Iran. That's sending a message to the United States: you cannot just gather your troops and your equipment and threaten Iran and expect Iran to just sit back and wait till you strike first. No, Iran will not wait, because we are at war, because the war has already started, because there is no ceasefire, because you're waging war against us. So we will carry out this attack.
But I think what this does more than anything else is show how confident Iran is about its position. Iran is not going to just wait till the Americans strike and then strike back. Iran does this for moral and religious reasons — Iran cannot start wars, and so it hasn't started wars. But in this case, the war is already there. We are at war. This is not a ceasefire. So Iran, by not waiting for the United States to initiate a new phase of the military conflict and striking first, is showing a large amount of self-confidence.
We saw that in the last 24 hours — many people were expecting the United States to carry out a serious strike on Iran last night and take out the electricity. And if they had done so, maybe you and I wouldn't have been able to have this conversation right now. But it didn't change the Iranian position. The Iranians said: if you strike, we will strike back. So it shows Iran's confidence. And the strikes on Jordan again show Iran's confidence, and militarily speaking, they weakened the United States. The two strikes on Jordan were very effective and took out key assets of the United States that would have been needed for an air operation against Iran.
Cascading Miscalculations: Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq
Glenn Diesen: I often make the point that this illusion of escalation control — something the political West had throughout the hegemonic era — is possibly the greatest danger there is now in terms of miscalculations that will spark wider wars, be it against Iran or with Russia.
I want to thank you for taking the time on the weekend. I'll keep this very short, but just one final point. Another miscalculation was with regards to Yemen — striking the Sana'a airport has led Yemen to strike back at Saudi Arabia, and then Yemen has said that they are not going to accept the siege on their women and children anymore, and so they've imposed a counter-siege on Saudi Arabia.
Now Saudi Arabia can create a coalition of countries — which of course would be an immoral coalition, because it's the Saudis that have carried out genocide against Yemen, the Saudis who have imposed a siege for many years against the women and children of Yemen. And this coalition is assisting the Saudis in continuing this barbaric policy. But it's going to fail. And the Saudis are harming themselves at a time when the Persian Gulf is closed. They cannot leave the Persian Gulf because of the Strait of Hormuz and the conflict between Iran and the United States. They need the Red Sea. So they provoked Yemen — some say with encouragement from the United States — and that has backfired.
And then, even though it was Yemen that took credit for bombing Saudi oil installations, the Saudis — because they didn't want to strike back at Yemen, afraid that the Yemeni armed forces would again strike more oil and gas targets — went and bombed Iraq. They retaliated against the Iraqi people and killed a large number of people. That has created outrage across Iraq, and now the Iraqis are saying they're going to retaliate. So this is the miscalculation — whether on the battlefield with Iran, or with regards to the people of Iraq or the people of Yemen. The miscalculations of the empire and its proxies are acting as catalysts that will bring down the empire and will ultimately bring down those proxies. We're seeing it at multiple levels and across the region.
Glenn Diesen: I think the assumption was always, in the hegemonic era at least, that these were essentially bloody-nose attacks — we'll bomb you a little bit, but if you try to push back or defend yourself, then we'll be really angry. The schoolyard bully approach: just sit there while I punch you a little bit, and it won't get any worse. And you see Trump always leaning into this — oh, now I'm really angry, if they dare to do this or that, I'm really going to destroy them. But as long as one doesn't shy away from pushing back, it doesn't work anymore, it seems.
And I think ultimately it could be good for the United States as well — as a lesson to learn that it has to adjust to the new reality, the new distribution of power. Same with Europeans pretending they're living in the unipolar moment when they're already in the multipolar world. It's incredibly destructive. So hopefully there will be a steep learning curve and it will all come out better at the other end. But as I said, thank you for taking time out of your weekend.
Seyed Marandi: Thank you very much for having me. It's a great pleasure.