Seyed Marandi on how Israel's strike on Beirut threatens to derail the US-Iran negotiations
Glenn Diesen interviews Seyed Marandi, professor at Tehran University and former adviser to Iran's nuclear negotiation team, on the state of US-Iran talks.
Summary
Glenn Diesen speaks with Seyed Marandi about the fragile state of US-Iran negotiations following Israel's attack on Beirut, which Marandi argues was deliberately timed to prevent the signing of a memorandum of understanding between Washington and Tehran. Marandi outlines the general framework of the emerging deal — including sanctions relief, the release of Iranian assets, an end to the Gaza genocide, and normalization of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz — while noting that no final text has been agreed. He argues that Israel's strike on Beirut crosses a red line that will compel an Iranian response, and that this will delay or entirely derail the deal. Marandi also discusses the internal Iranian debate between supporters and critics of the deal, centered on whether adequate implementation guarantees exist given the US failure to honor the 2015 JCPOA. He concludes that the Israeli action ultimately damages not only the prospects for peace but also Trump's credibility and the broader US position in the region.
Key Takeaways
FULL TRANSCRIPT
Opening: State of the US-Iran negotiations
Glenn Diesen: Welcome back to the program. We are joined today by Seyed Marandi, a professor at Tehran University and also former adviser to Iran's nuclear negotiation team. Thank you for coming back on. I think most of the world now is looking at what is happening in this deal, or what looks like a deal, between Iran and the United States. We're told from the American side, the Iranian side, as well as the Pakistani side, that a memorandum of understanding would likely be signed today — with possible delays. I would like to be somewhat optimistic, because from what I understand the deal will start with the US releasing some Iranian funds, which is an important buy-in. However, this is still far away from an actual deal, if I understand it correctly, and I also have a hard time envisioning that these deals will actually be signed and followed by both sides. So how are you seeing this? Many people would like to be optimistic after these months of war.
Seyed Marandi: We should always be optimistic, but I think it's pretty clear that because of the Israeli regime's attack on Beirut, things will change. The attack obviously was to prevent a deal from happening — to prevent the two sides from agreeing upon a memorandum of understanding — and I think that will have an effect. The Iranians are saying that either the Americans are not serious, or that they are incapable of controlling the situation. If the Americans are incapable of controlling the situation, then there's no reason to negotiate with them. If they're not serious, then again there's no reason to negotiate with them. If they're playing good cop, bad cop, again there's no reason to negotiate with them.
We were close to an agreement. We haven't achieved the final text, contrary to what Trump says or what the mediators are saying. The deal isn't — we haven't reached the final text — but the framework is pretty clear, and the differences have been under discussion. Although right now I think that for now the Iranians are not going to negotiate, and they're going to focus on the Israeli regime after what it did in Dahiyeh, murdering at least three people today in the capital of Lebanon, because that was a red line that they were not supposed to cross. And they carried out that attack just to say that they will not be abiding by any agreement. And if that's the case, and again as I said earlier, there will be no agreement.
Of course, I think this ultimately hurts the Israeli regime more than anyone else, because the entire world is waiting for a deal and the entire world is thirsty for energy supplies and all the other products that are stuck in the Persian Gulf or that are produced in Persian Gulf countries. But it seems that it will be — it's just like with the previous ceasefire that took place after the 39 days of battle. The Israelis back then carpet-bombed Beirut to crash the deal, and that led to where we are now, where the Strait of Hormuz was partially closed and now fully closed ever since the US assault a couple of days ago. This is a repeat of that. In other words, just like the Israeli regime wrecked the ceasefire agreement after the 39 days of fighting, right now the objective is to wreck the agreement.
The big question is: what did the Americans know, when did they know it, and what their position was on this. But in any case, for now I think we're going to have to see a different course of action.
The framework of the deal
Glenn Diesen: You say that the framework seems somewhat clear. What do we know about the framework? I've been told the media should be careful about speculating, but of course we do know some things. What is it that we know so far?
Seyed Marandi: What happened was that two or three weeks ago we were close to a deal, and then the Americans tried to impose some new conditions, and that just stopped the negotiations. Then they tried to put pressure on Iran — the Israelis attacked Beirut back then, of course, where Iran retaliated — and then the Americans began to attack Iran. Then it was, I think, on Wednesday that they sent the Qatari delegation to Iran, basically saying that the US had withdrawn those conditions. So the negotiations went back to normal.
Of course, Wednesday night the United States carried out that attack, and it's believed here that that attack was basically to hide the fact that the United States had withdrawn those conditions. In other words, they didn't want to be seen as weak. So they carried out that attack so that if there's an agreement in the following days, it would look as if they were doing it from a position of strength — but in reality the Americans retreated from their excessive demands.
So in general, the terms of the agreement are what you already know, what has been discussed for weeks: lifting or waiving the sanctions on Iran's energy exports, releasing Iranian assets through a particular mechanism, ending the genocide in Gaza and forcing the Israeli regime to retreat and end the siege, and Iran would promise not to develop nuclear weapons — which Iran has been saying for decades. And also Iran would normalize the civilian trade that goes through the Strait of Hormuz. But of course Iran has said publicly that it will continue to control the strait, and it will receive fees from ships that go through the strait, and they will not allow ships that belong to Iran's enemies to pass through. So that's more or less where we are.
The internal Iranian debate
There is an ongoing debate in Iran which became pretty harsh yesterday, between supporters of the deal and opponents of the deal. The arguments are basically about implementation. The critics of the deal say that there aren't adequate assurances, and that during the JCPOA — the nuclear deal of 2015 — the United States cheated Iran under Obama and harmed Iran badly, because Iran carried out its side of the bargain, implemented its obligations, and the United States didn't. And since it was a very one-sided deal as a result, the concern now among those who are opposed to the deal is that we have a similar situation. For example: what if the United States does not hand over the stolen Iranian money? What if, especially in Lebanon, the Israeli regime continues to kill and slaughter across Lebanon? What if it continues to occupy Lebanon? These are all key questions that are being discussed, and there were even some protests last night against the deal.
Personally, I think that both sides have a case — both sides have some strong arguments, and I think both sides have some weaknesses in their arguments. But we don't have a final deal yet. And I think in a sense what the Israeli regime has done is it has created more unity among both sides — that we have to be more careful about Lebanon and of course all the other issues. So for now, that debate that was very intense last night has been pushed to the side because of Netanyahu.
And what Netanyahu is basically doing — I think he's definitely damaging the Israeli regime badly — because what he's done is undermine Trump. Now, of course, some may say that Trump may be being deceptive and that he's in collusion with the Israelis. I have no way of knowing if that is true or not. But I do think at least among ordinary Americans, it would be seen as if an American attempt to bring an end to the war, or to bring at least a more normal economic situation, has been deeply hampered or blocked by Netanyahu and the Israelis.
I think that this is not a good move by the Israeli regime — bombing Beirut, which is a red line that they've crossed — because Iran is going to have to punish the regime, but it is also going to set back any potential deal. And the Israelis will be seen by ordinary Americans as impeding US government attempts to bring an end to this situation, and thus worsening the economic crisis or the energy crisis.
So Trump either is opposed to what the Israeli regime is doing — and that weakens him, it shows him as weak — or this is a good cop, bad cop game, and still Iran is going to retaliate and it's going to be more skeptical of US intentions and more sensitive about Lebanon. Or Trump has been persuaded to change his opinion by the Israelis, and again that destroys any belief in Tehran that the United States may be serious about carrying out its side of the bargain.
But I think across the globe this will be seen as a continuation of the Israeli regime and Zionist attempts to disrupt and wreck the global economy, because this war was carried out by the Israeli regime and Trump and Netanyahu, and the energy crisis began as a result. Then after the 39 days of fighting, when they had a ceasefire agreement, the Israelis carpet-bombed Beirut, thus wrecking that agreement and causing the energy crisis to continue. And now that the two sides are close to an agreement — although there are differences — by carrying out this assault on Beirut and crossing that red line, the Israeli regime is extending this crisis even further.
I think that people across the world will be increasingly angered that this regime, which is genocidal, is also wrecking the lives of people across the world. And I think that's something that's not going to be lost among ordinary Americans either.
Who controls whom — Israel and the United States
Glenn Diesen: Yeah, I'm watching footage now of the destruction in Beirut. This is an interesting time for the Israelis to strike the capital of Lebanon on the same day as the US and Iran are supposed to sign this memorandum of understanding. But it always begs the question of who's influencing whom. I often hear that the US is controlling Israel. Others are pointing out that Israel has this excessive influence over the United States. But is it possible to get a deal through if there are so many actors who would like to sabotage this? Because from what I understand there are significant hawks — well, not just in the US but also in Iran — but I think Israel would be the most problematic one here, because they all seem to be hawks. So do you think it's too big a minefield to navigate towards an actual agreement?
Seyed Marandi: I don't think we can compare Iran and Israel and the United States. In Iran, those who are critical of the deal are worried about implementation, not about the framework of the deal itself. If Iran's assets are released and the Israeli regime is forced to end the genocidal attacks on Lebanon and so on, everyone here would be satisfied — at least the main political factions and parties and the general public. The divide is whether this text has enough assurances built within it to make sure that the United States carries out its side of the bargain.
In the case of the Israeli regime, I think what it wants to do is wreck the agreement in any way possible. And in the United States, it's the Zionist lobby that is aligned to them and that wants to wreck the agreement. They don't want an agreement. They want war. They want crisis.
And for Netanyahu, this is all about political survival. But as I said, I think this hurts the regime. I think it hurts Trump. It hurts the US government because it shows them to be subordinate to the Israelis. It makes ordinary Americans more angry. I don't think this does the regime any good.
But in general, I think that the Israeli regime has been very foolish since October the 7th. They've been going down the road of self-destruction. They've destroyed their image. We know that it is the most despised entity in the world according to global public opinion, and people across the world see them as responsible for the economic woes that we are seeing. We are inching towards the cliff. We've seen experts come on different programs say that the tipping point will be in late June, early July, late July — sometime in this period. And the more this agreement is delayed, the worse the economic crisis will be, the deeper it will become, and the longer-lasting it will become. So I don't see this as a smart move by the Israeli regime, but they've been very foolish alongside genocidal since October the 7th.
The Strait of Hormuz and the deal's ambiguities
Glenn Diesen: One of the parts of the deal will be — well, again, the Iranians will seemingly get a lot. They will have some limitations from what I understand on US forces in the region — the US at least wouldn't ramp up its forces, it would have to withdraw what it has there now. But it's argued that Iran has to open the Strait of Hormuz, but this is a very vague term, because what exactly does that mean? There's no going back to the old status quo. I think this has been made very clear by the Iranian foreign minister. Yet at the same time Iran is also making the point that it never actually closed the Strait of Hormuz — but of course there are restrictions. So what is baked into this memorandum of understanding in terms of what's going to happen to the Strait of Hormuz? And I guess, are there ambiguities here, because it's very hard for the US to sign any deals where it can't claim victory. Will the text be specific, especially on issues like Hormuz?
Seyed Marandi: Well, again, there's no final text, and things could change, and there may not be an agreement anytime soon because of the Israeli attack and because the signing of the agreement would probably not have happened today anyway — there are a number of issues that the Iranians feel need to be resolved. And as I said, these are the issues that are being debated in Iran right now: issues regarding assurances. Will the United States truly release Iranian stolen assets? Will the United States pull back its forces? What assurances are there in the deal to make sure that happens?
Now, of course, the counterargument is that Iran controls the Strait of Hormuz — but even that's open to debate, although I think that the negotiators on this particular aspect have the stronger argument. The negotiators are saying that we will control the trade through Hormuz. The critics of the deal are saying that's not in the deal, but the negotiators are saying we don't need it to be in the deal. This is our sovereign right and we will impose fees and we will control the strait, but allow ordinary shipping to go through normally — which is what we also want, because we want trade and business to grow in the Persian Gulf region and for the region to thrive.
So the debate here is about control of the Strait of Hormuz. The critics are saying: what if the other side does not abide by its commitments once we open the strait? It will be difficult to close it again. It will be politically problematic. What if the Israelis start bombing homes and killing people and provoking and slaughtering families? And then what does Iran do? Does it shut the strait or does it keep it open? And if it keeps it open, then the Israelis will kill more and more families and slaughter more people and destroy more towns and villages. That's the argument. But the negotiators are saying: whenever necessary we will be able to do what we need to do with regards to trade, because if the other side implements the deal then everything will move forward normally. If it does not implement the deal, then restrictions can be made again.
The JCPOA precedent and cautious optimism
Glenn Diesen: I would imagine in Iran there would be a lot of apprehension after the JCPOA and other deals where Iran made these agreements and implemented its conditions, but then saw the United States essentially ignore them. And it seems to be a recurring theme. So I guess that's why I'm a little bit optimistic if it's correct that the US will release these Iranian funds essentially as a buy-in — to show that if the deal falls apart, it's the US that will have made the mistake. So it's a reason for cautious optimism at least.
But let's say it does move forward, or that they agree on the final text and no one's able to sabotage the deal. What does this mean for the wider region? Because over the past 47 years the whole region has been very much defined by the United States building up alliance systems with the Gulf states and with Israel to contain Iran — ideally over time weaken it and collapse it. How is this going to change the region? Because it looks as if this deal goes through, it's hard not to interpret it as an Iranian victory. What does this all mean?
Seyed Marandi: Well, assuming that Iran retaliates and then after a period of time the two sides — meaning the United States and Iran — agree to a deal and start implementing it, let's say in a week from now, a few weeks from now, or whenever — I think that will be a turning point in the region. But even without a deal I still think this is a turning point. And I think that will be a symbolic turning point in itself, and that the United States will be formally having to accept defeat. Any deal with Iran that is not capitulation on the Iranian side is a defeat for the United States. I think it'll be remembered as such.
What the Iranians are trying to do right now is to see if they can change the relationship between themselves and the countries in the Persian Gulf. Those countries were obviously complicit in the war, and Iranians are very angry — many people died as a result. But the Iran-Oman model and the Iran-Iraq model is something that Iran wants to expand. Iran is in one-on-one negotiations, and I think these countries — some of them more so, some of them less so — are coming to the understanding that the United States is not protecting them. The United States has wrecked their countries in many ways over the past few months by using their territory. Of course, they were complicit — they were all for it. It was only when things went south and the Americans didn't protect them or couldn't protect them that they began to recognize that this is not the way forward.
So what Iran wants to do is to convince these countries to tilt away from the United States and to become more wary of the Greater Israel project. I think that an agreement would contribute to that, because the United States has shown that it's not able to sustain its hegemony over the region as before. This is a major turning point. But again, even if there is no deal, I think we're still going in that direction.
Trump's nuclear threats and the collapse of the liberal narrative in Iran
Glenn Diesen: Yeah, I've seen news pop up on the feed here where CNN is arguing that a deal will not be signed today after all, despite what Trump is saying. Again, I'm not using CNN as evidence of reality, but as you suggest, everything seems to be still up in the air. The final text isn't agreed. And early this morning I saw Trump tweet something — he wrote that we promised the ultimate solution or answer if Iran doesn't sign the deal. It sounded like a nuclear threat essentially. And yesterday he had a very long tweet — basically a nuclear threat — which is now becoming normal, and it just shows how abnormal the West has become.
Seyed Marandi: Trump has been saying on many occasions he's talked about using nuclear weapons before — he's talked about obliterating Iran, sending it back to the stone age, wiping out the civilization. He said it many times, but you don't see any parliaments in Europe condemning this. You don't see any governments condemning it. You don't see the media condemning it. You don't see important journalists condemning it. You don't see American journalists, Canadian journalists, Australian journalists, New Zealanders — you don't see any condemnation, even though he's threatening to carry out the biggest holocaust in human history. You don't see the European Parliament or the British Parliament saying anything.
So for Iran, that is a sign of where the West stands. And it has really wrecked the liberal narrative in Iran, because as you know — you've been to Iran — there's always been this counternarrative that existed among elites, many elites in Iran, and liberals in particular, about Iran's relationship with the West and strengthening that relationship and not prioritizing Russia, China, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and so on over the West. But what we're seeing — both through Trump's actions, the war, the West's support for the war, two wars, last year's war which started yesterday last year, and how the West supported both wars, and how they refused to condemn the attacks on Iran's peaceful nuclear program — all of these things combined, and the threats made by Trump where no one in the West, not the left, the right, the liberals in the mainstream, none of them will condemn him — all of that has convinced Iran that we should look elsewhere.
And the liberals, even though they were always a minority, were a substantial and disproportionately influential minority in Iran, because they are often from the more wealthy class as well. Many wealthy people in Iran support that particular mode of thought. But all of these events, and the language used, and the lack of any outrage in the West among elites with regards to this language, has really changed the way many people in Iran think about the West.
The West's abandonment of its liberal veneer
Glenn Diesen: The problem is beyond Iran as well. During the June war, the German chancellor came out and said that Israel is doing our dirty work for us. And yes, I see the tweet here by the way — Trump sent it out last night. He wrote: "Hopefully this process" — referring to the negotiations — "will work out quickly, easily, and smoothly. If it doesn't, we have the ultimate alternative, hopefully never to be used again." I mean, yes, some plausible deniability, but I think it can't be read as anything other than a threat of nuclear war on Iran for not essentially capitulating to US demands. It's quite extraordinary. If you also see the kind of things that have been done during the Ukraine war as well — I think the political West has lost something. I'm not pretending it was a beacon of morality before this, but it's too overt now. There was always this liberal veil — at least we pretended to be going after leaders of countries, not the countries themselves, allegedly in service of some higher goal of human rights or democracy. But now, as you said, when there's talk about destroying entire civilizations, there's no pretense anymore. I'm not sure if I should be happy that the honesty is at least out there, or just be a bit fearful that the pretense has been given up.
Where is this headed — optimism or a return to war?
Anyway, just a final question. How do you see this? You've been following Iranian politics, the United States, all of this for a very long time, and you're there in Tehran. Where is this headed? Are you somewhat optimistic, or do you think there will be a return to war?
Seyed Marandi: I think there will quite possibly be at least a limited war, because Iran will probably respond to the Israeli regime.
Glenn Diesen: You're referring to Beirut.
Seyed Marandi: Yes. And I think because the genocide is just too much. People are seeing families being massacred across Lebanon every day, tens of people are being murdered every day by the Israelis, and the West has no problem with it. Western media is looking away as usual. So the Iranians are saying that we can't just let this go on. So I think there will be a response by Iran. Again, I don't have any idea — I haven't spoken to anyone and I'm not in the know.
I think there won't be an agreement in the coming days, and as you pointed out, something has apparently come out to indicate that that's going to be the case. I'm not a pessimistic person by nature, but this is — the real question is who calls the shots. Is it Trump or Netanyahu? And of course Netanyahu the individual is not that important — it is the people behind Netanyahu that allow him to make these decisions.
And again, if Trump is against it, then he seems powerless. If he supports it, then he's being dishonest. If he's shifting his position, again, he's useless. So none of this is going to do any good for a deal. It's going to delay it and it's going to make the situation more difficult. And if I were an Iranian negotiator, I would be making new demands with regards to the text to ensure that the Israeli regime can't just continue doing this sort of thing.
Glenn Diesen: But in short, you think the Israeli attack on Beirut has already derailed the entire US-Iran deal for now?
Seyed Marandi: I think it will. I think it has already set it back, and I think it could be set back further depending on the events in the coming hours and days. It could be totally derailed — I'm not ruling that out. But at least for now, what I can say is that it will be delayed, in my opinion, for a while. Which is a big thing, actually, because with the economic crisis growing, I think each day and literally each hour counts. But that's what I think.