Larry Johnson analyzes the US-Iran MoU, the oil crisis, and escalating NATO-Russia tensions
Glenn Diesen interviews former CIA analyst and State Department counterterrorism official Larry Johnson.
Summary
Glenn Diesen interviews Larry Johnson, a former CIA analyst and US State Department counterterrorism official, on the Fourth of July. Johnson argues that Trump's signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Iran was driven by a looming diesel and aviation fuel crisis caused by the closure of Persian Gulf oil flows on February 28th, and that the strategic petroleum reserve was set to run out around July 11th — roughly four weeks from when Trump made his public admission about oil supplies. Johnson contends that the US has since violated the MoU by striking Iran after Iran exercised its explicitly granted authority over the Strait of Hormuz, and that the US is now quietly withdrawing military assets from the region. He also addresses the widening Poland-Ukraine split over Ukraine's honoring of figures responsible for the Volhynia massacre, arguing that a story about Russia planning to strike Poland is an information operation designed to paper over that rift. Johnson closes by warning that Russia may conduct preemptive strikes on Western weapons factories, and potentially use tactical nuclear weapons, if European escalation continues.
Key Takeaways
FULL TRANSCRIPT
Introduction and the Oil Crisis Behind the MoU
Glenn Diesen: Welcome back. Larry Johnson joins us today, a former CIA analyst who also worked at the US State Department's Office of Counterterrorism. How have you been, Larry?
Larry Johnson: Pretty busy. We're celebrating the Fourth today, but I always make time for you.
Glenn Diesen: I appreciate that. And happy 250th, I guess, for the United States. The shirt is very appropriate.
Larry Johnson: My ancestors were involved. I had 28 ancestors that fought in the American Revolution. So I'm a revolutionary at heart — genetically.
Glenn Diesen: Very good. My focus today was going to be on Iran and the energy crisis — especially Trump's signing of the Memorandum of Understanding, which I would say reads as a declaration of surrender, and it begs the question: why would Trump sign this?
His main answer was that we only had four weeks left of oil, which is quite an astonishing admission. But at least that's what he said — that was the motivation. And it begs the question: how is the situation with oil now? Are things loosening up, improving? It's hard to simply switch the dial and suddenly turn everything back on.
Larry Johnson: I like to credit that I was always this smart and knew all this all along, but I didn't. I've frequently referenced a Civil War soldier by the name of Ambrose Bierce, who went on to become an author. He was attributed with saying — it's not proven — that war is God's way of teaching Americans geography. And now we could add to that: war has been God's way of teaching Larry Johnson about the oil industry.
When Trump made that claim, he wasn't talking about all oil across the board. What he was talking about is the supply of high-sulfur oil — known as sour crude or heavy crude. The Persian Gulf supplied 20% of that to the world. When on February 28th that was cut off, it wasn't an immediate disruption in supply, because there were very large crude carriers still out on the ocean full of oil that were sailing to their final destinations. The last of those ships carrying crude reached their destinations roughly around April 7th to April 10th — about 40 days after the start of the war. And I think it's no coincidence that it was at that point that Trump basically pressed for a ceasefire with Iran, and Iran agreed to it. It was the oil situation.
Now, what happens with this heavy crude? The majority of oil refineries in the United States are set up to handle heavy crude with a high sulfur content. They're not set up to deal with West Texas Intermediate — called sweet crude. It doesn't have that high sulfur content and it can be refined in a much easier fashion. Think of it like two different coffee makers. If you have a conventional Keurig, you put the coffee in a cup, press the button, boom — you get coffee. What about a French press? With a French press, you've got to boil the water, you have the coffee in the bottom, you pour it in, you let it sit, then you press it down. Just because you're making coffee doesn't mean it's made in the same way. Similar with oil — the refineries are set up to process this heavy crude, and what they produce out of that is called the mid-distillate.
A full barrel of oil is not consistent from top to bottom. About a third — 30% — is removed to make what are called the mid-distillates. That's what's processed in these refineries to produce diesel and aviation fuel. That was what Trump was talking about. The amount of diesel — or the oil capable of producing diesel and aviation fuel — in the strategic petroleum reserve stood at about 120 days. It was either March 11th or March 18th when Secretary of Energy Wright announced that they were going to start drawing down the strategic oil reserve at 1.4 million barrels per day. There were basically 174 million barrels that you could draw — work out the math: 120 days. Well, that 120-day period ends on July 11th — next week.
So when you go back and look at when Trump made his statement about four weeks, he knows that the United States needed to get the Persian Gulf back open and get that oil flowing — specifically to America — because most of the oil that's come out since the signing of the MoU is going to Asia: China, India, Japan, South Korea. So that really hasn't fixed it for the United States.
We come back to the problem that when February 28th the war started, and let's jump ahead 40 days to April 8th — the total supply of diesel fuel fell 20%. That was no longer available to the world. The way to cope with that was to start drawing oil from the strategic petroleum reserve. That allowed you to pretend it got back up to where it was. But now, sometime next week, we're going to actually be at a real deficit. And there's no way to replace that deficit until such time as the oil coming out of the Persian Gulf is restored back to the original volume and is arriving on shore in the United States.
Even if an oil tanker leaves the Persian Gulf tomorrow heading to the United States, that's a 42-day sailing trip. So there is no immediate solution to that. And the economic markets, as far as I understand, have not captured or caught up to this. It's going to sort of hit them by surprise.
Current Oil Flow and the Refinery Problem
Glenn Diesen: Well, is the oil flowing? Because the shooting has — well, not really returned — but Trump took credit for hitting the Iranians hard a few times. It's important, I guess, to keep up the strongman image. But to what extent is oil actually flowing now?
Larry Johnson: There's about 20% of the normal daily capacity that came out of the Gulf prior to February 28th coming out now — about 20%. But it's overwhelmingly going to Asia. So it's not coming to the United States. It's certainly not going to Europe. This is where the West has a problem.
As you noted, there's no immediate fix. This isn't like you flip on the light switch and boom, everything's back on and we're running. I guarantee you I didn't understand this until I had two different people with familiarity in the oil industry explain it to me, and then I listened to Chris Martenson — Chris is very smart on it. The one point Chris has not made in his analysis is drawing the distinction — helping people understand that the shortage is not oil in general. The shortage in particular is in the heavy crude that's used to make diesel and aviation fuel.
And understand that if a refinery is going to make aviation fuel, it's got to be set up in one way. If it's going to do diesel, it sets up in a different way. So it's not just a matter of it comes in and they say, "Okay, half is going to go to aviation, half is going to go to diesel." This is going to get pretty dicey.
All of this assumes that there's not an emergency. What could create an emergency? Well, if the United States decided to go back into combat operations against Iran, it's going to need a lot more aviation fuel. Or if there's a hurricane — and we're in hurricane season now — and it comes into the Gulf of America, or Gulf of Mexico, take your pick, and wipes out one of those refineries, then you're really in a serious situation where you're going to have to make a choice: are we going to have diesel for trucks and tractors to carry food to grocery stores, or are we going to have aviation fuel to fly aircraft around the country? I think if it comes down to that, they're most likely going to choose diesel over aviation fuel. Again, that's a simplistic approach, because aviation plays a critical role in the transport of a lot of goods as well.
The MoU: What It Says and What the US Is Doing
Glenn Diesen: Well, Vance was trying to defend the MoU because it has obviously attracted a lot of criticism. His main argument seemed to be that we had to do this in order to get the oil flowing again. Well, if that's the goal, that's not the same as saying we're going to put our hostilities with Iran in the past and create completely new relations. Indeed, it could indicate that this could be quite deceptive — buying some time to open up and refill world markets. But on the other hand, we also see that the US appears to have begun renegotiating the MoU almost as soon as it was signed.
In the specific case, an offer was made to the Iranians that we'll release some of your frozen assets — something they're supposed to do anyway according to the MoU — but conditioning it on there being no toll or fee on transiting the Strait of Hormuz. How do you make sense of this?
Larry Johnson: Well, the MoU has 14 different sections. You can make the argument that Iran was very sloppy with its language with respect to full sanction relief and the unfreezing of assets. They left it very vague, giving the United States lots of room to play games with them.
The two areas that were very specific — and that the United States can't really weasel out of, or is weaseling out of but is violating — are these: one, respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon. Instead of doing that, the United States intervened with the Lebanese and Israelis, got Joseph Aoun — who is a minority president representing only some of the Christians in Lebanon, while two-thirds of the country is Muslim — to claim to reach an agreement with Israel that allowed Israeli troops to stay in and to violate the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon. So that was the first problem. Iran could still throw the penalty flag on that and say, "You're not fulfilling your part of the MoU, so we're out of here."
The second is paragraph five. That deals with the Strait of Hormuz. The language there is very specific. Let me read it. It says: "Immediately upon signing this MoU, the Islamic Republic of Iran will make arrangements using its best efforts for safe passage of commercial vessels with no charge for 60 days only, from in and out of the Persian Gulf to the Sea of Oman."
Notice: no other country is specified as having the responsibility for making arrangements for the safe passage of commercial vessels. Only the Islamic Republic of Iran — not Oman, not Qatar, not Saudi Arabia, certainly not the United States. So in that regard, paragraph five of the MoU gives Iran full control over the Strait of Hormuz. No matter what the United States says, the language is what it is — very clearly, the Islamic Republic of Iran and only the Islamic Republic of Iran will make arrangements.
Now, they only have to do that for 60 days. Then they can start charging tolls. There is nothing in the MoU that says Iran cannot charge tolls. The United States is saying they don't like it, but there's nothing in there preventing Iran from charging tolls, which they are going to do.
The United States did abide by the one section of the MoU that is in the US interest — they removed all sanctions on oil and on banks processing payments from oil sales by Iran. So Iran can freely sell its oil, which it has been doing, putting out roughly 1.6 million barrels per day, being sold at a 20% premium off the futures prices. Ignore those futures prices — they really have no relevance. What you're looking at is the actual price being paid for a barrel of oil when it gets to port.
Iran has not wavered on this point. Today there were six ships that attempted to go through the Omani side of the corridor without securing permission from Iran under what they call the Persian Gulf Strait Authority protocols. Iran turned them back, warning that if you try to go through here without our permission, we're going to set you on fire and sink you. Well, that's essentially what they did — they attacked one of the vessels attempting to transit. And this is what sparked the US strikes on Iran, which Trump took great pride in — that the Iranians stepped out of line and he dealt with it. That was the spin.
But understand: there is not one word in the MoU that says that if Iran tries to prevent a commercial vessel from leaving the Strait of Hormuz without Iran's permission, the United States can attack or punish Iran for doing that. Not one word. That was a violation of the MoU. The MoU's first paragraph says neither side will attack the other. The United States said, "Well, we're not going to allow that." Well, too damn bad. You didn't put it in the MoU. You didn't stipulate that Iran couldn't do that. In fact, you stipulated that Iran was the one to use its best efforts for safe passage of commercial vessels — that it's Iran's responsibility, not yours.
US Military Posture: Withdrawal and Stand-Down
Glenn Diesen: So that was the first point where the United States violated the MoU. But now that some of the shooting has resumed — and of course it's died down again — what does this mean? How are you assessing not the front lines but the potential battlefield? Is Iran preparing itself for a possible new American attack? What is the United States doing? Is it building up its troops in the region? Is it pulling back? Is it meddling in neighboring countries? How do you assess the American strategy now, given that the MoU is obviously not a done deal — they want to renegotiate it?
Larry Johnson: Well, the US is pulling out. Eight or nine days ago now, Pete Hegseth signed an order to start the withdrawal of US forces that had been deployed to the Persian Gulf for Operation Epic Fury. There was a report out of the UK yesterday from Fairford — I think that's the name of the base — where B-52s had been established and based there for action against Iran. They withdrew from the UK in the last 24 hours. At the same time, six to twelve F-15 jets that had been based at Jordan flew from Jordan to the UK and are now on the ground in the UK. So the United States is starting to withdraw.
In order to cover the fact that they're withdrawing, they're putting out some very strange disinformation. For example, this week they announced that the US Marines and the USS Boxer have arrived on scene and are ready to engage Iran. They left San Diego on the 18th of March. They arrived in the Arabian Sea back around April 30th. So they've been there for two damn months, and just now the Department of War is starting to hype and highlight their presence — which makes absolutely no sense.
So the United States continues to talk tough, but across the board it's not just this withdrawal of physical assets. Before the war started, the military — CENTCOM, the Pentagon, and other commands peripherally involved with supporting Central Command — established what are called CATs: crisis action teams. These CATs were set up to operate 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. The soldiers, sailors, marines, Air Force officers and personnel who staffed them would come in at 6:00 a.m., work to 6:00 p.m., go home, get some food, get some rest, come back the next day. That went on for like three or four months.
It was only about three weeks ago — coinciding with the signing of the MoU — that the CATs stopped operating on a 24/7 basis. There are still individuals tasked with monitoring what's going on in the Persian Gulf and with Iran, but they're working Monday through Friday, 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Big difference. Until that CAT is put back on a 24/7 rotation, the United States is not going to engage in the kinds of attacks they were doing back on June 9th and June 10th. And here we are on July 4th already. The last big attacks were June 9th and June 10th. And remember — it was Iran that struck last, at the air bases in Kuwait at Ali Salem and at the air base in Bahrain at Al Isa — and the United States didn't retaliate. So the US has effectively stood down in terms of its military effort.
Iran's Strengthened Position and Regional Realignment
Glenn Diesen: If what you say is correct — that the United States has decided to essentially stand down — that means the Iranians will come out on top. What does this mean? How will that transform the region? Iran was severely weakened. It was supposed to be knocked out, and now it looks as if it can become a key regional power. Do you see any possibilities there? The Gulf States would have to adjust. The Israelis seem to be turning a lot of their anger toward Turkey now for a variety of reasons. Do you see a possibility that if the US position is weakened in the region, you could have some improved ties between Turkey, the Gulf States, and Iran? Or do you think they still have their own internal issues irrespective of the US?
Larry Johnson: Well, objectively, it's an objective fact that the US is in a weaker position now than it was on February 28th. On February 28th, you had the US naval headquarters — Fifth Fleet headquarters — in Bahrain. You had an admiral, a complete staff, different sections: intelligence, logistics, plans, operations — the whole shooting match. They were there to receive and provide support for ships. That's now closed. It exists in name only but is effectively closed. There are no command operations going on there of any significance. In addition, the radars — there were several radar and satellite communication systems tied into that base — they were destroyed. So right now the United States has lost full capability in Bahrain.
Similarly at Al Udeid. Al Udeid was the largest air force base until you got to somewhere like Incirlik. When the war was going hot and heavy in both Iraq and Afghanistan, Al Udeid was a major transit point for US troops coming in and going out. In fact, I flew through there in May of 2006 — I was headed to Balad in Iraq but had to go through Al Udeid. Well, once the United States basically drew down its military effort in Iraq and started scaling back in Afghanistan, Al Udeid became the center for what's called the Combined Air Operations Center — the CAOC. The CAOC had a billion-dollar radar there at Qatar, and they could literally see to India, to the middle of the Mediterranean, north to the Black Sea coast of Russia, and south to Diego Garcia. So they had this huge area they could cover and monitor all flights.
I know that when the US was conducting air and ground operations in Syria, a friend of mine who was stationed there at the time — back in 2016, 2017 — told me that every day the Air Force general in charge of that operation was on the phone with his Russian counterpart deconflicting, so that Russian planes and US planes wouldn't run into each other. Similarly, that's where when Trump made a decision to strike Syria for allegedly using chemical weapons, it was that general in the CAOC who called up his Russian counterpart and said, "Hey, we're going to hit this base at such and such time with this many Tomahawk cruise missiles, so if you've got any personnel there, you may want to get them out." So it was all political theater. It was staged. It wasn't a genuine strike to take out capabilities.
That's gone. The CAOC is now based over at Shaw Air Force Base in South Carolina. So the reality is, although the United States is still in the Gulf, the two main bases that had the majority of the personnel are effectively closed. And then the other, smaller sub-bases — they too have been damaged. The US has a presence there in name only right now. There is not really anything of substance that can carry out and sustain operations.
Israel's Position and the Limits of Its Military Options
Glenn Diesen: Well, the US has lost its bases and would like to draw down. It has all these incentives in place. The Israelis, though, don't seem to be on the same page as the United States. There was some polling — one of the Israeli media outlets, I forget which one — and I think it was about 90% of Israelis believe that Iran had won. And of course the Israeli politicians are quite critical of the US efforts to pull away from this war. They're also making the point that they will not feel restrained by US demands. At one point there was even a news report alleging that the US warned Iran that Israel might kill their negotiators. They look like they would be a key disruptor. I'm not sure if the US and Israelis are on the same page or just playing good cop, bad cop, or if this is a real split. But what do you see the Israeli interest being now, and how would they actually play those out?
Larry Johnson: Well, there's a difference between what they want to do and what they can do. Israel is no longer in a position to be able to carry out sustained attacks against Iran. They talk a big game about, "Oh yeah, we're going to hit them." And apparently — I was puzzled by this — a story came out yesterday or the day before about the United States telling the Iranians about the plot to kill Araghchi and Ghalibaf. Well, that is ancient news. That comes from two months ago. Pepe Escobar and I both reported on it at the time. In fact, the Iranians — Professor Marandi himself was interviewed earlier today by Nima, and he discussed it. He said they didn't get a single warning from the United States. It was delivered by Pakistani ISI, the intelligence service, and the Iranians took precautions in returning to Iran.
At present, Iran would like to — I don't think they've relented in their desire to kill the new Ayatollah, as if that's going to accomplish anything. But without the presence of the United States and its fleet of KC-135 tankers, not to mention a dedicated supply of aviation fuel — which is again going to come in short supply — Israel can launch an attack, maybe two, and then they're going to be crushed. They will be crushed by the Iranian response.
As Ted Postol decisively demonstrated a week ago in an interview he did with Danny Davis, he showed the video footage and proved beyond any doubt that even with the Patriot missile and the THAAD missile systems — which reportedly carried out two-thirds of the response to ballistic missile attacks fired by Iran during the war from February 28th through April 15th — less than 10% of them were effective. So in other words, Israel does not have any kind of effective air defense against these ballistic missiles. If Iran decides to re-engage, Iran is going to be in a position to destroy the airfields and destroy the aviation fuel capabilities of Israel.
Israel has already had two bites at the apple, and each time they've had to beg for a ceasefire because of the damage they were suffering. Iran holds a lot of cards right now.
The Poland-Ukraine Split and the Russia-NATO Escalation
Glenn Diesen: Well, listen, before you go, let me ask you about something with the Ukraine war. There are now reports in the Telegraph and some other newspapers stating quite openly that they have intelligence that Russia is planning to strike Poland to check NATO's response. At one level I thought, yeah, possibly the Russians do need to restore their deterrence and they're quite outraged at the moment. On the other hand, why Poland? Poland at exactly this point in time, when you have this huge split between Poland and Ukraine. If it was Estonia — after the revelations that they were involved in the attacks on St. Petersburg — or Germany, because they seem to have lost their minds, it would seem more plausible. But Poland? And the goal isn't to restore deterrence — it's just to check how NATO would retaliate. It sounds fishy. At the same time, it could be possible. I'm not buying it. How are you looking at this?
Larry Johnson: You put your finger on it. Look, over the last two weeks, the split between Poland and Ukraine has widened. I think the average person listening to you or watching this doesn't realize that during the first three years of Ukraine's fight with Russia, the largest contingent of foreign fighters in Ukrainian ranks were Poles. They were the largest representatives, and well over 10,000 Polish soldiers or volunteers have died in the course of this war.
But in the last three weeks, Nawrocki — the current Polish president — and even Donald Tusk started taking note of the fact that the Ukrainians were honoring Stepan Bandera and these other fascists or Nazis. There's no other way to put it — they were actual Nazis who were responsible for the Volhynia massacre, in which over 130,000 Polish civilians were murdered by these Ukrainian forces during World War II. Poland has basically come out and said there's no way in hell Ukraine is getting into the EU until they repudiate all of that. Absolutely not.
And I think this story about Russia planning to strike Poland was leaked as part of an information operation to try to generate more sympathy in Poland for the Ukrainians — to say, "Oh, forget about that Volhynia massacre stuff. You've got to worry about the Russians. They're coming to get you." But I think the Poles are saying, "No, we're not forgetting the Volhynia massacre. These people that Ukraine is honoring and elevating to hero status were mass murderers. They killed civilians. They're guilty of war crimes."
And Russia doesn't need to quote "test NATO's response." No, they've been making it very clear that NATO is going to get a response, but it's not a test. Your friend and my friend Sergey Karaganov — this is what he was speaking to. Over the last two months in particular, the rhetoric coming out of Europe — Germany in particular, the UK in particular — has been extremely threatening, and that's been accompanied by actions as well.
In fact, Vovan and Lexus — I don't know if you know the boys.
Glenn Diesen: I do. They are incredible talents.
Larry Johnson: They managed to get the Estonian foreign minister or defense minister — one of those two — on the phone. He thought he was talking to an adviser to the president — one of Zelensky's leading guys — and he admitted, "Yeah, we've been facilitating your drone attacks on Russia." So now Russia knows that the Baltic states are actively involved in collaborating with Ukraine in these drone attacks.
Then two days ago, one of the Russian oil tankers was exiting the Baltic and a German patrol boat came up and tried to intercept it. It was being accompanied by a Russian warship, and the Russian warship made a beeline for the Germans — and the Germans retreated. So the tensions are ratcheting up between NATO and Russia, and Russia has made it clear that they are going to exact a price from Europe if they continue to escalate in this fashion. That's where Karaganov comes in — that initially it was probably going to be an Oreshnik missile, but at some point it may take a tactical nuke to reestablish deterrence with Europe, so that Europe will no longer try to threaten.
And then add to that: Finland and Lithuania are now saying they're going to base nukes on the border with Russia. And Russia is saying, "No, that's not going to happen."
Glenn Diesen: What I thought was interesting is how the newspapers across the West present this dispute between Poland and Ukraine as simply a little dispute about history — that's how they whitewash the whole thing. Celebrating fascist collaborators who murdered 130,000 of your civilians is an interesting way of spinning it. But what is interesting is why the Poles suddenly now took notice. It's 2026. I remember on the day of the coup in Ukraine in 2014, none other than the BBC had a big story saying that the Ukrainians have a Nazi problem — they have all these people dressed up with fascist symbols. They noticed that in city hall after the coup it was full of banners attributing tribute to the nationalist Bandera and all these people who are considered war criminals in Poland. So now, 12 years later, they notice. It's a bit strange. I'm wondering if it's for domestic purposes, if they see what's coming and would like to distance themselves. It does seem a bit strange that one would only notice at this point in time after calling it Russian propaganda for 12 years.
But my question was about what you said — that the Russians might launch a strike, even a tactical nuclear weapon. When would that come, or under what conditions? Because the Europeans are now saying, "Oh, we're not ready for war with Russia, but we'll get ready by 2030. We'll build up the weapons and then we will be ready." If I was sitting in the Kremlin, why would I want to wait for the Europeans to get ready? They're going to arm themselves to the teeth. They're declaring the intent. At some point, the Russians must think: if the Europeans are planning to hit us, why not hit them first? And why wait until they're actually ready? We have a huge stockpile of Oreshnik now. Do you think a preemptive strike by the Russians is a possibility?
Larry Johnson: Yeah, I do. The Russians, just as they did with respect to warning foreign delegations to get out of Kyiv because it was going to be struck — and then the strike they made this past Wednesday — it was widespread and went after a couple of hotels where Westerners are known to stay. Reports from the Russian side claimed there were deaths of NATO and European officials. We've not seen any independent confirmation of that, but it was a clear sign that Russia is going to make good on that threat.
The next threat would be against factories in the UK and in Germany. I think those would be the two priority targets. If Russia continues to get hit with long-range missiles or intermediate-range missiles and long-range drones produced in the West, it will take action against them — hit them — and then follow up with a warning that if this continues, it will be followed with tactical nukes. We are not playing around anymore. We're not going to let you sit here and launch attacks on us as if there's no consequence.
Glenn Diesen: Well, I remember in November of 2021 when the US and Ukraine signed some strategic partnership — I forget the exact name — which would elevate US military contributions to Ukraine. At that point, an adviser to the former French president made the point that this was when the Russians believed it was either attack or be attacked, and merely three months later they attacked, wanting to be first. So there are some indications that from the Russian perspective, they saw that attack as preemptive — a war that was coming, and they would do it on their own terms instead of waiting for the other side. So it's not that unrealistic, I guess.
Anyways, before we go, do you have any final thoughts?
Larry Johnson: Well, I'd pay attention to what happens with the fuel situation — with diesel and aviation fuel — over the next couple of weeks. Again, maybe those who passed me this information missed something, but I thought they made a pretty credible explanation about how the price on the market for futures is not actually accurately capturing what's going on. So we'll have to see. At a minimum, I think the fuel shortage will limit what the United States can do militarily, at least for the short term. But once we're into September, the odds of Trump trying to restart attacks on Iran and risk US casualties and US losses before the midterms — I don't see that happening at all.
Glenn Diesen: Well, Larry, as always, thank you, and happy Independence Day.
Larry Johnson: Hey, thanks so much, Glenn. Appreciate it, man.