Trump and Xi Jinping meet in Beijing amid trade war, Taiwan tensions, and the Iran crisis
Glenn Diesen interviews Xu Qinduo, host of Dialogue at CGTN, on the day of the Trump-Xi summit in Beijing.
Summary
Glenn Diesen speaks with Xu Qinduo on May 14th, 2026, as Donald Trump and Xi Jinping are meeting in Beijing. Xu describes the atmosphere as strongly positive, with both leaders exchanging warm remarks at a state banquet and agreeing on a framework of "constructive strategic stability" to guide the bilateral relationship for the next three years or beyond. The conversation covers the trade and technology war between the US and China, the Taiwan question — which Xi described to Trump as the most important issue in the relationship and the "reddest of red lines" — and the ongoing Iran crisis, including the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and its implications for Chinese energy security. Xu argues that China's manufacturing strength, diversified energy sourcing, and rare earth leverage place it in a position of resilience, and that 2026 may represent a milestone year for US-China relations after years of confrontation. A significant portion of the discussion concerns whether the US is acting as a status quo or revisionist power, with Xu noting that some Heritage Institute scholars have framed the Iran war as ultimately directed at China, and drawing parallels to what he characterizes as US bad-faith diplomacy toward both Russia and Iran.
Key Takeaways
FULL TRANSCRIPT
Opening: The atmosphere and tone of the Trump-Xi summit in Beijing
Glenn Diesen: Today is May 14th, 2026, and we are joined by Xu Qinduo, who is the host of Dialogue at CGTN, to discuss what is happening now at the meeting in Beijing. As we know, Donald Trump is currently meeting with Xi Jinping in Beijing. Thank you very much for coming on the program.
Xu Qinduo: Thank you for having me, Glenn.
Glenn Diesen: Most of the world is now looking at this meeting. There are often a lot of superficial theatrics when we deal with Trump, but at the same time there are a lot of issues which have to be resolved by these two giants — the two largest powers in the world, the US and China. What do we know so far about how this meeting has gone, and what are essentially the main objectives of each side? Is there any common meeting point?
Xu Qinduo: I can share with you what happened today. In general, the atmosphere has been very positive. Mr. Trump was obviously impressed with the welcoming ceremony, for example, and the reviewing of the ceremonial guards together with President Xi Jinping, the visit to the Temple of Heaven, and then the state banquet. The two leaders spent the morning talking to each other with their own teams, and then the two of them were at the Temple of Heaven in the afternoon. In the evening, I think they are still ongoing — they have a state banquet hosted by President Xi, who gave a speech that was very warm. He talked about how China and the US should be partners rather than rivals.
President Trump also responded with a brief speech, but very warm. He talked about how both Chinese people and Americans take care of their families and work hard — that they share a lot in common in terms of their values. He talked about the engagement between the two peoples over the past 250 years or so. He mentioned the first US ship arriving in China in 1784, at which time the Chinese people called Americans "new people from a new country." He talked about Chinese workers helping build the railroad link between the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans — the continental railroad. He talked about the establishment of Tsinghua University, one of the top universities in China. He also talked about China and the US being allies during the Second World War, and that Confucius was also well respected in the US.
Both sides agreed upon a vision called "constructive strategic stability," which will guide the bilateral relationship for the next three years or even beyond that. I would say that's very impressive.
The trade and technology war: what needs to be resolved
Glenn Diesen: Those are some good signs. However, ever since Trump's first administration, we know that China has often been in the spotlight — both in his administration and more generally within the US — given that China is seen as the main peer rival. I saw Xi Jinping even make a reference to the need to essentially overcome what is often referred to as the Thucydides Trap — that is, where a rising power challenges an existing hegemon, and this often results in conflict between the two great powers. Given that there will be a need to harmonize relations or manage the competition, how do you see the prospect of overcoming this economic war? That's something that has really shaped US-China relations over the past decade.
Xu Qinduo: That's a good question. You mentioned the Thucydides Trap — President Xi also mentioned this phrase, but what he meant is that we should overcome this idea, we should overcome this trap, and we should set a new model, probably for major power-to-power relationships. I think he referred to China and the US as peers in a sense — in terms of economy, high-tech development, innovation, and military capabilities. Right now they are at a critical juncture. How they handle each other, how they handle their relationship, is not only of consequence for the two peoples and the two countries, but also for the stability of the entire world. President Xi mentioned that this is something beyond the bilateral relationship.
When it comes to the relationship itself, trade is a very important part. It used to be called the ballast — the stabilizer of this relationship — because there was so much investment from the US in China and so much export from China to the US that it somehow brought the two peoples and nations together. At the peak time, every 15 minutes there was a plane taking off or landing in either China or the United States. The two countries used to be very closely connected. But of course we know what happened later on, and right now it is at another challenging time. Looking ahead — what kind of relationship do we want to have after this trade war, this tech war, this tariff war? Do we want to continue? Is that in our interests? Is there any possibility of a new model of living together, of coexisting peacefully, for the benefit of the two countries?
That's why at the very beginning, Xi Jinping mentioned that we should help each other succeed, to overcome this zero-sum mentality. On his way to China, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio talked about how China is rising and continues to grow, but that the Chinese rise cannot be achieved at the expense of the US. It's a bit unclear how to handle that — what exactly constitutes "the expense of the US." But obviously there is still this mentality, this questioning, this unclear state of what we are going to do to achieve that ideal state where both sides help each other succeed. It's quite idealistic, but probably the right way to go.
Glenn Diesen: What specific issues have to be resolved? I know initially the objective was to roll back the technological development of China and stop its economic rise, but as we saw when the US put all these tariffs on China, China was able to push back essentially with threats against rare earths and others. So the US had to back down and not go after China. But if this is not just a temporary pause and there's a genuine interest in resolving the economic war with China, what is it that actually has to be fixed? Is it the tariffs? Is it the limitations on exports of chips to China? Is it China's openness to export rare earths? What is it that each side wants from the other? I've seen the US, for example, wants the Chinese to buy more US energy and agriculture. This seems to fit a pattern around the world of reorganizing the energy trade. What do you think has to be resolved in terms of specifics?
Xu Qinduo: You mentioned a couple of them. They are talking about building a board of trade and also a board of investment between the two countries — a kind of institutionalized dialogue and communication between the two sides to deal with individual issues. That's helpful in itself, because it means they can talk to each other on a regular basis rather than having dialogue that is isolated to a single case.
At the same time, from the Chinese point of view, we have gone through this trade war and the US has not really been winning. The Chinese side has suffered because we used to export a lot to the US and now have to export to other places in the world, but China is not losing. Chinese exports continue to grow, which means the US effort through tariffs to stop Chinese exports is not working — it has failed.
I think they are being pragmatic. They are talking about having this board of trade, meaning we can do more trade as long as it's not in sensitive areas. If it's not high-tech — for example, advanced chips — then Chinese purchases of US oil, US agriculture products, soybeans, beef, or Boeing airplanes are things the Americans would be more than happy to sell. I think the Chinese side is also warming to that. Yes, we can do more where we can trade. Where we think technology is sensitive and related to national security, that's a different matter.
At the same time, the idea of constructive strategic stability — the Chinese idea is that it should focus on cooperation. The theme should be cooperation, competition should be limited, and communication should happen across different areas: military, trade, tech, and so on. If that works out, then gradually they would build confidence, and the US would have a reliance on the Chinese market because they sell a lot to it. Similarly, the Chinese side would rely on US imports of agriculture products or airplanes.
My idea is that trade itself is mutually beneficial. If you trade, nobody suffers from doing trade. The imbalance itself is not really the issue — it's about the long-term challenge of the economic structure and the US position as the supplier of the major reserve currency, the US dollar. That's why the US can print dollars and usually runs a trade deficit. But gradually, hopefully, more and more people will come to this understanding, and then we can continue to do trade while gradually expanding it into different areas between the two countries. We can build on that momentum to increase understanding and become less sensitive about what they call the "China threat" or threats to national security — a lot of which, to a high degree, comes from ideological thinking or a lack of trust.
Energy security and China's diversification strategy
Glenn Diesen: The spectacular rise of China has put the world in a very unique situation — to have China come almost out of nowhere in 40 years and become the leading economy. It does put a shock to the system, and I guess that can stir up some unhealthy stereotypes and demonization of China. But in international trade, we often see that great powers are not only looking for positive-sum gains where both sides gain — they're also often concerned about the balance of dependence. Great powers would like others to be dependent on them but want to reduce their own dependence on others. It's this asymmetrical interdependence where they often get both economic and political influence.
If we focus on the specifics of energy, it looks like the United States has a very specific energy plan. There seem to be objectives to reduce the export capacity of key energy exporters — Venezuela, Russia, Iran — and often they seem to try to replace this with US supplies. If you look at the case in Europe, after the destruction of Nord Stream, the US now apparently is pushing to take over the energy infrastructure — managing gas exports and transit from Russia to Europe, buying cheap energy from Russia, and selling their own expensive energy to Europe. So it looks like the US is trying to make itself more central in the energy trade. How do you see this with China? Is it a vulnerability if China makes itself too dependent on US energy, or has China already diversified sufficiently to avoid that vulnerability?
Xu Qinduo: There is concern on the Chinese side about over-relying on the US for oil exports or liquefied natural gas, for example. If you buy too much from the US and gradually form a reliance on the US market, then as you pointed out, big powers have this sense of insecurity — especially in a situation where, if you watch or read the US media, there is wall-to-wall negative coverage about China. This public sentiment is strongly against China, and of course you have this worry about whether that reliance is sustainable.
That's why I think China overall has diversified away from the US to a large extent in terms of exports, and has been very successful in doing so — increasing the volume of exports to ASEAN countries, Southeast Asia, African countries, Latin American countries, and Europeans. Secondly, I would say Chinese diversification in terms of energy has been very cautious in avoiding reliance on a single source. If you look at their sources of oil and gas imports, the reliance on any single source is usually not over 20%. They import oil and gas from Russia, from Iran, from Saudi Arabia, from Brazil, from Ghana — multiple sources.
At the same time, China is rapidly developing renewable energy. We know China is in a leading position in terms of EVs, solar panels, and wind turbines. China is also investing heavily in nuclear power plants — the projects under construction amount to almost the combined number of the rest of the world. China is also rich in coal and has the technology to transform coal into gas. In a crisis, in the worst scenario, China can rely on coal to provide electricity. Yes, there's a climate concern, but we're talking about survival in the worst scenario.
So in that sense, China has been fully aware of the energy security issue. It's not only about whether you have enough supply — China, used to be called the factory of the world, consumes a lot of power — it's also about security and whether you have enough access to energy resources around the world.
For the Chinese point of view, yes, US control of Venezuelan energy resources, and some people would say the US attempt to control Iranian oil and gas — of course not a successful attempt — and the warming up to Russia all have their own considerations. What we are seeing is a revolutionary transformation in terms of EVs, including electric trucks, which are cost-effective compared with diesel-based trucks. So there's a strong incentive for consumers to go electric right now. Hopefully as time goes on, China will not see a threat from the US's growing control of energies around the world.
Taiwan: Xi Jinping's strongest warning to Trump
Glenn Diesen: Obviously, if we shift towards security, a key issue is of course Taiwan. Taiwan is considered by the US to be an important part of the dual island chain to contain China, and since the US and China restored relations in the 1970s, it was founded on the one China policy, in which the US recognized that Taiwan is a part of China. However, we've seen over the decades that the US has been pursuing incrementalism, chipping away a little bit at China's sovereignty. I often remind people that President Carter defined the one China policy as limiting US ties to Taiwan to cultural and economic ties — no political or military ties. But something that has been intensifying over the years is of course the move into political and military ties as well, and also not so subtly backing secessionist movements. How central do you think the Taiwan issue has been in these talks? And do you think there's a possibility for a common meeting point, something to at least reduce the tensions, or do you think each side is locked in its own positions?
Xu Qinduo: In his discussion with President Trump, Xi Jinping mentioned the Taiwan question as expected. He said this is the most important issue between China and the US. He talked about how, if mishandled, the entire China-US relationship could be put in jeopardy. In my impression, this is probably the strongest rhetoric used by the Chinese top leader in an exchange with his counterpart from the US. I think this is a warning. The Chinese side is basically increasing the volume and the severity to help the Americans understand that this is — as we used to say — the reddest of the red lines on the Chinese side.
He mentioned that separatist activity is a danger to peace and stability in the region, so Americans should be aware that their arms sales will embolden those secessionists, especially those in power, and that will create a security risk and danger to peace and stability in the region.
In the past eight or nine years in particular, the one China principle has been hollowed out in a sense by American administrations. You mentioned no more ties beyond economic, trade, and cultural relationships, but what we are seeing is there were even a small group of American soldiers based in Taiwan, they are proposing the largest package of weapons sales to Taiwan, and they are increasing arms sales to Taiwan. If you look at one of the three communiqués which serve as the foundation of the China-US relationship — the one signed in 1982 — it says basically the US will reduce arms to Taiwan until it becomes zero. Instead, they are not keeping their promise. They are increasing arms to Taiwan. How can you say sending more weapons to a certain region is a gesture of peace, a contribution to peace? No.
If Washington really cares about peace and stability in this region, they would make clear to the separatists in Taiwan that they oppose Taiwan independence, and they could go further and express support for Chinese efforts toward a peaceful reunification of Taiwan. That would be even better. By doing that, they will be able to rein in the separatist activities in Taiwan, which is a source of threat to stability in this region. That will also help the bilateral relationship a great deal, because you are basically taking out this constant irritant in the bilateral relationship. Then they can focus on what they can cooperate on — their common interests beyond this bilateral relationship, such as AI governance, or the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz, or Ukraine.
I also want to add: if you look at the change in military and defense capability between the mainland and Taiwan, obviously the mainland side is way ahead of Taiwan. Whatever amount of arms purchased by the Taiwan authorities will not be a match for the Chinese mainland. That's basically pointless in terms of the purchase of arms from the US. Of course, for those separatists, that's a way of being loyal to Washington, and the military-industrial complex in Washington can profit from this kind of situation.
Also, if you look at it — some military experts have done board games and the conclusion is that even with US participation and intervention in the worst scenario, the US will not win a war against China. That's an increasingly true reality. And if the US is not able to defeat Iran, what makes them believe they can defeat China in a region where China enjoys home advantage? If they are realistic, they should give up this idea of supporting the separatists in Taiwan by arming them — the idea that this will somehow slow down Chinese growth or sabotage the Chinese modernization drive. No, that will only bring about a disaster that nobody in this region wants to see.
Is the US a status quo power or a revisionist power?
Glenn Diesen: I often wonder if the US in its relationship with China — if the conflict over Taiwan — is emerging because the US is a status quo power or a revisionist one, because I think both could be true. If the US is a status quo power, you can argue that China and the US are trying to deter two different things: the US is trying to deter China from taking back Taiwan by force, which is why they send weapons, while China wants to deter the US from backing secessionism. As you suggested, a status quo conflict might emerge because if the US hands weapons to Taiwanese authorities to deter taking it back by military force, it can embolden them to push towards secessionism, which would then actually trigger the use of force on the side of the mainland.
But if the US is a revisionist power, then sending all these weapons has an explicit purpose — to actually push for secession. That is the goal, simply because time is not on America's side. Every day that passes, China grows stronger in relative power — not just vis-à-vis Taiwan but also vis-à-vis the United States. In other words, if you want to weaken China and break Taiwan away from the mainland, it's better to do it today than wait ten years. So they essentially have this incentive to escalate now.
This is why I'm curious where the US is going, especially as I listen to these warm words by President Trump in Beijing. I can't help but wonder if it's genuine diplomacy or not. Because what we saw with Iran was they were saying the same things — "Oh, we're getting along well with the Iranians, we're close to a deal" — and they said this twice while launching a surprise attack. Even now that they're negotiating, they initially agreed on a ten-point plan with the Iranians and now have abandoned it altogether. And one can extend the same to Russia — they had this spirit of Alaska, they had some agreements, nothing has happened, and the Russians have more or less reached the conclusion that the US is not negotiating in good faith. They're still sending money and weapons, the CIA is still there picking targets, they're killing Russians every day, and nothing is moving forward. So how do you see the intentions of the United States? Are they a revisionist hostile power, or a status quo power locked in an unfavorable mutual deterrent?
Xu Qinduo: From some of the conservative institutes in Washington, like the Heritage Institute, there are scholars calling for the Iran war as being all about China — that Iran is simply one goalpost toward the final realization of defeating China by Washington. That could be true. I think for the Chinese side there was not much discussion about that, but for decision makers you probably need to prepare for the worst. What if that's true? What if that's Washington's true face — to defeat China, to slow down China? Well, that's already a public statement by the previous Secretary of Commerce, and by the administration — to slow down Chinese innovation. In public remarks, they talked about Europeans needing to work with the US against Chinese innovation.
But I think China is in a position that, if forced to retaliate and resort to countermeasures, can also do harm to Washington if they don't play fair — just like what happened with the 145% tariffs. China resorted to rare earths against the Americans. I know inside Washington there's a debate about whether the US will be capable of manufacturing its own rare earths within one or two years so they can get rid of the reliance on Chinese rare earths and then impose more restrictions or tariffs on the Chinese side. I think the Chinese side is fully aware of that, and they know better about the processing of rare earths — from exploration to processing to the manufactured product, the whole process takes probably more than one or even two years.
Also, China has a position of strength. China's manufacturing capability is probably the largest in the world — much larger than the US. It amounts to the combined manufacturing output of the US, Japan, and Germany. If you look at history, in a wartime situation, you don't fight a manufacturing giant. They can produce weaponry and ammunition endlessly. In that situation, if you challenge such a country, you are usually in a weaker position and will be on the losing end.
So I think the Chinese side is really focusing on defense. They are not trying to offend or attack the Americans, because for the Chinese there is no idea of replacing the US as the prime power or achieving global dominance. This is not the Chinese strategic goal. If you look at the Chinese strategic goal, it is very clear in the five-year plans and long-term plans. It's about the revitalization of the Chinese nation — basically, they want to build a nation that is better tomorrow than today. That's the Chinese goal. If you have a strong defense and you have the resources and the power to defeat the party that initiates the war, you will probably be in a safer position. I think generally that's the philosophy I would use to describe the Chinese idea in terms of this geopolitical situation with the US.
The Iran crisis, the Strait of Hormuz, and Chinese energy interests
Glenn Diesen: You mentioned Iran, and I've heard from many Americans that a key target in this blockade on Iranian ports is China, as it is overwhelmingly the main export destination for Iranian oil. Scott Bessent also made a comment towards this end, arguing that China shouldn't buy Iranian oil. This must have also been a key focus of discussions between Xi Jinping and Donald Trump — this massive war now going on in the Middle East. One of the key focuses on trying to resolve the Iran war is the Strait of Hormuz. Of course, it didn't go as expected for the Americans. I think when the meeting was initially set up with Xi Jinping, the idea was that Donald Trump would show up in Beijing having just defeated Iran and come from a position of strength. But instead we see the US is more or less trapped — there's no pathway to victory, and it can't leave because the Iranians can use the Strait of Hormuz to decouple the US from the region if they hold on to it. How central has this issue been in the discussions between the two leaders?
Xu Qinduo: Their discussion certainly covers the topic of the Iranian crisis. Before the trip took place, there was media coverage in Washington claiming that Trump should apply pressure on the Chinese side so they can pressure the Iranians to give up their demands and give up their efforts to close the Strait of Hormuz. Personally, I would say that's a wrong approach. Some people would say you should come to China to ask for help if you are sincere in addressing this crisis, because China had nothing to do with this crisis in the first place. It's a war launched by Washington and by the Israelis without UN authorization, without proper explanation, without legitimacy. It's an illegal war, an unprovoked war against Iran.
So in that sense, I would say the Chinese side would probably urge the Americans to finish their business as soon as possible, because the crisis and the energy shortage are causing big troubles for countries, particularly in Asia, and also threaten global economic growth. It's the US's mess — created by the US — and they should solve that problem as soon as possible. Instead of receiving pressure from Washington, Beijing should apply more pressure on Washington.
With that said, I would say China and the US do share some common interest in this situation — basically the opening of the Strait of Hormuz — because it's not simply a matter between Iran and Washington. For example, Gulf nations' exports of oil, gas, and other products rely heavily on this waterway. China imports, I think, 40 to 50% of its energy from this region and also relies heavily on this international waterway.
So I think the Iranians, of course, understand this. Washington will probably have to restrain their demands and also respect the fact that it's them that launched the war and they are failing to achieve any goal at all. They have to accept this reality. The Chinese side should probably help them have a better understanding of the situation and be ready to restrain their demands, be ready to make compromises with the Iranians, so we can have a proper deal that will be implemented faithfully and provide a long-term solution and long-term stability for this region — a long-term stable relationship, probably, between the US and Iran.
But so far we haven't seen the US side being earnest, not to mention faithful, in resolving that problem. Some US media said that Trump himself said he doesn't need help from President Xi. But they did talk about this topic. So far we don't have enough details about how they managed this topic, but I think we are aware of where they are in terms of their positions and the differences in how to approach it.
Glenn Diesen: I saw a common statement that both China and the United States agreed, for example, that Iran shouldn't have nuclear weapons. This seems somewhat uncontroversial because the Iranians also say they're not going to get nuclear weapons.
Xu Qinduo: Exactly.
Glenn Diesen: Where there could be tension is again the common stance on the Strait of Hormuz — that is, that the Iranians should not essentially have this toll booth. I was wondering how that fits in with whether it puts China in a clash with the Iranians, because from the Iranian perspective they can't go back to the old status quo where they live under perpetual crippling sanctions and perpetual threats from the US and Israel. From the Iranian perspective, given that there's no diplomatic path and no deal the Americans will follow through on — which essentially removes the threat — they see controlling the Strait of Hormuz as kind of the ticket. They get reparations from the attack, and they can organize a toll or fee based on who is threatening Iran. If they put sanctions on Iran, the fee is higher. If they threaten Iran by hosting US bases, there can be a fee. If they trade their oil in US dollars, there can be a fee. So they have all these ways they can essentially shore up their own security and create incentives for putting an end to the sanctions and the military threats. How do you see any tensions there coming between China and Iran due to this stance?
Xu Qinduo: I don't see tensions upcoming between China and Iran. For China, for example, there are at least three oil tankers already navigating through the Strait of Hormuz without much disruption, given the stable, consistent, and strong relationship between Beijing and Tehran. Obviously, 90% of Iranian oil exports go to China, so there's no point in looking for a toll from any oil tankers if the destination is China. If they are sophisticated enough, they can say Chinese oil tankers are exempt from paying a fee, and that will reduce any source of potential tensions between China and Iran anyway.
So yes, the Chinese side would love to see the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz or a return to the previous status quo, but I think people are also realistic and understand why Iran is doing this — because they have been under crippling sanctions for decades and they need development, they need breathing room. This is what they can do to protect and defend themselves. I think the Chinese side fully understands that. So if we end up in some form of control by the Iranian side, I wouldn't be surprised, and the Chinese side wouldn't oppose that kind of situation either.
Because if the US refuses to make a compromise, refuses to lift the sanctions, refuses to allow Iran to conduct normal business with other countries, then that's probably the right response from the Iranians against Washington. Washington has to understand that you cannot impose your will on other countries — in particular countries like Iran and China that have a long history, that are civilizations — and expect them to simply accept your unilateral sanctions and unilateral moves. I don't think that will go far if the US continues to follow that kind of practice.
So it's really about the acceptance by the rest of the world of some form of Iranian control, even some form of collecting tolls when crossing the Strait of Hormuz. What we are seeing is that many oil tankers don't see a problem — it's like paying more insurance fees going through the strait now. I think it's really about the US. They have to find a face-saving approach to solve this dilemma. They are imposing their own blockade against the Iranian blockade, and the stalemate will continue. It's about how long the US will tolerate it — in particular, how long US consumers will tolerate the inflationary pressure, which is rising. If you look at the latest figures, when people go to the pump station, they will not be happy.
Prospects for a grand bargain and the significance of 2026
Glenn Diesen: My last question is: what are your thoughts on the overall outcome? We don't know it yet, but do you assume there will be a grand bargain in terms of China and the US essentially resetting relations, or do you think there will be minor tweaks attempting to resolve, for example, trade disputes? How significant do you think this is in terms of international diplomatic meetings?
Xu Qinduo: So far I would say it's a significant encounter between the two sides — not only between the two leaders. If you look at the pictures or the video clips of the two sides, for example, their top executives mingling with each other and talking to each other — I think that will increase understanding of each other and create probably cooperation opportunities and more engagement. This kind of engagement has been absent for like nine years or even longer. We do need this kind of close, face-to-face engagement. That will help broaden the mindset, to be more open-minded, to have a better understanding of each other's concerns, and to build trust based on individuals — individual top executives, individual officials. For some of the US officials, they are here for the first time: Marco Rubio, Pete Hegseth, Steven Miller. I think this is the first time for them to be in China, to see a different culture, different people, a different system — equally working, equally innovative, equally industrious, increasingly on par with the US comprehensively.
We do need this kind of engagement. If you look at 2026, this is the first such large-scale engagement. Trump has issued his invitation to President Xi Jinping to visit the US in late September, and then they have two other opportunities to meet each other on the sidelines of the APEC summit in Shenzhen and the G20 summit in the US. If you take these kinds of intense, frequent engagements into consideration, I would call 2026 probably a milestone year for China-US relations — after so many years of clueless confrontation and conflicts, and now, probably after trying all the wrong approaches, they have found the right approach. That is to have constructive strategic stability with a focus on cooperation and limited competition — to do something that will benefit both sides instead of this zero-sum mentality. As time goes on, maybe that's a new beginning for this type of major power relationship. If that's the case, that would be a blessing for the two nations and also probably for the entire world.
Glenn Diesen: I agree. Sometimes diplomacy in itself is quite an achievement — especially from where I'm sitting in Europe, where diplomacy has been to a large extent vilified and even criminalized, as I'm thinking of European leaders boycotting diplomacy with the Russians for years now. So I think that in itself can be seen as a big plus — to have the leader of China and the United States actually meeting there in Beijing. It's a required step to at least manage the competition and ideally push peace forward. Overall, good signs from that perspective alone. I want to thank you so much for taking the time. I know I've been on your program many times in China, so I appreciate you coming online. It's good to have this exchange of ideas and observations and analysis of what's going on, in particular between these two largest economies.
Xu Qinduo: Thank you, Glenn.