Seyed Marandi discusses the Iran-US war, Strait of Hormuz tolls, and Iran's nuclear posture
Glenn Diesen interviews Professor Seyed Marandi on the current state of the Iran-US conflict and diplomatic prospects.
Summary
Professor Seyed Marandi — a professor at Tehran University and former adviser to Iran's nuclear negotiation team — joins Glenn Diesen to assess the current state of the Iran-US conflict. He argues that the US has been the consistent aggressor since the ceasefire, conducting siege warfare and periodic strikes on Iranian territory, while Iran has retaliated with sufficient force to cause the US to pause escalation. He contends that Iran's control of the Strait of Hormuz — including the collection of transit fees and the exclusion of Israeli-affiliated vessels — is now a permanent feature of the regional order, and that Trump and Netanyahu bear responsibility for creating this new reality. On the question of a nuclear weapon, he states that while Iranian public opinion has shifted strongly in favour of acquiring one, he sees no indication that the Iranian state is moving in that direction, and he questions the logic of conducting a physical nuclear test given that modern AI simulation makes it unnecessary.
Key Takeaways
FULL TRANSCRIPT
Opening: The state of the war and US ceasefire violations
Glenn Diesen: Welcome back to the program. We are joined again by Professor Seyed Marandi, a professor at Tehran University and a former adviser to Iran's nuclear negotiation team. I'm very glad you had the time to speak today because there seem to be a lot of developments going on — both with the war, the possible diplomatic path, and also speculation about Iran, if not developing a nuclear weapon, at least showing its capability to do so. I want to ask how much is speculation, but maybe we start at the beginning. How do you see the current state of the war? Because we now saw that the US appears to be stepping up against Iran, and at the same time we see Iran having struck Kuwait. How can we best understand what's happening at the moment?
Seyed Marandi: Ever since the ceasefire began — the supposed ceasefire — the United States has effectively, almost immediately afterwards, a few days afterwards, begun siege warfare against Iran, which is an act of war. And it's a double-edged sword, because the global economy is crashing as a result. In addition to that, every now and then the United States carries out some sort of attack on Iranian territory. Iran has never initiated any ceasefire breach. It's always been the United States. And it's interesting that when Trump says, "In that part of the world these things happen," no — it's just the United States and its allies that are always breaching ceasefires. No one else does that.
The Iranians, though, every time the Americans would attack, they would retaliate, but this time round was different. The Iranian retaliation was very harsh, and two things could have happened: either the Americans could have again carried out further strikes in sort of retaliation — even though they themselves started this — or they could have stopped. And so far they've stopped. I think that shows that the Iranian escalation was something that the Americans did not want, at least at this stage.
This comes almost simultaneous with what happened in Lebanon right before this latest incident. As you know better than I, and your viewers obviously know better than I, the Israeli regime decided to flatten Beirut, especially the southern part of Beirut. They've been saying it openly — they don't say it much in the Western media, obviously. The Iranians said that if the Israeli regime starts bombing civilian infrastructure in the capital Beirut, it will fire missiles at northern Israel. And that caused a conversation between Trump and Netanyahu where this completely discredited Axios put out a quote from Trump which, in this particular case, may indeed be true. But ultimately the Israeli regime refrained from bombing Beirut, which would indicate that at this moment at least the United States does not want escalation at any cost.
That could be — and probably is — because the global economic situation is, as we've been discussing for weeks now, moving closer and closer to the cliff, and we are indeed now very close. Energy experts, oil experts, and economists have been saying that the month of June will be a turning point with regards to the economic crisis, because the strategic reserves for oil will be depleted or close to depletion. And of course the shortages of all the other goods that are missing now on the market because of the siege on the Strait of Hormuz — helium, petrochemicals, all the different petrochemicals, LNG, as well as fertilisers — all of these things. Interestingly, from what I've read, a lot of these different commodities will also be in very short supply during this period — June, July — so there's a lot of overlap in the shortages across different commodities.
In any case, I think the United States is very fearful of escalation now because they know that if there's escalation, there are no negotiations and there will be no more messages being sent back and forth. When I say negotiations, I mean written messages that go back and forth. This is basically what is going on between Iran and the United States. The Americans send a written message through Pakistan. It goes to Iran. They read it, they write a response, and they send it back through Pakistan to the United States.
So when you look at the harsh Iranian response in the Persian Gulf region — and the reason why they struck Kuwait and Bahrain was because these two regimes were deeply involved in the American strikes on Iran — and the major threat that Iran made to the Israeli regime to refrain from bombing Beirut, in both cases the United States has for now backed down, or forced the Israeli regime to back down. And I think that says a lot.
The diplomatic path: conditions, obstacles, and the Strait of Hormuz toll
Glenn Diesen: So to summarise: the US continues these probing attacks until the Iranians push back, the global economic situation goes from bad to worse, and I've heard the same thing that this month could be a very difficult turning point. But Trump — his whole approach to this — he's become the boy who cried wolf. On day one he talks about how close they are to peace with the Iranians, on day two he will destroy Iran, day three he goes back to being really close to a deal. It's a bit back and forth. His motivations are many — some signalling to the Iranians, his own public, the stock market — there are a lot of considerations here. But in terms of actually reaching something that looks like peace, how possible do you think it is? Because Iran says Lebanon has to be included in a ceasefire, in a peace deal — they can't simply stop the fighting with Iran and then start plowing through Lebanon and essentially bombing Beirut to the ground. And at the same time, the Strait of Hormuz — what do the Americans demand there versus what the Iranians can deliver? Because from what I understand, the Iranians are already essentially operating a toll booth there. The new realities are already in place and they don't seem willing to walk this one back. So is Trump trapped in this conflict now, or do you think there's a pathway to peace through diplomacy?
Seyed Marandi: You're right. Iran is receiving fees at the Strait of Hormuz and this will not go away. This is going to be a permanent feature of the Persian Gulf in future. And that is of course something which the United States and the Israeli regime should blame Trump and Netanyahu for, because Iran never had such an ambition before.
But more important than the fees they get at the strait is the fact that many ships will no longer be able to pass through — meaning US military vessels, but also ships that are linked to the Israeli regime will no longer be able to use the strait. You may be surprised to know that among the roughly 1,500 or so ships that are stuck in the Persian Gulf, quite a few of them — I've been told over 200, but I'm not sure if that's true — have at least partial Israeli ownership. And they don't necessarily take goods to and from the regime. They may, for example, take goods from Bahrain to Iraq, to the Emirates, or something of that sort. So in future, ships affiliated to the regime will no longer be able to use the Persian Gulf or the Strait of Hormuz. Again, people in the regime or in the United States can blame Trump and Netanyahu for this catastrophic change of circumstances.
With regards to peace, that's difficult to say, because of course two key issues exist that the Iranians are not going to compromise on. One is of course the siege on the Strait of Hormuz, and the other is the end to the war in Lebanon and the full retreat of the Israeli regime from Lebanon and Gaza. The slaughter in Gaza has to end and the ceasefire in Gaza has to be implemented. That's something the Iranians have said. If anyone looks at the text they write, there has to be an end to the wars across the region, but the particular focus has been on Lebanon because the genocidal attacks on Lebanon now are even worse than what we see in Gaza these days. So it includes Lebanon. There must be a full retreat in the case of Lebanon. And these are issues that are very difficult for the United States. Trump would like to see Lebanon removed from the agreement and to have the Israelis destroy Lebanon. But Iran won't have that.
And as I said, Iran is also saying that the ceasefire — the problem with Gaza, Glenn, is that countries in our region helped Trump put Gaza in this horrific situation. Erdoğan, Abdullah of Jordan, el-Sisi, the despots in the region, Aliyev of Azerbaijan, and rulers from across the region and across the world went to Egypt for that fake ceasefire celebration of Trump's. Not only did they whitewash his genocide, but they gave a stamp of approval for it. There is a ceasefire in Gaza where the Israeli regime controls more than half of it in accordance with that ceasefire. But we've been seeing slaughter ever since. Almost a thousand Palestinians have been murdered since the ceasefire — women and children. Israeli snipers shoot into tents where kids are having class and kill the kids. They burned kids alive just a couple of days ago in their tent. This is not something directed towards Hamas — even though in a ceasefire it doesn't matter if it's Hamas or Islamic Jihad or anyone else or Hezbollah or anyone. When you have a ceasefire, you have a ceasefire.
But in any case, since there is a ceasefire in place in the case of Gaza, Iran can only demand so much, because that ceasefire was agreed to by Hamas under great pressure from these regional regimes that did nothing for them, unlike Iran and the axis of resistance. So unless the Israeli regime is forced to leave — which is going to be difficult — the resistance in Lebanon has been very effective. The Iranian threat has played a major role, but Hezbollah is performing exceptionally well. I think a lot of your viewers have seen images of drones striking Israeli regime targets across southern Lebanon and even northern occupied Palestine.
So it's difficult to achieve with these sorts of differences, but it's not impossible. And Trump needs an agreement. The Americans have had a greater sense of urgency with regards to an agreement with Iran than we've ever seen before, especially in recent weeks. But the counter forces are very strong.
Just one thing, Glenn: I think that the statement that came out — I think Trump insulted Netanyahu — I think this was actually intended to weaken Netanyahu, and that it's not just Trump. I think that even Zionists — Israeli firsters in the White House, very powerful Zionists in the United States — may be concluding that Netanyahu should gradually be removed from power. Because unlike in previous cases where Axios did a lot of fake news on differences between the US president and Netanyahu — and we are approaching the anniversary of the Libs Creek attack last year, the 12-day war, where we had the same sort of news where Netanyahu and Trump had differences and Trump wanted to give negotiations more time, and then they attacked Iran — it was obvious that it was a lie, basically to deceive the Iranians. This was about three or four days from now last year when probably this Axios article came out.
But in this case it's different, because Netanyahu has been humiliated at home and he's being attacked by his opponents but also by his political allies. This is very different from previous Axios so-called revelations. And it's also bad for the Israeli regime, because to have Trump say "everyone hates Israel" and so on, and to have even Fox News repeat this — at least I saw it on its Twitter account — is a big thing. So I think there is probably an attempt to bring an end to Netanyahu's reign, which will have elections in a few months. But again, this is just speculation on my part.
The greater Israel project and the delegitimisation of the Israeli regime
Glenn Diesen: Well, whenever I talk to people like Professor Mearsheimer, he always makes the point that while the US and Israel are joined at the hip, if the key strategic interest of the United States is threatened, this could be the moment where the US essentially elevates US interests above Israeli ones. That is, if it's a peripheral interest, it will put Israel first. But if it's a core interest of the United States, then reality will have to be respected. Again, speculation or a thesis at least. But it is interesting that it's not just the core interest of the US but also part of the Israeli, because from the Israelis' point of view they often seek more strategic depth to enhance their security — essentially seizing territories and sowing some chaos in neighbouring countries, along the lines of Syria. I assume that's what they're going for in Lebanon as well. But if Trump is trying to rein in the Israelis, aren't we talking about essentially ending the greater Israel project here?
Seyed Marandi: I'm not sure if it's so much Trump rather than forces more important than Trump. I'm not quite sure whether Trump himself put this into Axios or whether people around Trump said maybe it's time to put such a quotation in Axios. Whether it's accurate or semi-accurate, it doesn't matter — what the public has been fed has had a huge impact.
I think that the greater Israel project is going to bring about the destruction of Israel, and I think that this whole two and a half to three years of genocide that we've seen has pushed the Israeli regime towards its ultimate destruction, because the greatest threat to the Israeli regime is not the armies of neighbouring countries. It is the delegitimisation of the regime in the eyes of the world. Two and a half to three years of genocide, which is ongoing, and then in addition to that the global economic hardship that the regime is imposing — because across the world people are saying, for example, let's look at India: the Indian government has shown unfortunately a lot of support for the Israeli regime for the last couple of years since the genocide, under Prime Minister Modi's government, yet the Israeli regime has shown complete disregard for the interests of the people of India in the war against Iran and what's happened to the Strait of Hormuz. So the hardship in India, or in Uganda, or in Argentina, or wherever, is going to be blamed on Trump and Netanyahu — and is being blamed on them. According to colleagues in India, the mood in that country has shifted, with the majority now opposed to Trump. They dislike Trump now. And of course the same is true with the Israeli regime. The mood has changed. So when a place like India has this shift, you can imagine how it is elsewhere. I think this is the greatest defeat of all.
I also think that right now this is the Iranian strategy — for weeks this has been the Iranian strategy — to increase the pain on the Americans until they reach an agreement, and to continue down this road until the United States comes to the conclusion that they have to prioritise their own interests over the Israeli regime. The siege which the Americans have imposed is a double-edged sword. It's destroying the global economy and it's hurting Iranians — no doubt about that. The economic difficulties in Iran are clear. But the Iranians will see this through. Whatever pain is inflicted on Iranians, the Iranians know that this is a fact of their survival. So what the Iranians are attempting to do is not to wreck the global economy — that's not an Iranian objective at all. But they want to continue down this course of action until the United States reaches a point where it concludes: if we continue with this siege and with this policy, it will wreck our economy, and so we have to make a decision that prioritises the United States over the Israeli regime.
This is, I think, similar to what Professor Mearsheimer was speaking of. And I believe personally — and I have not seen anyone else say this, so it may just be inaccurate speculation on my behalf — I believe that the Axios report could be seen within this context, even though I believe that the Israeli firsters put that forward. In other words, even those who are Israeli firsters in the United States are gradually becoming fearful of what is happening to the United States, because of the way in which that will impact the mood towards the Israeli regime. I would imagine that quite a few Zionists and powerful people in the United States would be saying to themselves: look, Netanyahu — Israel is becoming deeply unpopular in the United States. I think 60% of Americans now look negatively at the regime. And so if this continues, it becomes more entrenched and worse. Maybe if we remove Netanyahu and put someone else — some other genocidal monster — in his place, we can say that the genocide and everything was Netanyahu, and this is a new government, and so on. Even though, according to polls and according to their own public statements by opposition figures in Israel, they're just as genocidal. But they could have a public relations opportunity to try to change the mood in the United States.
I think what Iran is doing is basically what Professor Mearsheimer was also talking about — to push the United States towards greater economic hardship to a point where the United States must conclude that it has to prioritise itself now rather than the Israeli regime.
Can the US accept peace? The Strait of Hormuz as strategic leverage
Glenn Diesen: I think the United States is at least slowly coming to the conclusion that they can't win this war militarily. But I'm wondering to what extent the US can accept the peace. I mean, if they can't do war but they can't accept peace either — I say this because, if I were Iranian and holding on to the Strait of Hormuz, I would not just have a toll for rebuilding. I would use this instrumentally to enhance my security. I would put a slightly higher toll on countries that sanction Iran, because I would create economic incentives to remove those sanctions. I would put a bit higher tolls on countries that threaten Iran by hosting US military bases, again putting some incentives to have them scaled down or removed altogether. And you can also put a higher toll on countries that sell their oil in US dollars, to essentially put an end to the petrodollar system that links US security interests so closely to the region. Again, not advocacy — I'm just saying, if I were Iranian, I'm assuming it is not just for reparations and rebuilding. So I guess these thoughts have also occurred in Washington. To what extent do you think Iran would use the Strait of Hormuz instrumentally like this to also enhance its economic and military security, and to what extent does it become possible for the US to essentially accept peace under those conditions?
Seyed Marandi: I'm sure the Iranians are thinking that. As we speak, they are taking fees and they will continue to do so, and they will restrict certain ships from enemy countries or unfriendly countries from using the Persian Gulf. And they may indeed have a two-tier system — preferable rates for friends and not so preferable rates for unfriendly countries. I think that's something they would definitely be considering. They've already been talking about it.
I find it very difficult to believe that the United States can come to any peace agreement with Iran — this United States, this government, this state. Even if there is a ceasefire agreement, even if there is an agreement signed between the two sides in the coming weeks — I doubt it's days — it will be in two stages, as we all know. The first stage will be ending the blockade, ending the genocidal attacks on Lebanon and retreating, and of course Gaza, and the return of Iranian stolen assets and the waiving of sanctions for Iranian oil and energy exports for the duration of the agreement. And in return, Iran will promise not to develop a nuclear weapon, which it has done hundreds of times — no big deal. And the Strait of Hormuz will go back to normal in terms of the number of ships that pass through.
But that's the first stage. The second stage would be the removal of all sanctions on Iran. Many of them are enshrined in law. Trump can't remove them, and I find it almost impossible to imagine the House and the Senate doing such a thing — removing those sanctions. And then of course the Iranian nuclear programme, which the Americans want Iran to put aside, and that's not going to happen either. So what sort of agreement would they be able to agree upon? These are big questions, and I find it almost impossible for Trump to be able to come to some sort of long-term agreement with Iran. I'm really not sure. It's still, for me, 50/50 whether there will be an agreement, and if there is an agreement I think it's highly unlikely that the second phase of that agreement will ever reach the ultimate results that either side is seeking.
Iran's nuclear posture: fatwa, public opinion, and the logic of deterrence
Glenn Diesen: At this point it seems more probable that it will be an extended ceasefire under continuous negotiations of the terms. Again, it's hard to say, but this is not a stable situation, especially pointing to the global economy. I have read lately a lot of speculation about Iran's nuclear weapons — I'm not going to say nuclear weapons programme or that it has nuclear weapons — but the assumption has often been that Iran would position itself as a threshold state. That is, if for example Israel were to strike Iran with nuclear weapons, the Iranians would be in a position to quickly cross that threshold, assemble some rudimentary nuclear weapons, and then retaliate. This would essentially be its deterrent — having a nuclear deterrent without becoming a nuclear power. You can assume Japan and other countries would do something similar. But others have speculated that Iran might try to send a powerful message by having a nuclear test or something along these lines. I was wondering how you see this, because on one hand that would be a powerful deterrent, but on the other hand it would perhaps turn much of the world against the goodwill of Iran. I thought, who better to speak with than a former adviser to Iran's nuclear negotiation team?
Seyed Marandi: I have great respect for Larry Johnson, and Pepe Escobar too is a very good friend of mine and I have great respect for him. I know both of them personally. We've been together and their information — I listen to what they have to say on different issues because they have a lot to offer. In this particular case, I don't have any information on this front, on this issue.
Until now, the Iranian policy has not been to pursue nuclear weapons, and it's been stated in public. There's a fatwa, and fatwas are very serious things in Shia Islam in particular. In Shia Islam, the mujtahid — the highly qualified expert — in Shia Islam the gates of ijtihad, the gates of jurisprudence, are open, unlike in Sunni Islam. So time and place have an impact on religious laws and regulations. Laws can change. Of course the foundations — it's not relativism — but laws are also influenced and impacted by time and place. So the 21st century is different from the 20th century. Time and place is important. The context is important.
Ayatollah Khamenei's ruling, his fatwa, was clear — that there would be no nuclear weapon. But even at that time, we did have Dr. Zarif — who was martyred in this war — who was the chair of the Supreme National Security Council. He said, actually before he was the chair of the council but he was an heir to the leader, that if there was an existential threat to Iran's existence, Iran's nuclear posture would change. Dr. Kharrazi, who was the foreign minister for eight years under President Khatami's presidency, and who was also an adviser to the leader — he too was martyred in this war — he said that Iran could have made nuclear weapons years ago but Iran chose not to do so. And I think he also said that if Iran is under existential threat, its nuclear posture would change.
So even under the martyrs, Iran had that position. And the current leader — the current fatwa stands, but if he were to make a different fatwa he would be entitled to do so, because as I said he's a different person and he would have his own fatwa. And in Shia jurisprudence, time and place matter — the gate of jurisprudence is open.
But I don't see any shift in public statements, in the mood among senior figures in government and in the state. I don't see that shift. I don't see this sense that Iran is under existential threat, first and foremost, at the moment.
Public opinion has changed, though. Before the 12-day war a year ago, the government and senior figures were always saying we do not want nuclear weapons — they would always stress the fatwa. Back then the mood was almost 50/50 among ordinary Iranians. After the 12-day war, most Iranians wanted a nuclear weapon according to polls. And I would imagine after this war, although it's still ongoing, probably the majority is even greater. My anecdotal experiences on the streets of Tehran, when people approach me, are: why don't we have nuclear weapons? I think the majority — I would imagine a strong majority now — wants that. But I don't think the state at this moment wants that.
I've listened to what Larry has said. I've listened to what Pepe has said too, and I can't — I'm not privy to that sort of information, and I'm absolutely certain that they are correctly reflecting what has been told to them by people who have good sources. But there are a couple of things I would imagine would be unlikely. One is to test a nuclear weapon. I don't see why — let's say if Iran were to at some point in the future, under an existential threat situation — why would Iran test? I don't see the necessity of doing so, especially nowadays with the technologies and AI simulations and so on. You don't really need to — I don't think anyone needs to do so. Why would they waste a nuclear weapon?
So I have no information. I cannot reject what they say. I don't see the logic of testing a nuclear weapon. But I don't see any sign or indication among Iranian officials that the country is moving in that direction. I don't feel that the country is currently under existential threat. I think that the defeat of the United States on the battlefield was decisive. Iran's upper hand during siege warfare is clear. And I think so far at least — I may be wrong — the United States does not want to continue a war with Iran and is looking for a way out. And I also believe that probably many Zionists — for their own reasons, still Israeli firsters — probably think deescalation is better for the Israeli regime.
In fact, I've said this on your show before: I think that the Zionist regime is the biggest loser in the last two and a half to three years, and this war has been a big loss to them too. They've delegitimised themselves in the eyes of the world. They've weakened the United States, which is the country they need the most. They've created dislike towards the regime in the United States. So I think that some Zionists, for the sake of the survival of the regime, would probably want to see Netanyahu removed and the Israeli regime backing down, to allow the deescalation to continue between the United States and Iran — and that would of course include Lebanon. Not that they are not genocidal — they're just as genocidal as others — but I would think that some of them are more pragmatic and would see the dangers that are approaching.
But I think that Iran has the upper hand. Iran has its peaceful nuclear programme. Iran is technologically advanced — I think we saw that on the battlefield. I don't see any indication of what our two very good friends are quoting. It's not visible to me.
Nuclear proliferation, US demands, and the logic of Iran's conventional deterrent
Glenn Diesen: Well, that's got to be my running assumption — that the main reason for not acquiring nuclear weapons would be the predictable proliferation in the region. The Saudis, others would then start to look towards it, the Turks quite possibly. But if —
Seyed Marandi: And by the way, Glenn — sorry for interrupting — this war by Trump, if anything, not only has it made Iran into a world power effectively through its control of the Strait of Hormuz, but it creates an incentive for many countries to start thinking about nuclear weapons. Countries all across the world will be saying, you know, we could be next, for whatever reason. So what Trump has done is increase the possibility — not of Iran, but of many other countries — to say, well, maybe we should think about nuclear weapons.
Glenn Diesen: Well, that's what I was getting to. The main reason to acquire one would be if you make a country fear for its existence. And not only going to war with Iran, but then putting peace conditions as Iran essentially giving up its conventional deterrence — its ballistic missile programme, its regional allies. If a country fears for its existence and has no conventional deterrent, I mean, this is the perfect recipe for nuclear proliferation. So I'm wondering if they thought thoroughly through what they're actually demanding here.
But it's very hard to make sense of this war and the decisions that have been made. Just a very last quick question: in terms of US intentions and pursuing the war or seeking peace, how do you read the US current force posture? Do you see them building up, drawing down, or just maintaining? Because I'm not getting a lot of information on this topic.
Seyed Marandi: Well, just to touch upon what you said last — when it comes to the Israeli regime, US policymakers and Western policymakers are very irrational, and so they do things that have destroyed their image, destroyed their soft power, and destroyed their economic and military capabilities, all for this little colony. And they've made Iran and the axis of resistance popular across the world after 47 years of demonisation of Iran. Iran is hugely popular across the global majority. You may be surprised to know how many people are supporting Iran in the United States right now — online, young people, and so on. I'm not saying a majority or anything, but clearly things have changed. And so 47 years of Western demonisation of Iran has crumbled because when it comes to Israel they're so irrational and unreasonable.
This potential policy — or the idea that will now grow among policymakers across the world that we have to have some sort of deterrence in future — has been brought about due to Western policy. But it's not just this. I mean, the rise of BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the realignments, the growth of the notion of a multipolar world — all of this is due to Western policy and imperial policy. So it's both global, but in our region with the Israeli regime they are particularly irrational. That's what leads to Western media turning a blind eye to genocide in Gaza and Lebanon. In Gaza, the Western media said, "Well, we don't have a presence." So while we were watching kids being flattened and torn to pieces every day, they would look away saying, "Well, we don't have people there." In Lebanon, they have a full presence, a very large presence. But they do the same. They look away. They try to justify what the Israeli regime does. They keep saying these are Hezbollah targets while we're watching footage of dead kids and families being massacred. So the West has undermined itself utterly. When it comes to Israel there is no morality — their reasoning, their logic is cast aside and they are utterly illogical and unreasonable. So I don't think they care enough about whether this would cause other countries to pursue nuclear weapons or not. They say, "We have to do this for the Israeli regime."
What was your question? I'm sorry, I got so distracted.
Glenn Diesen: The US force posture in the region — do you see them building up, drawing down, or just preserving as it is?
US force posture in the Persian Gulf and the role of Saudi Arabia and Qatar
Seyed Marandi: It's more or less the same. It's a very large presence. They have not removed their assets. But from my understanding, the morale of US troops is not good. The weather is very hot and humid now in the Persian Gulf region and in the Arabian Peninsula. US sailors on ships are having a very tough time. US forces on the Arabian Peninsula are having a very tough time because their bases have been destroyed. And they have lots of equipment there that is not well protected — not only from potentially Iranian attacks, but also from the hot weather and from the sand. The damage being done to US equipment and planes is enormous because of the humidity, because of the sandstorms, because of the heat. So the morale isn't high, and the equipment is not in an ideal environment for protection.
But they are still there and they haven't moved. They've brought in extra troops — ground troops and equipment to carry out ground assaults. They are based in the Emirates, in Bahrain, and in Kuwait more than in Saudi Arabia and Qatar. In Saudi Arabia and Qatar they do have assets, but in these three countries — Kuwait, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates — they have large numbers and are more active against Iran as we speak. Saudi Arabia and Qatar are trying to take a different position and are beginning to behave more reasonably. But again, if there is war and their territory is used, the Iranians will retaliate — there's no doubt about that. But we do see movement in Saudi Arabia and in Qatar in a different direction.
Western media narratives and the self-censorship trap
Glenn Diesen: Just a quick side note on the Western media — I think they trap themselves a bit. I noticed, especially at the beginning of the war, that even before it started, if one would challenge the motivation for going to war or the likelihood of success, one could be argued to be making a pro-Iranian argument, so it's kind of dismissed. It's similar to the war against Russia — if you make the point that this is a proxy war and we can't win this, then that's a pro-Russian argument and it kind of disappears. No journalists want to essentially be seen as taking the side of Iran. The great irony, of course, is that that's the source of all this self-harm. If they had been honest — for example, that Iran sees this as an existential threat, then it could have been very predictable that Iran would be willing to absorb a lot of pain if its existence is at stake. And if they had been honest about the fighting power of Iran, this would also have been quite important. But I think this is a self-harm of being trapped in these narratives. Anyway, any final thoughts?
Seyed Marandi: Just one final point. Last night I was on the British Channel 4 News — it's sometimes a bit different from other English media, and some journalists more so than others. Jon Snow, who used to be their lead anchor, was I think a very decent person and unique in British television media. They sent a team to Iran and I was on their show last night for a few minutes. I went to the streets with them, and in those four minutes the host — who I think is one of the better journalists — said, "Yes, but in Iran I see people on the streets who are afraid to approach us because there are guards around." And I was saying — the connection apparently wasn't that good at that moment — come on. After all, after three and a half months of war, after all the Americans had done, it's clear where the Iranian people stand. But you still want to say this is a police state.
I mean, you're first and foremost sending a message to the West, and you see all these people on the streets. If people are cautious about you, it's not because they're afraid of guards. It's because for the most part people don't trust you. They think that if they speak with you, you will twist what they say and use it against Iran, because you're from the British media. But he said, "I see people in the streets who are afraid to approach me." I say, how do you know they're afraid? What do you see in their eyes? What is visible?
The problem is that that narrative is still there, even when they come to Iran. Instead of saying, "Well, the Iranian people were steadfast, they rallied around the flag, they resisted this onslaught — this unprecedented onslaught where the Americans put in all they had, the Europeans applied maximum pressure sanctions, and regional regimes were helping them directly or indirectly" — instead of acknowledging that the Iranian people were opposed to this war, he tries to fit in this idea that people are afraid. These people, under air strikes, weren't afraid of standing on the streets and protesting. When their protests were bombed, they weren't afraid and they wouldn't flee. When people were killed in front of them on the streets, they wouldn't flee. But still, Western media — I'm not saying that the reporter is a bad person. I would imagine that reporter, in order to remain relevant in the UK, would have to say this sort of thing so that he would not be accused, as you were saying, of being pro-regime or pro-Iran or repeating Iranian regime talking points.
Glenn Diesen: Apologist — that's a popular one too.
Seyed Marandi: Yeah.
Glenn Diesen: Anyway, thank you so much for taking time out of your very busy day.
Seyed Marandi: Thank you very much for having me, Glenn. It's always a great honour.