Seyed Marandi updates on Iran's rejection of the US deal and the likelihood of renewed war
Glenn Diesen interviews Professor Seyed Marandi of Tehran University on the state of Iran-US negotiations and military tensions.
Summary
Professor Seyed Marandi — a professor at Tehran University and former adviser to Iran's nuclear negotiation team — joins Glenn Diesen to discuss the rapidly evolving situation following a 39-day war between Iran and the United States (itself preceded by an earlier 12-day war, from which Iran says it drew strategic lessons). Marandi argues that the US proposal handed to Iran is almost certainly unacceptable because it fails to meet Iran's conditions: a regional ceasefire covering Gaza and Lebanon, and preservation of Iranian sovereignty over its nuclear program and the Strait of Hormuz. He states that the mood in Iran is that a major US military assault is highly probable and could come at any time, and that Iran's missile and drone capabilities are now greater than before the war began. Marandi also warns that the ongoing siege of the Persian Gulf — even without active combat — is silently devastating the global economy through collapsing supply chains, and that every day of continued US pressure makes a global depression more likely. He also discusses a recent Iran-China meeting in Beijing, noting that China was strongly impressed by Iran's performance in the war, and contextualizes the conflict within a broader US strategy of simultaneously pressuring China, Russia, and Iran.
Key Takeaways
FULL TRANSCRIPT
Iran's Response to the US Proposal and Core Negotiating Conditions
Glenn Diesen: Welcome back. We are joined again by Professor Seyed Marandi, a professor at Tehran University and a former adviser to Iran's nuclear negotiation team. Thank you for coming back. Things keep changing fast in this war. The last news I see is that the United States has handed over a peace proposal to Iran and they're now arguing that they're waiting for Iran's response. However, it seems that part of this deal doesn't actually address any nuclear issue and also doesn't address the Strait of Hormuz, if I'm not mistaken. What can we make of this? Why are negotiations taking place?
Seyed Marandi: Thank you very much for inviting me, Glenn. It's always a great pleasure. With regards to the content of the American proposal, we'll have to wait and see, but I think it's very clear that the Iranian position is not going to shift away from its current priorities. Number one is a ceasefire — an end to the fighting. The United States and the Israeli regime are currently violating that ceasefire, and until they end the slaughter in Lebanon and in Gaza, and until Trump ends the siege on the Persian Gulf, there won't be any possibility to move forward. After that, it will be the ten-point plan that the Iranians put forward and Trump accepted. The Iranians are not going to move away from that. If the Americans think that over time it's going to change, or that these positions were put forward for internal consumption, they're mistaken. They're badly mistaken. It's a major miscalculation — as big as the miscalculation they made when they launched the war in the first place.
What the Americans are now saying — the news now — is that the Americans are insisting that the Iranians have to respond within a particular time frame. That very demand is going to make the Iranians respond later. In other words, when the United States starts trying to bully Iran at any level, the Iranians are going to push back. So I assume that whatever deadline the Americans have given, the Iranians are going to give their response even if it's ready a day or two or three later than that deadline, just to make sure that the Americans get the message that Iran is not going to be intimidated.
My assumption — and I'm just speculating — is that the American proposal violates Iranian sovereignty and seeks, without knowing the exact content, that which it has not been able to gain on the battlefield. Thus it will definitely not be acceptable, if that is true. Iran is willing to be flexible on different issues, but not on matters of principle. When it comes to the nuclear program, Iran is not going to give up its peaceful nuclear program or its enrichment program. It's not going to give up its sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz. It's not going to give up any of these key issues. But it is willing to do a deal — like it did in 2015. However, I don't believe the 2015 deal is acceptable to Iran either. It's going to have to be an upgraded version — not the upgraded version that Trump is thinking about, but the upgraded version that the Iranians are thinking about. So if Trump thinks he's going to get a deal better than Obama's, I think he's badly mistaken. Any deal ultimately, if we ever have a deal, will have to be much more favorable than the 2015 agreement.
At the end of the day, Glenn, the Americans — Trump and Netanyahu — they gambled and they lost. And they may attack again. The belief here is that there's a very strong possibility that an attack may be imminent. I know I've said this a couple of times before in the last couple of weeks, but that's been the mood here for the last couple of weeks — that an attack could happen at any time. It could happen now. It could happen tonight, tomorrow morning. It could happen anytime before Trump's visit to China, and it could happen afterwards as well. At the moment, the way in which US forces are postured in the region indicates that an attack is quite possible. It's probable. Again, it may not happen, but that's what the Iranians have prepared themselves for.
The belief is that the attacks the Americans have carried out in the Persian Gulf region — in the Gulf of Oman and near the Strait of Hormuz — were a test. And I think they understood that the Iranian response was significant. The Iranian response was robust. So the Americans — regardless of what exactly happened during these last few days — the fact is that no ships left the Strait of Hormuz. I think that's the most important thing to come out of all of this: despite all their efforts, no ships left. They're all in the Strait of Hormuz. And the US ships, from my understanding, have been struck not by missiles but by drones. The Iranians did not want to damage these ships badly because Iran does not want to escalate. But at the same time, the Iranians want the Americans to recognize that they are very vulnerable. So the damage done was intentionally limited.
In addition to that, the Americans have not — from my sources, and my sources are not bad — they have not struck any military naval ships. They've hit a civilian ship that was carrying a small amount of cargo from Oman, killing one person. Before I thought there were five people killed, but one person was killed. And they hit a number of fishing boats that were, I think, moving to help that boat that was hit — the boat that was in distress — but no one was killed in that incident. What the Americans did do is they murdered a few people on a tanker that was linked to Iran. But they have not struck a single Iranian soldier. Not a single Iranian naval boat or ship has been struck by the Americans, and no ships have left the Persian Gulf.
Finally, I just want to remind your viewers — always remember: the Strait of Hormuz is not closed. The Iranians have never closed the Strait of Hormuz. It is closed to those five countries that participated in the war against Iran — meaning Bahrain, the Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. Otherwise, ships belonging to friendly countries go through. And ships belonging to friendly countries that did business with these five countries — some of them, through negotiations, have passed through the Strait of Hormuz. It is the Americans who have caused a situation where effectively nothing is going through the Strait of Hormuz.
The Ceasefire Conditions and the Question of Lebanon and Gaza
Glenn Diesen: It does appear that the US is going back to war against Iran. As you said, the troop posture in the region indicates this, and also the rhetoric — that Iran has to accept this deal, Iran can't accept this deal. So it does appear they're going back to war. On the other hand, the US seems to have some limitations in terms of actual weapons stockpiles and what it can actually achieve. I think the Americans are now accepting more that they're not going to be able to achieve these objectives — to put the Strait of Hormuz under US control. That begs the question of what they would do next. But I wanted to ask, since you mentioned Israel and Lebanon — one of the things that Iran has put forward would be to have an end to the attacks on Lebanon, but it appears that the United States isn't really going in this direction, or at least seemingly avoiding putting any limitations on Israel's warfare in the region. Do you know if this has dropped out completely from the talks, or is this still something they're discussing?
Seyed Marandi: It doesn't matter to Iran what the Americans want to have on the table or what the Americans remove from the table. There has to be a regional ceasefire. Lebanon was named specifically because of the heavy fighting, but it's a regional ceasefire, so it would have to include Gaza. The Iranians are not going to remove that from the table. That is a condition. If that condition is not met, then there's no ceasefire, and it doesn't matter what sort of pressure the Americans try to put on Iran.
Not only that, but they have to fulfill all of their obligations within the framework of the ceasefire that was agreed after 39 days of war. The Americans began the war with Netanyahu and the Zionist regime. They began the war by demanding unconditional surrender, and they failed. At the end of the day, after 39 days, they accepted the Iranian ten-point plan as the framework for negotiations. Trump himself accepted that. That is why Iran accepted a ceasefire, and of course it was a major symbolic defeat for the Americans — that's why Trump was ridiculed and attacked, and then his spokeswoman said "no, we threw this in the bin." But this is what he accepted. So that is the framework for negotiations, and the ceasefire that was agreed upon is also the framework for being able to move forward with those negotiations.
Iran is not going to accept the Americans shifting their position. What the Americans want is for the Israelis to slaughter Palestinians and slaughter Lebanese. We've seen two and a half years of extermination in Palestine, and the collective West has supported it. That's not acceptable to us. And that will block negotiations or progress in negotiations.
Gulf State Alliances and Cracks in the US Coalition
Glenn Diesen: How do you make sense of the seeming disruption in some of the cooperation between the Gulf states and the United States? Apparently Saudi Arabia limited its airspace to the Americans and then pulled back from that limitation shortly thereafter. Are there any splits now in the American-led alliance, or was this just a very temporary phenomenon?
Seyed Marandi: I don't think anyone is very certain whether it was blocked and then unblocked at all in the first place, or whether it was blocked or is still blocked. No one knows. The only thing the Iranians know is that the US has substantial aircraft capabilities — air power — in Qatar and in the Emirates. I think their air power is focused in four or five places, but a lot is in Saudi Arabia, in Jordan, in the Emirates, and in Qatar. The ground troops they brought to the region — from my understanding, a lot of them are in Kuwait, in Bahrain, and in the Emirates again.
So they are present, and therefore the Iranians are prepared for an attack. If Iran is attacked, we know what the Iranian response is going to be. It's going to be devastating for those countries that host and support US action. It will be like the 39-day war, but probably significantly more devastating.
You'll recall that after the war they were saying that Iran's missile capabilities were diminished and their drone capabilities were diminished. I was arguing that this is not the case, and now we're seeing information coming out in Western media that's closer to the truth — they're saying the strong majority of Iran's capabilities are still intact. But I would argue that even that assessment is not correct. Iranian missile and drone capabilities now are greater than before the 39-day war, because Iran has been producing more advanced missiles and drones. Before the 39-day war and during the 39-day war, Iran was using to a very large degree its older missiles and drones. A lot of the missiles and drones that were used in the Persian Gulf region and against the Israeli regime were produced 15 to 10 years ago. But many missiles and drones have been produced in underground factories over the past couple of months that are among the most advanced military hardware that Iran possesses.
China, Trump's Visit to Xi Jinping, and the Broader Strategic Picture
Glenn Diesen: You mentioned China, and as we know Trump and Xi Jinping will most likely meet next week. I'm guessing that Iran will be high on the agenda, especially given that the Chinese for good reason see themselves as targets in this war as well. We've also seen reports of a Chinese vessel being attacked. To what extent do you think this meeting between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping will pan out in terms of discussions around Iran? Are the Chinese going to play hardball on this, or do you think they will roll over? What will they even put forth? Will they demand anything?
Seyed Marandi: The Chinese and the Iranians met in Beijing a few days ago and had a very good meeting. The Chinese were very impressed by Iran's performance during the war — very impressed, just as the Russians have been very impressed, and so have people across the world. I think many people expected Iran to fold in the war, and they were pleasantly shocked that it ended the way it did. I wasn't surprised, and I think many of our friends were not surprised, but many others were. The Chinese said that Iran's global stature has been enhanced significantly and that it will impact the future.
As you rightly point out, the United States is targeting China, Russia, and Iran simultaneously. It's not lost upon the Chinese that the Americans have already occupied Venezuela, and that they and the Israeli regime want full control of Western Asia — which would mean that energy resources would be under US control. For China, that is a serious concern, not so much because of energy for Russia, but because if, for example, they had succeeded against Iran, NATO's presence in West Asia would be very different from what it is today.
I don't think there's much the Americans can do. To be very blunt — Iran has very good relations with China and excellent relations with Russia, but Iran won this war on its own. There's no doubt that the driving force behind this victory came from within Iran. It was Iran's resilience, Iran's resistance, the people, the armed forces. Iran has good relations with China and Russia and other countries, but the Iranians achieved a great deal on their own. That is what impressed the Chinese and the Russians so much.
No matter what happens, the Americans know that the Strait of Hormuz is controlled by Iran. If the Americans are publicly in the Persian Gulf region, then they have to abide by their commitments within the framework of the ceasefire. Nothing other than that will be acceptable to Iran, and there's nothing that the United States can do about it. They can wage another war. They can bring in land troops as well. But they won't be able to change the status of the Strait of Hormuz.
Iran's Red Lines and the Escalation Ladder
Glenn Diesen: I was wondering — the Americans seem to be probing now, as they did with this operation. They were going to see if they could sail through the Strait and whether the Iranians would back down. If the Iranians did back down, of course, they would announce this to the world — especially to the Europeans and some of their allies in East Asia — trying to recruit more to participate in keeping it within full US access. But what do you see as Iran's red lines that would trigger a much wider war? Because as you said, when Iran struck these American ships, they used drones because they didn't want to go too fast up that escalation ladder, to give the Americans an opportunity to back down. But the first time around, when the Americans attacked back in February, Iran went very quickly up that escalation ladder. So what are the main red lines that the Americans might cross that would trigger a much more forceful Iranian response?
Seyed Marandi: Right now, as I said earlier, the main discussion is that there's a high possibility of the United States carrying out a major assault — and simultaneously using terrorist organizations that are based in the no man's land in Pakistan, but more importantly the organizations based in northern Iraq, to carry out a major assault. I'm sure you and your audience have been hearing the news of Iran striking at these groups in northern Iraq over the past few days, because the Iranians know they are preparing for a potential assault.
So that is basically what the Iranians are thinking is the number one possibility — that Trump and Netanyahu will launch a major assault simultaneously. You may have land forces try to take islands, or attack the mainland in Iran, or carry out an operation deep inside Iran as they tried before and failed. And then simultaneously you'll have Kurdish terror groups, alongside other terror groups, and Wahhabi terror groups in Pakistan joining them under the guidance of the United States and the Israelis — a combined operation.
But the Iranians are confident that they will be able to easily beat back the terrorists from northern Iraq and the terrorists from inside Pakistani territory, and also any American invasion of the country. They are fully prepared. Just as the Americans have been bringing in new troops, the Iranians have been very busy preparing themselves for the next phase.
And as all this is happening, Glenn, the global economy is getting worse by the day. While the Americans are constantly looking for ways to escalate, they're pushing the world closer to the abyss instead of trying to seek a solution. If they do escalate, since Iran's response will be very severe, I would imagine that oil installations and critical infrastructure will be further damaged across the region — if not totally destroyed. That would make a global depression a fact. It will no longer be something that people speculate about.
And even if the damage is limited — let's say the United States carries out a short attack, which is another scenario the Iranians are contemplating — first of all there would be damage, and the Iranian response will be very severe. But also it will set back any opportunity for a ceasefire to be put in place. So it's only going to make the global economy suffer more. And from what I've been hearing from economists, we are reaching that very critical phase where the global economic crisis goes far beyond inflation and rising food prices.
The Economic Consequences of the Ongoing Siege
Glenn Diesen: That's a great point, because even while this very flawed ceasefire is ongoing, a lot of the problems are still building up. The problems for the global economy are worsening, and what do you think could be the wider economic consequences if this continues much longer? As you said, we seem to be reaching a point where it will become quite disastrous, but we haven't felt everything yet because it hasn't really worked its way through the system.
Seyed Marandi: There are things that are going to happen even if there is a ceasefire today — even if the United States under Trump comes to his senses and tells Netanyahu: we're not going to continue this, we have to implement a ceasefire, you can no longer bomb women and children in Gaza and in Lebanon, and we're going to have to end the siege on the ports. Even if that happens today, from my understanding, the global economy is going to suffer immensely, and that suffering is going to increase in the weeks and months ahead before it settles down.
But every day that this crisis continues — and there's no shooting going on except for skirmishes near the Strait of Hormuz — what is happening to the global economy is more devastating than a major war, because the global economy is silently being destroyed. In the days and weeks ahead, what we're going to see is supply chains falling apart. It's not just fertilizer, it's not just helium or oil or LNG — it's all those different petrochemical products that are produced in the Persian Gulf region, in petrochemical plants, that are necessary for all sorts of goods to be produced in factories. And then there are other industries in the Persian Gulf that are energy-intensive — aluminum, for example — where the Persian Gulf was the ideal place to have those plants. We are heading towards disaster.
But instead of moving towards a ceasefire, Trump is making it worse. Time is not on the side of Trump. He thinks he's starving Iran, and the Iranian economy is hurting — there's no doubt about that. We are at war. This is siege warfare. But the global economy is much more vulnerable than the Iranian economy, because Iranians have been living under siege for decades. The world economy is not prepared for this.
And second, the Iranians are resistant and resilient because they know that they are victims of aggression. The world has no reason to feel that it has to be resistant and resilient, because Trump and Netanyahu brought this upon them for no reason at all. In addition to that, the United States foolishly began this siege after the ceasefire. The Iranians were expecting this siege to begin on day one when the war started — the Ramadan war, the 39 days of fighting. The Iranians thought the Americans were going to impose a siege on the Strait back then. So the siege on Iran is only about two or three weeks old. Whereas what the Americans and the Israelis have done to the global economy — that's been going on for about two and a half months now. All of their calculations were wrong. Everything they've done has been carried out foolishly. The Iranians are very confident that the United States has absolutely no good options, and the world is going to blame the United States and Israel and Zionism for the catastrophe.
How the War Is Reshaping the Middle East
Glenn Diesen: How do you see the Middle Eastern region in general being changed following this war? We haven't seen Yemen join in yet — though of course if the US attacks Iran again, one can assume Yemen might jump in rather quickly. But if we look at Iraq, it also appears to have changed a lot over the past two months — a lot of the Western troops have been leaving. You also made a point that they could make a move against Kuwait. The UAE and Qatar especially had a lot of their oil and gas profits, their finances, their real estate — all of that is going to be very difficult to recover. And of course the big prize for Iran would be to have the Strait of Hormuz under its control, which would allow Iran to extract both security and influence — essentially, if any of these Gulf states want proper access, they can't continue to function as frontline states for the US. So how do you see the whole Middle Eastern region shifting if this war continues to go in Iran's favor?
Seyed Marandi: The longer the war lasts, the worse it's going to be for these five countries — especially the Emirates. The Emirates is now trying to convince Egypt to help them, but it's not going to change anything. The Emirates is extremely vulnerable. It's a tiny regime with a population of 1.2 million. And Iran is not going to tolerate any of these countries being allies of the Israeli regime anymore. They're not going to allow the United States to have these countries as a foothold to attack Iran either.
In the case of the Emirates, it's the alliance with the Israelis — even though the Iranians know that all of them are friendly to Israel. Qatar has its secret communications with the Israelis; they've had it for years. The Iranians know all of these things. But that's not going to be tolerated in the future. Neither will US military assets that can threaten Iran be tolerated.
So the region is going to change. If there's further war, it's only going to weaken these countries because they're small and vulnerable. If their infrastructure is destroyed — especially in the summer months — if the United States does what Trump threatened and destroys Iran's critical infrastructure, or attempts to do so, then the critical infrastructure of these countries will be destroyed. They're all in the Arabian Peninsula. It's going to be very hot and humid there. They will not be able to tolerate the place. They'll have to leave. The countries will all be emptied out, and US forces will not be able to stay there under such circumstances when there's no electricity.
So it would be utterly foolish to engage in warfare against Iran — especially because this month, May, is a transition month. The end of May is much hotter and more humid than early May. Time is not on the side of the Americans. These regimes' fate will be determined by the actions of the United States.
The summer weather for Iran is like the winter for Russia. We know the role that winter played in Napoleon's invasion of Russia and in World War II. The summer heat in the Arabian Peninsula serves the Iranian military very well. But hopefully they won't do this. Iran does not want to hurt these regimes.
If we look back at the damage that Iran has done to these countries — which is massive — but when we look at the number of people who died, it's extraordinary. Only roughly 20 people died in these five countries. Meanwhile, 3,400 and some Iranians were murdered by the Americans, the Israelis, and these countries that helped carry out the war. But only about 20 were killed in the Persian Gulf. Why? Because Iran is careful not to target ordinary citizens. They've been targeting those assets that have been targeting Iran, or retaliating for strikes on Iranian critical infrastructure. They've been striking back at critical infrastructure, but they never targeted ordinary people.
When you look at the damage done to these five regimes — and to the Israelis, that goes without saying — and you put that alongside Iran, the infrastructure damage to these regimes is much greater. The oil and gas and so on. But when you look at the number of people murdered, it's incomparable. Iran doesn't want anyone to die. Iran does not want anyone to suffer. But if Iran's critical infrastructure is struck, there's not a chance in the world that Iran will refrain from retaliation, because if they don't, that will invite further strikes against Iran.
Remember when this coalition — this Epstein coalition, as I call it — struck the Iranian South Pars gas field? What did Iran do? Iran struck the Batarba gas field immediately, and it was a devastating blow. Then Trump put out a Truth Social post saying, "I had no idea this was happening. Netanyahu won't do this anymore." That's deterrence. Iran did it so that Trump would refrain from further attacks. If we have another war and we have such a scenario again, Iran will be ruthless in destroying infrastructure.
Iran's Preparedness for a Return to Full-Scale War
Glenn Diesen: That was my last question — if the war appears imminent, and as you pointed out the window of opportunity for the US to launch another strike might be closing, that's an indication this might come soon. But if the US decides to return to all-out war, what cards do you think the Iranians will play? How will they do this differently this time?
Seyed Marandi: If we look back at the 12-day war and the current war that began two and a half months ago, you see that the Iranians performed much better this time than in the 12-day war. They won the 12-day war, but after the ceasefire they rethought their strategies, their military structures, their civilian infrastructure, and found ways to be better prepared for war. And during this war, they outperformed that previous war. So I have no doubt that the experiences gained from the 39 days are going to give them a big advantage.
And there is a strong degree of self-confidence among the Iranian people, which existed at the start of the war but was enhanced a great deal during it. A lot of Iranians were expecting success. I was expecting success, but a lot of Iranians were not so confident. Now you see that the number of people who feel very confident about fighting the United States and responding to aggression from the United States is significantly greater than before. So the United States has no good options. The smart option would be to back down.
And I said this during the war: the Iranians from the beginning were preparing themselves for a long war. The Iranians would actually prefer the Americans to carry out a land invasion, because the Iranians want the United States to experience a comprehensive defeat so that we never have to go through this again. So the Iranians are not at all worried about another war. They're saying: if they back down, fine. If they implement the ceasefire, fine. But if they want to continue the war, we're fully prepared. Because ultimately what the Iranians want to do is to make sure that this country is never assaulted again, never invaded again, never attacked again.
Glenn Diesen: Well, thank you for taking the time, and I hope to speak to you very soon, as this situation appears to be changing very, very rapidly. Thanks again.
Seyed Marandi: Thank you for having me, Glenn. It's always a great honor, and I hope to speak to you soon.