Pepe Escobar and Glenn Diesen discuss the deepening Russia-China strategic partnership and its global implications
Glenn Diesen interviews journalist and author Pepe Escobar, speaking from Shanghai.
Summary
Pepe Escobar, journalist and author speaking from Shanghai, joins Glenn Diesen to analyze the joint declaration signed at the recent Putin-Xi summit in Beijing and its implications for a new system of international relations. He argues that the joint declaration signed at the summit represents a foundational document for a new stage in the partnership — one in which Russia and China are explicitly positioning themselves as leaders of a new system of international relations. He contends that Western media has almost entirely failed to engage with the substance of the declaration. He also addresses the BRICS foreign ministers' meeting in New Delhi, which he describes as a disaster that produced no joint statement, and expresses serious pessimism about whether the annual BRICS summit in September can produce anything consequential given deep internal rifts — including India's alignment with Israel and the UAE against Iran.
Key Takeaways
FULL TRANSCRIPT
The Putin-Xi Summit and the Joint Declaration
Glenn Diesen: What I really wanted to discuss with you was the meeting last week between Putin and Xi in Beijing, and in terms of how you see this in the wider trajectory of China-Russia relations. What is it that makes the Russia-China partnership structurally different from previous great power alliances?
Pepe Escobar: This is enormous. It is as big as it gets. I wrote a column last week where I dedicated half of it to breaking down their joint statement, which was something absolutely extraordinary. It was of course redacted by sherpas with the final approval of both Putin and Xi. The terminology in certain sectors of the joint statement was relatively concise — you can read it in five minutes. But some of the specific concepts, some of them Putinisms and some of them Xi-isms, meaning things they have been talking about in many cases for years, are immensely important.
Apart from all the deals they signed, the tea ceremony lasted over two hours — very, very important, with only three members of the Chinese delegation, three members of the Russian delegation, the translators, and Xi and Putin — where they discussed essentially Ukraine, the war on Iran, and the United States. The declaration is the real deal, because it is the foundation act of the next stage of the Russia-China strategic partnership.
You and I have been following this in detail for years. It's part of our job. But when you look at this relatively short document, everything is outlined there. Basically, Russia and China are telling Eurasia as a whole, and especially the Global South, and whoever wants to listen in the Global North, that we are in the driver's seat of building a new system of international relations. That's why this joint statement is the real deal, and it was very important that it was signed, sealed, and delivered by both of them in this special meeting in Beijing — in less than 24 hours, in fact.
Now we have all these discussions — on the Russian side, the concept of the Greater Eurasia Partnership, which is something you have followed, Glenn, and on the Chinese side, the Community for a Shared Future for Mankind, with the geopolitical and geoeconomic arc of the new Silk Roads, the Belt and Road. This is now explicit: we are going to use all these mechanisms, leading towards more equitable, egalitarian mechanisms, respect for international law, no exceptionalism of any kind. This is the building block for all of us to build a new system of international relations.
So it's not an accident that virtually nobody in Western mainstream media paid attention to the joint statement or even made the effort to try to understand what it is saying. That was the number one takeaway of the meeting itself.
It was great to watch this from Shanghai. I deliberately preferred to watch the whole thing from here because Shanghai is the cultural capital. Cultural traditions here have an enormous weight. It's the business capital, one of the top innovation and tech capitals of China. And of course, in terms of the modernization of China, you just need to go for a walk in Shanghai and you are immediately struck by it. When you see the reactions of foreign tourists being exposed to Shanghai for the first time, they can hardly believe it. This is the big window of China's modernization.
I had a particularly fascinating aside because I spent a day in a school — a primary school, middle school, and college, Aurora, one of the top ones in Shanghai — with the students and the teachers. While we were having our activities, including a conference on artificial intelligence, we were also discussing what was going on in Beijing. Even the students had their own opinions on it. They are fascinated by Russia. So this added a people-to-people element to this very fateful day. But this joint declaration is the real deal.
Western Misconceptions About the Russia-China Partnership
Glenn Diesen: What do you think are the main misconceptions the West has about the relationship between China and Russia? One gets the impression that it is still filled with deep mistrust, and it's always pointed out that they don't share values. But how much of this partnership is based on a common vision of the future versus mere opposition to US global dominance? There is an overlap there, of course.
Pepe Escobar: In Europe, they have no clue about the Russia-China strategic partnership. You can see that from your vantage point in Norway. In my case, when I'm in Europe I am between France and Italy, which at least still have a certain remaining tradition of intellectual thought and critical thinking — disappearing very, very fast. Only among marginalized scholars, academics, or professionals in France or Italy do you see people starting to grasp what's happening across Eurasia, in East Asia, or in China itself.
In the US, as we all know, these are two strategic threats which now happen to be closely intertwined. So the Russia-China strategic threat is going to undermine American civilization — if that thing exists, by the way. Don't expect intelligent analysis coming from the West about Russia-China.
For all of us who live around here, or between Russia and China, or who travel to Russia and come here to Asia, it's a completely different story. We see how Russian soft power is increasing. We see how Russia is starting to understand China better and vice versa — still a long way to go, but it is already happening. In Southeast Asia, Russia is making inroads, and the number one partner for all ten ASEAN members is China. It's two parallel universes: how the West sees this strategic partnership evolving, and how — in Xi's terminology — they are now in the driving seat of changes we have not seen in a hundred years.
He repeated that in his introduction. It was exactly what Xi told Putin when he was visiting Russia in the spring of 2023. Putin took him to the entrance of the Kremlin to say goodbye before he stepped into his limousine, and that's what Xi said to Putin. Now they are in the driving seat, and they agreed. So this joint declaration is a formalization of what they discussed three years ago in Moscow, and everything that happened in between — the solidification of the SCO, the solidification of BRICS, the concept of global governance, which is also part of the declaration.
Most of all, from the point of view of the West, they don't even know what they're talking about. They don't see it. The mainstream media doesn't even make the effort to explain. You receive stupid reports from US think tank land, and the headlines are always the same: the threat of China, the threat of Russia, the technological threat from China. Ideally, if I could, I would forget about the West completely — but it's part of our job.
Glenn Diesen: I think if one could differentiate between the West and Western hegemony, then perhaps there wouldn't be so many threats. But at the moment, any great power rising is essentially a threat. It's very hard to explain how China became a threat in any other way. I've heard many people say, well, they believe Taiwan is part of China — but they always thought this, and we recognized it. The one thing that has changed is the power balance, not much more.
What Putin and Xi Discussed: Ukraine, Iran, and the US
Glenn Diesen: You mentioned they were discussing Ukraine, Iran, and the relationship with the United States. With Ukraine, do we know anything about what they discussed? The Russians have been worried that the attacks are becoming more than pinpricks — the attacks from the Baltic territories, for example. And it looks like they are now escalating, talking more openly about retaliating against the Baltic states. I'm assuming Putin must have run this by Xi to keep him in the loop.
Pepe Escobar: No leaks whatsoever — forget it. This was a closed meeting. Ushakov, who is an old fox, afterward only leaked what was inoffensive. But among those of us who follow this closely, we are practically certain that Putin had to explain to Xi that the conditionalities and the internal logic of the special military operation are going to have to change, because now they are facing essentially a series of terrorist attacks. Obviously, this is very uncomfortable for the Chinese, because they would love a solution — but they know there is only one solution, and it is going to be on the battlefield, essentially.
Putin obviously had enough time to explain to Xi that from now on Russia might have to be much more forceful than before, because they are essentially fighting a terrorist organization. When we see the response to the latest massacre in the dormitory — with ballistic missiles and also the Oreshnik — that is probably the first of many. But will that be enough? Not necessarily. This is something I am very curious about. I'm going to Moscow by the end of this week, and I'm very curious to see how they are discussing the possibilities of, okay, let's get rid of this thing, let's go for the head of the snake. There is now a groundswell of revolt and exasperation because they know it can only get worse in terms of attacks against civilians inside the Russian Federation. From this point of view, the Russian way of waging war is going to have to change, or will change — it's practically inevitable.
On Iran, from what we know from a few nuggets here and there, they are completely coordinated — totally coordinated — on a diplomatic level, on visible and invisible military means of support, and especially on these mediation efforts being conducted by Pakistan, but behind which is China, 100% China. China basically gave the Pakistani mediators the green light: you can do everything, just report back to us. Which assumes that what is happening today, as we speak, would lead toward what was becoming — until yesterday — an Islamabad declaration, which would be a memorandum of understanding. There will be a declaration, and then a second stage of negotiations. Now of course the usual suspects blew it all up, so we don't know if this memorandum of understanding will even be signed in the next few days. But behind all these diplomatic maneuvers, it's China.
The Russians already knew that. So they were talking about the technicalities and the details of all that. And of course, in terms of managing the totally out-of-control empire of chaos and piracy, they are more than synced. After all, Xi had the opportunity to tell Putin face to face what he heard from Trump. So this was a personal briefing to Putin by Xi. And of course, Putin could tell Xi about the direct and sometimes indirect negotiations between the Russian oligarchy and the American oligarchy. That's how a strategic partnership works. They are interlinked and talking about all these major issues nonstop, and that's why they need to see each other every few months — because it solidifies at the highest level what one is telling Lavrov and vice versa. It's fascinating to watch how the whole thing moves. And the good Chinese analysts recognize that very well. Some of the best are here in Shanghai.
Shared Security Challenges and the Sanctions Shift
Glenn Diesen: I'm amazed by the speed of everything. On the common security challenges they're all facing — the Chinese have for many years been worried about the US dual island chain strategy and the efforts to possibly shut down the Strait of Malacca in the future, putting Chinese shipping under threat. Now the Russians are obviously facing the same thing — the possibility of the Baltic states becoming more and more inaccessible, the piracy of Russian ships. And of course you have the blockade on Venezuela, on Cuba, the hijacking of Iranian ships for many years. Everyone seems to face the same challenges — not just military but economic. The US hostility is really pushing them together much faster than they otherwise would have been. It seems very counterproductive.
I did notice one thing though: as the war intensified in Iran and the US pushed more sanctions, the Chinese are now essentially instructing their companies not to abide by US sanctions. How significant is this for the relationship with the Russians? For a while the Chinese appeared to be a bit cautious about Russian trade in order to protect themselves from American sanctions.
Pepe Escobar: They discussed that of course, and they discussed the fact that now, with any batch of American sanctions, the instruction directly to Chinese companies is: don't follow it. Ignore it completely. Abide by Chinese law. This is an enormous difference compared to only a few months ago.
In terms of investment — Chinese investment in Russia, in the Russian Far East, in the Arctic, and Russian investment in China — this is going to grow. They will be discussing this at St. Petersburg next week, and then at the Vladivostok summit in early September. And of course, Power of Siberia 2 — they finally got some sort of agreement on pricing, because that discussion had been going on forever. And it's not going to be 2029 or 2030 anymore. They want to speed it up and have Power of Siberia 2 functional by the end of 2027 already.
This is all part of the escape from Malacca. The Chinese have observed in detail everything that happened with Hormuz. There are no illusions here in China that sooner or later the Americans are going to try something with the Strait of Malacca — especially after that ill-conceived military pact between Jakarta and Washington, which even inside Indonesia prompted criticism. The foreign ministry criticized the defense ministry in Jakarta: how could you do something like this? But we know why — the people at the defense ministry in Jakarta, including President Prabowo, who was a former soldier who worked with Suharto — they were always very close with the Pentagon. This is a serious internal rift inside one of the top BRICS members. More BRICS problems, as if they needed any more.
But the Chinese, when they look at the escape from Malacca, are not very worried, because they have so many Plan B, C, D options — gas from Turkmenistan, oil from Kazakhstan, gas from Myanmar, and so on. When you discuss this issue here, nobody is worried. And it's true: Iran is now exporting 100,000 more barrels of oil a day to China compared to two months ago. All the Chinese tankers cross Hormuz with absolutely no problem. They don't even need to pay the environmental fees — the toll booth, if you want to call it that. And China is becoming more and more self-sufficient in energy — around 86% self-sufficient, which is enormous.
Of course, they discussed Hormuz and Malacca, but the Chinese are prepared. And on breaking out of the first and second island chain — slowly but surely, more surely than slowly — they have everything it takes if they want to break out at any time. Since last year, since that tsunami of sanctions by Trump in April, there is a new atmosphere of self-confidence in China across the spectrum. They are not intimidated by the Americans anymore, and they respond in kind. That has changed completely, and diplomatically they respond every day.
Glenn Diesen: That's what I meant by being his own worst enemy — it looks like not just the Russians but the Chinese as well were a bit risk-averse, and they're essentially being forced to decouple too fast from the US. You can't ask the Chinese to respect sanctions on Russia, Iran, and many of their key partners. At some point they would reach the conclusion that it makes more sense to alienate the Americans.
Pepe Escobar: No, I think they overplayed their hand in Washington, definitely.
India and the State of BRICS
Glenn Diesen: I just had one last question, because you and I have spoken in the past about BRICS running into trouble. You mentioned Indonesia, but where does India fit into all of this? We see Russia and China gravitating closer and closer. What is India doing these days?
Pepe Escobar: You saw the BRICS foreign ministers' meeting in New Delhi last week — it was a disaster. Such a disaster. There was no joint statement at the end. You could tell by Lavrov's body language that it was really a disaster. The only person who could put this Humpty Dumpty back together in Delhi was Lavrov himself. Wang Yi was not even there — he was here in Shanghai, side by side with Xi, meeting Putin. Obviously there were no leaks from the Indian side and no leaks from other BRICS members, but this meeting in Delhi was definitely a disaster.
Now they have only four months, because the annual summit is in Delhi in September, with so many rifts inside BRICS. Can they produce something consequential four months from now? I'm very sorry to be so pessimistic, but I don't think so. First of all, we have two BRICS members at war with another one. We have the UAE at war against Iran, and we have India supporting the Zionists and the UAE against Iran. So this is already a major disaster.
There are rumors — including among some of the sherpas — that maybe it's time to bring Pakistan into BRICS now that Pakistan has a new geopolitical position, very high up, from South Asia to West Asia and across Eurasia. We can imagine the Indian reaction. India is paralyzed completely. The Russians and the Chinese, when they look at the Indian position, don't like it at all. They are the most important members of BRICS, so they would have to do something to put Humpty Dumpty back together. But in only four months, it's going to be very, very hard.
The possibilities for this summit are very gloomy, because at the moment — and it's inevitable, I have been saying this over and over again — BRICS is in a deep coma. It has to be resuscitated, and there are only two people able to do that. They will have to work on this full time, and they can't, because they are worried about a million other important issues. Those two people are Lavrov and Wang Yi. Dreadful, to say the least, for the moment.
I don't believe in Hail Mary passes in terms of BRICS — like at the last minute they will come up with something. No, it's not going to happen. The Brazilians were good at that last year. The summit in Rio worked at the last minute — that's a typical Brazilian setting. They know how to improvise. But the Indians, not at all. They don't have the swing to pull that off. And they know that they are in a minority inside BRICS because of their close relations with Israel and the UAE.
Glenn Diesen: Well, thank you for taking the time, and keep a close watch on what's happening in BRICS. I hope you'll check in with us very soon.
Pepe Escobar: Yes, absolutely. Take care, Glenn. Thank you so much. Cheers.