Iran and Yemen's escalating offensive strategy as the US-Iran war enters a new phase
Glenn Diesen interviews Seyed Marandi, an Iranian academic and political analyst, on the shifting military and diplomatic dynamics of the ongoing US-Iran war.
Summary
Seyed Marandi, an Iranian academic and political analyst, joins Glenn Diesen on August 16th, 2026, as the US-Iran war approaches the six-month mark. He argues that Iran has moved from a posture of strategic patience and proportional retaliation into a more assertive, offensive phase, driven in large part by the appointment of Major General Mohsen Rezaei as chair of Iran's Supreme National Security Council. He contends that Iran is now fully prepared for another round of intense fighting and is simultaneously expanding its missile, drone, and underground infrastructure at a pace that outstrips American air defense replenishment. He also details Yemen's growing military effectiveness against Saudi Arabia, the financial vulnerability of Gulf monarchies, and the broader collapse of US soft power globally. A key claim is that Iran and Oman have already finalized the text of an agreement over the Strait of Hormuz, but are deliberately withholding any announcement until conditions on the ground make implementation meaningful. The guest also discusses the Astoria incident — in which Trump reportedly changed planes twice under circumstances immediately attributed by Marandi to Israeli intelligence — as an ongoing source of damage to the Israeli regime and the Zionist lobby inside the United States. He further argues that the war in Ukraine and the war in West Asia are deeply interconnected, with US weapons shortages partly attributable to the Ukraine conflict, and that coordination between Iran, its allies, and Russia is likely far greater than publicly acknowledged.
Key Takeaways
FULL TRANSCRIPT
Iran's new strategic posture and the significance of Rezaei's appointment
Glenn Diesen: Welcome back. Today is August 16th, 2026, and we are joined by Seyed Marandi. Thank you for coming back on the program.
Seyed Marandi: Thank you for having me on your show, Glenn. It's always an honor and a pleasure.
Glenn Diesen: It seemed that Iran's strategy in this war has been — well, let's say strategic patience. It has the benefit that it can outlast the United States, and in terms of retaliation it seems that the Iranians have been attempting to mirror whatever actions the US is doing — that is, if the US attacks, the Iranians respond — with of course the important purpose of proving that they can go up the escalation ladder, which suggests the US cannot simply escalate to force Iran to capitulate. So all of this has been — well, you can say successful. "Successful" is actually a good term given that Iran is winning this war. But it appears to be shifting a bit. I'm not sure if it's the new IRGC leadership or simply that Iran is moving into a new phase, but it does appear that Iran is going on the offensive — not just in terms of rhetoric but also in action. I was wondering if you can explain what is happening in Iran.
Seyed Marandi: I don't believe that the change in leadership in the armed forces — or at least for the most part the IRGC, though it's not just the IRGC, it's also the regular army — I don't think that represents any major change in itself, because first of all these commanders were already in charge. Their names had not been declared for security reasons. I think the fact that their names have now been declared shows a greater confidence in Iran about security. We also had, almost simultaneously with this news, other news that President Pezeshkian met for a seven-to-eight-hour meeting, which again shows that things are moving back to normal — that news about the highest-level meetings is being put out for the public, and that the names of those who are leading the armed forces, who replaced the martyrs, are being declared. I think that is significant in itself.
What has changed is the chair of the Supreme National Security Council — a new person being put in charge of the chairmanship: Major General Mohsen Rezaei. Now this is significant for a couple of reasons. I think Rezaei is more powerful and influential than the previous chair, who was made chair of the Supreme National Security Council after Dr. Ali Larijani was martyred by the Trump and Netanyahu coalition. Rezaei is a much stronger person. He has a greater background in management and in managing key organizations. He was in charge of the Revolutionary Guards when the war started — when Saddam Hussein invaded Iran in 1980 with the support of the West and the Soviet Union at that time. He led the Guards throughout those years, and when he was in charge the Guards was a small organization with very light weapons at best. During those years he effectively created the IRGC into what it is today, and he led it — I think for sixteen years if I'm not mistaken.
He also has a PhD in economics. He was a deputy to President Raisi — his economic deputy. So he knows about economic issues. He knows about political issues. He's been a high-ranking official. He is obviously a person who has a great deal of capabilities and knowledge that will be important for his position, because the Supreme National Security Council is not just about military matters. It's not just about war. It's about foreign policy. It's about economics. It's about all things that are important for the security of the nation. And members of the council include key economic figures in the government, the foreign ministry, and key members of parliament for different meetings depending on what the topic is. So he is a stronger person. He is more influential and he has a lot more experience. That's one aspect of it.
I think this is going to make the Supreme National Security Council a more powerful entity in the state than before, simply because of his character — because since he is so well known in political circles and is a public figure, he can more easily coordinate the key actors in the state: the president, the speaker of parliament, the head of the judiciary, the armed forces, the state-owned foundations, and so on.
In addition to that, we know that his public position towards the United States, towards the Israeli regime, and towards this coalition that has been created against Iran is significantly more assertive. And so I think that his view on the conflict — on the war that's been waged against Iran — is to be more on the offensive. In the past, as you rightly pointed out, the Iranians would retaliate, and as time went on Iran's retaliation usually was more severe than the American strikes. Especially during the last episode — the last chapter of violence after the United States tore up the MOU and restarted the war — the Iranian responses became increasingly harsh towards the Americans. In other words, if the Americans hit a target, the Iranians would hit back harder. But I think Rezaei's view on the situation goes further than this, and that he is going to be much more decisive if the United States escalates — whether through economic pressure or military pressure. I think his response is going to be much more decisive and much more painful to the anti-Iranian coalition.
So I think this is a substantial change. And also, since he is a major general, all of the commanders in all of the different parts of the armed forces are going to be able to communicate with him easily, and he is going to be able to understand their issues. So he is going to be able to help the armed forces more than probably anyone else.
The US strategic impasse and the prospect of renewed war
Glenn Diesen: I see the United States having — well, let's say it has locked itself into, painted itself into a corner. That is, it doesn't have any convincing path to victory anymore, if it ever had one. So it can't win, but also it doesn't know how to put an end to the war either. It has of course signed documents — most importantly the memorandum of understanding — but for the Americans I think it's politically impossible to actually follow through on what they signed. That is, it's difficult to see them formally accepting the Strait of Hormuz being under Iranian administration. They won't return Iran's assets. The reparations of $300 billion — I mean, they might sign it, but they can't actually do it. Which means they can't win and they don't have a way out for peace either. And meanwhile Trump, in his desperation, is digging a deeper and deeper hole in terms of his rhetoric — the Strait of Hormuz is now wide open and in US control, the steel wall has been formed, and after Iran has been completely defeated the Strait of Hormuz will be US territory. All this rhetoric seems to get more outlandish the worse the situation gets for the United States, and it kind of shows the desperation they're in. And when great powers are desperate they can do not just foolish things but very aggressive things. I was wondering how you see the days if not weeks ahead. Do you expect another round of war?
Seyed Marandi: There is a possibility of war. The Americans have informed Iran through third parties that they are preparing for a strike or preparing for a war. It doesn't mean that will necessarily happen, but those messages have been sent. The Iranians have also seen the US build-up in the region. They are prepared for war, and they are continuing to expand their missile program, their drone program. They are developing new missiles. They are expanding their underground missile and drone bases and their factories, as well as their command-and-control centers. They are basically also preparing the country for a long-term war. The government has been shifting towards a wartime economy. I think the Supreme National Security Council has played an important role in that as well.
So Iran is prepared both for another wave of attacks that could last at least a week or two, and they are also preparing for a war that would last until the end of Trump's presidency. Now it doesn't mean that the war will last until then, and it doesn't mean that the United States will strike, but the Iranians are preparing themselves.
Also, the Iranians have warned that right now the Strait of Hormuz is closed, of course, but Iran does allow some ships to go through — both through its own corridor, which is easily accessible through the internet but also from the Omani coastline. Some ships do go through, and those are largely with Iranian coordination. In other words, through the Iranian corridor, ships from countries friendly to Iran — those that haven't participated in the war — can pass through. But sometimes there may be ships from countries that are friendly to Iran but are afraid to go through the Iranian corridor out of fear of punishment. So on some occasions the Iranians allow them to go alongside the Omani coastline, and there are some deals going on — negotiations that have always been taking place between Iran and the countries in the Persian Gulf. So sometimes Iran allows some ships to go through based on agreements that exist between, let's say, the United Arab Emirates and Iran.
But if the United States escalates economic warfare, we've heard that the Iranians could start targeting US naval ships. Iran is known to have capabilities that it has not used because it does not want to go up the escalation ladder too far, at least for the time being. But also Iran will completely shut down the Strait of Hormuz — that will be one of its responses. And that means a complete shutdown where nothing gets through, and probably no pipelines would be functioning either, whether in the Emirates or in Saudi Arabia. So the Iranians are prepared for all sorts of escalation — whether economic or military — but ultimately they are prepared for a very long fight.
Iran's offensive options and the vulnerability of Gulf monarchies
Glenn Diesen: As I said, I think the US's only off-ramp — one that would work for them — would be a return to the old status quo, while for obvious reasons the old status quo is completely unacceptable for Iran. You can't have forty-seven more years of this. But given that it's likely leading up to another escalation, and Iran is now prepared to act more confidently and go on the offensive, what might we see from Iran in terms of actions? Do you think the Iranians might go after some US aircraft carriers? Will they go after the US satellite states in the Gulf region in a tougher way? How do you see this happening? Because at the same time as we see the escalation and Iran's preparedness to take a harder line, you also see countries like the UAE apparently transferring money to Iran — again, these are the reports — to buy its way out of this conflict. Something is obviously brewing. I was wondering what is happening here.
Seyed Marandi: I don't know the exact details, but something is happening between Iran and the Emirates. I don't know if Iran would call it reparations or what it would call it, but the Emirates has of course played a very devastating role. Like all the others, they assisted the United States in targeting Iran, in killing Iranian civilians and citizens and leaders, and of course Iranian infrastructure. But the Emirates — and by the way, these countries in the Persian Gulf that have assisted the United States in this war — it's not just that they've given their airspace or their territory or access to their space and territory to use against Iran. They also fund the war, because the US bases in these countries have their expenses paid for by the host countries. And during the war, when the expenses were going up, they gave more assistance. In fact, the Iranians have evidence that at some point during the forty-day hot war, the Qataris were having problems paying — they didn't have the cash necessary, for whatever technical or other reasons, to fund this. So their role in this war has been quite outrageous in the eyes of Iranians.
But in any case, there is something going on between the Emirates and Iran at the moment. Again, I don't know the details, but that is linked to why there is a limited number of ships that are allowed to pass through the Strait of Hormuz.
I think the Iranians are going to — as the Americans would like to say — keep all options on the table. That would mean both targeting US naval assets, but also the countries that have been hosting US bases. The United States has not left these countries — their bases have been either destroyed or mostly destroyed, and US forces are now based in hotels and in buildings that are not linked to any military installation. They currently exist especially in Kuwait and in Bahrain, where the governments are particularly helpful to the US military. But in Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Qatar, and also in Oman, they have a significant presence.
I think the Iranians are weighing all their options. It depends on the form of escalation. If the United States escalates in a particular way, they will respond in a particular way. That's what we've seen throughout these five and a half months. But the difference today is that it seems clear that the leadership wanted Major General Rezaei to be the chair of the Supreme National Security Council because he wants to respond to US and Israeli aggression against Iran — but also across the region — in a more decisive and proactive way.
Glenn Diesen: And well, if in this retaliation the Iranians obviously not only go after the United States and Israel but go after the Gulf monarchies, how vulnerable are they now? Because they've already taken quite a hit over the past few months. But if we're talking about going up the escalation ladder, what might we be looking at?
Seyed Marandi: If we look at Iran's military capabilities and how they've evolved — from True Promise One, when Ismail Haniyeh was martyred in Tehran right after President Pezeshkian's inaugural ceremony, and Iran struck the Israeli regime in what was called True Promise One — if you compare True Promise One to True Promise Two and then Three, and now at the beginning of this war and the latest chapter a few weeks ago when the Americans restarted the fighting after tearing up the MOU effectively, we see that Iran's capabilities have improved dramatically at all levels. Whether it's air defense and downing US drones, or Iran's capabilities in striking with greater precision and greater devastation — Iran's capabilities have changed. And the very fact that they've announced the names of the new commanders, who have been in charge already for the last few months, shows that the underground facilities needed for warfare have been put in place and built. It shows that Iran's missile capabilities are improving — in other words, R&D continues as the war goes on — and of course they have enormous experience now with their missiles.
So in the next chapter, I think that Iran's strikes will be far more decisive, and Iran will be capable of doing whatever they want to these monarchies in the Persian Gulf — very swiftly. I've always said, and I've said this for years, that these monarchies put themselves at risk by assisting the United States in aggression. And I've said during the past few months that these countries will collapse if Iran targets them in retaliation if Trump actually carries out his threat to send Iran back to the stone age and so on. But every single day that goes by, Iran's capabilities increase. And so it becomes easier and easier for Iran to hurt them decisively and to inflict pain on them that they simply cannot tolerate.
But also Iran's capabilities in striking the Israeli regime are much greater today than even a few months ago. The precision of Iranian missiles is becoming far more devastating. So I think that if the war expands, Iran will easily be able to destroy very key and sensitive installations and assets of the Israeli regime — whether inside the 1967 borders or beyond, whether in Lebanon or Syria. The pain that Iran can inflict on the Israeli regime now is far greater because of the precision of the missiles, because of their ability to use evasive measures, and also because of the shortages that the United States and the Israeli regime now have when it comes to air defenses. And Iran is producing new missiles and drones far faster than the Americans have the ability to build new air defense missiles.
US strategic calculations and the diplomatic landscape
Glenn Diesen: That is, I assume, what would have to be a calculation for the Americans when they do their strategic planning and think about doing another round of war. If I were in the US, I would look at how the numbers continue to go in the wrong direction — not just putting the global economy aside, but we see that in the US there are growing weapons shortages. It's becoming a bit of a scandal in the US how they're running out of weapons, how irresponsible it is. But at the same time we're seeing the Iranians building up. So you would assume that some would be looking for a diplomatic off-ramp, but as I said none is forthcoming. And meanwhile, there are small things happening — the US could simply walk away from this and pretend they won. As Scott Bessent said, pretend the Strait of Hormuz is irrelevant. I'm hoping he said that for a reason, that they might walk away. But you also see countries like the UAE apparently handing over some money to Iran as part of some deal. I haven't heard any developments on the deal between Oman and Iran, but apparently they are still discussing how to manage the Strait of Hormuz. And then you have other countries — this defense pact we talked about before, about Turkey, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia seeking to have something in place as the US presence diminishes. So things are happening on the diplomatic front as well. I was just wondering — is there anything there you see having great potential, or are these still not changing the situation on the ground?
Seyed Marandi: A number of important changes have taken place. But first of all, the negotiations between Iran and Oman are over. The text is finalized. They're just not declaring anything because there's no reason to do so, because there's a war going on and the United States has imposed a siege. So there's no purpose in declaring some agreement over the Strait of Hormuz — and I'm just speculating here — perhaps Trump would use this as a means to manipulate the oil market. So there's no purpose in announcing this because it's not going to bring about any change. This will only be implemented when the strait is open, and for the time being there's no news of that. So there is no disagreement between the two countries. They've effectively ended their negotiations with success, but they're just putting it in the file in some office building for a later date.
With regards to the region, it's obvious that the Saudis underestimated Yemen in a very big way, and we're seeing that play itself out — both in the ease with which Yemen strikes Saudi oil installations, and also the way in which the Yemeni armed forces are destroying Saudi regime forces inside Yemen and their proxies. We're seeing them using missiles and drones to devastate Saudi assets in areas of Yemen occupied by forces loyal to the Saudi regime. And that of course is why — it was clear that they miscalculated when they bombed Sanaa International Airport and started this war. The Yemenis used this as an opportunity to begin forcing the Saudi regime to end the blockade on the Yemeni people. So they imposed a counter-blockade on Saudi Arabia. Now Saudi oil exports are affected. Saudi installations are being targeted. Saudi-linked forces and Saudi forces are being hammered.
And that's why the Saudis and Turkey and Pakistan gathered together. It's not about — I mean, they didn't do this for Gaza. That's been ongoing for three years. They didn't do it for Syria. The occupation of Syrian territory has taken place for a long time. The Golan Heights have been occupied since 1967, but the new territories that have been occupied — which are far more important and far larger than the Golan Heights — in response to that, Saudi Arabia and Erdoğan and Pakistan didn't do anything. And it's not about Lebanon or southern Lebanon being occupied. It's all about Saudi Arabia and Yemen.
Now the objectives of Pakistan are very different from Saudi Arabia's, and the objectives of Turkey are also different. And we've seen that since the signing, Yemen and Saudi Arabia are fighting and nothing much has happened on that front. They may send a few ships to the Red Sea, but I don't believe it's going to have any major benefit for Saudi Arabia. So Yemen is now flexing its muscles, and that is going to be important in the weeks ahead.
Iraqi resistance is prepared for war, and they have said that they have not cancelled the response they're going to give to Saudi Arabia for the bombing of the Popular Mobilization Forces, which are part of the Iraqi military. The US-Saudi bombing — they say that file is still open. So we see that the regional component to this war is more important today than it was before. During the past five-plus months of the war, it was mostly Iran versus the coalition. But now the resistance front is expanding its work across the region. Yemen of course has its own grievances, but they're still coordinated. And so the closure of the Bab-el-Mandeb and the Strait of Hormuz together dramatically increases the pressure on the United States.
But if the United States pushes for further escalation, then obviously this side can escalate further too. And also if the Israeli regime continues with its aggression in Lebanon and in Gaza, then based on the new policy of the Supreme National Security Council, Iran's response may be more decisive and it may take less time for it to be carried out. In other words, Iran may show less patience than before. So the Americans — as Trump likes to say — the Americans are not the ones with the cards. The more the Americans escalate, the more Iran will escalate, and the more Iran's allies will escalate.
And every day that goes by, Glenn, as we've been discussing for months now, the global economic crisis is getting worse. Now the timeline may be different from what I expected, because my knowledge of global economics is limited. I didn't know, for example, that China had such enormous reserves. But also Iran has been cooperating — working with some of the countries in the region, as I said, to allow limited exports or allowing its friends to export. So the timeline that I had thought would lead to a global economic catastrophe was similar to what Trump himself had said when he signed the MOU — he said in four weeks. That was the assessment among many in Iran as well. But it's obviously taken more than that. Let's assume that during the period when the MOU was being implemented, the energy shortages didn't grow further. But I think, based on Trump's own calculations — whether they're very accurate or whether he was accurately reflecting what he'd been told — I think the crisis is getting closer and closer. And it doesn't really matter if it's tomorrow, next week, or next month. That's the direction the world is moving in. And if this conflict continues for much longer, we're ultimately going to get to a very dark place.
Saudi Arabia's strategic miscalculation and financial vulnerability
Glenn Diesen: How do you make sense of the Saudi position? Again, they were already having quite a difficult time with the strikes by Iran, and now of course they're escalating — taking this war to Iraq and to Yemen — and it's proving to be something they can't control. The retaliation, especially from Yemen, is beyond control. They're striking their ships, they're striking their oil facilities. This week alone there's been a lot of dramatic footage coming out, especially from Yemen. So do you see any efforts by the Saudis to pull out of this? I'm struggling to see the strategic thinking. If you can't win and it's escalating, why aren't you trying to put an end to this — walk away, do something like the Emirates, just buy your way out?
Seyed Marandi: Saudi Arabia is complicated, but first a couple of things. I think there are striking similarities between Saudi Arabia and the United States, and between Yemen and Iran, in the way this is playing out. Saudi Arabia underestimated Yemen just as the United States underestimated Iran. And this shows, Glenn, that Mossad intelligence and CIA intelligence and the intelligence of Western agencies are not very good. They know far less than we thought they knew. They underestimated Iran's missile and drone capabilities, their underground cities — which are expanding, with Iran building new underground missile bases as we speak. They underestimated the number of missiles that Iran has. They underestimated the number of factories that Iran has. They underestimated the R&D in Iranian military technology. They underestimated everything — and not just in a significant way. They completely misread the situation.
I think the same is true with Yemen. Yemen was quietly building up its underground capabilities, its factories, its missile and drone factories, its underground missile and drone bases. And the Saudis underestimated. Although I believe this to be correct as well — that the Americans encouraged the Saudis to strike Sanaa International Airport and to begin this confrontation, in the belief that Yemen would not respond or did not have the capability to respond. But as we're seeing, and as you pointed out, during the last few days we've seen very impressive strikes on Saudi targets across the board. So I think they miscalculated and misread the situation — the Saudis, just as the United States did with regards to Iran.
But also I think that Mohammed bin Salman is somewhat similar to Trump. These monarchies in the Persian Gulf are led by people who are surrounded by yes-men, and of course they get their intelligence briefings from CENTCOM and so on — that's where they get much of their information. And CENTCOM and the US intelligence agencies tell them what they want them to know. So they mislead them as well.
But in any case, they're surrounded by yes-men. Look at Mohammed bin Salman's track record. He kidnapped the Lebanese prime minister Hariri when he was prime minister, imprisoned him, beat him — the prime minister of another country. Not very smart. He began the genocidal war in Yemen with the support of the West and the entire region except for Iran. Qatar and Turkey under Erdoğan supported him as he was carrying out a genocide similar to what we see in Gaza — although Yemen could fight back and it was much larger, they tried to starve the people, and it failed. So that was catastrophic. Since 2015, hundreds of billions of dollars were spent on Yemen, and hundreds of billions of dollars on these mega-projects, which got him nowhere either. Again, that doesn't show great wisdom. And Saudi Arabia today doesn't have the financial cushion that it had before — this is not a small issue now, because of these wars and because of these mega-projects.
Then he imposed the siege on Qatar — another foolish act. Then we also saw what he did to Jamal Khashoggi in Turkey. So he's not the most wise of leaders, and I think that makes him strikingly similar to Trump — even though Trump humiliates him regularly. There are striking similarities.
So Saudi Arabia is in a very difficult situation now because, as I said, it does not have the financial reserves that it used to have at all. And this, Glenn — I'm sorry for digressing — but we have to keep an eye on Japan and the Japanese currency, and the fact that if this continues, Trump was depending on further milking of these Arab monarchies. He was counting on them spending two trillion dollars or more for the development of AI in the United States. They're not making money. They're losing money. They need their reserves. And Saudi Arabia is particularly vulnerable. Qatar is also not doing exceptionally well. But Saudi Arabia is particularly vulnerable because it has wasted all that money on wars and on these failed mega-projects. So Saudi Arabia is not in an ideal situation, and it has reflected itself in its dealings with Iran. Saudi Arabia is now behaving differently than before, but its conflict with Yemen continues, while its behavior towards Iran has shifted, at least for the time being.
The shifting world order and Iran's growing global standing
Glenn Diesen: My last question is just how you see the international order shifting in terms of how it's possibly benefiting Iran. Because what's happening in this war against Iran does reflect a wider trend around the world — the US is facing growing economic problems, deeper social and political problems at home, it's being balanced abroad militarily, and overall we are seeing the rise of new rivals. I was just wondering how you see the world order changing — not just as a direct result of this war, although I would say this is a huge component of the wider trend — but how is the shift in world order impacting Iran, or how will it impact?
Seyed Marandi: First, I think in the West things are going well for Iran. Europe, because of its own foolish policies — the war in Ukraine has had a huge impact on this war itself. Part of the reason why the United States has these shortages is because of the war in Ukraine. And part of the reason why the European proxies of the United States have not been able to do anything against Iran is because they have worn themselves out. And the reverse is true as well — the US war in West Asia has weakened its position in Europe and in Ukraine in particular. So there is a strong relationship between the war in Europe and the war in West Asia. I'm not saying the two conflicts have melted into one another, but I think the coordination between Iran and its allies and Russia is probably much greater than we think.
Europe is much weaker today and it is declining fast. I don't think Iranians have any ill will towards ordinary Europeans, but I'm talking about the governments and NATO and the EU and the UK as entities that have centuries of colonization behind them that have influenced our lives for all these years.
The changes taking place in the United States I think are also very good for Iran. The very fact that Trump — this whole episode in Astoria where he fled the plane and was hidden and taken — changed planes twice, I think. And then it turns out it was Israeli, as expected. As soon as I heard the news, I was absolutely certain it was Israeli intelligence, and it turned out to be exactly that. All of this is undermining the Israeli regime and the Zionist lobby. As we move forward, every new foolish act of the Israeli regime — giving false intelligence to Trump to humiliate him in order to restart the war, which he did, with the thirteen days of fighting that came after — all of this is coming out, and this is going to hurt the Israeli regime further. It is going to hurt the Zionist lobby further in the United States. The declining economy, the ongoing genocide, the war against Iran, the humiliation of the US president, the behavior of the Zionist lobby in the United States trying to take away freedom of speech in the country — all of this is destroying the status of Zionism in the United States. So that is going well for Iran too.
And of course Iran's status among powerful countries like China and Russia has been enhanced significantly due to the war. So even though Iran has been hurt — and it has been significantly hurt economically, there's no doubt that life is more difficult for Iranians today than it was six months ago — Iran's global status and regional status has been enhanced. And once this war is over, whenever that may be, Iran's growth will be impacted significantly. And of course the fact that it will hold the Strait of Hormuz will allow Iran to grow much more swiftly.
And then another thing that's important, Glenn — the statements made by Trump about taking the Strait of Hormuz and making it American territory further strengthen Iran's hand. It unites the Iranian people further. It always reminds people what the enemy is up to — that the enemy wants to take away your sovereignty, your dignity, your territory, wants to break up your country, wants to send you back, wants to exterminate your people by obliterating the country. So every time Trump reminds the Iranian people of who he really is and what his personality is like, and what the political establishment in the United States and the Zionists are like, that further unites the country and creates stronger sympathy for Iran across the world. Because what Trump says, wherever he may say it, is heard around the world.
So besides the death and destruction, besides the murder of children, the slaughter in Lebanon and Gaza, and the attacks on Iran and the murders they carry out in Yemen — all that aside — it's as if the general policies of the United States are being devised by the Iranians. It's like they're making the worst possible choices and the worst possible decisions in their attempts to undermine Iran and its allies.
The collapse of US and Western soft power
Glenn Diesen: One can often assess the mistakes of the US measured in economic and military terms. But if we also shift towards soft power — which has been one of the great successes of the United States — it has truly been shattered. And also how it's able to sell wars. From the war against Serbia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, against Russia, against Iran — they always sell their wars as a humanitarian mission. And now you see this rhetoric that we're going to annihilate Iran, that it's going to stop existing as a civilization, that we're going to take the Strait of Hormuz as US territory, that we're going to make so much money. All of this rhetoric is really destroying whoever still believed in that narrative.
Seyed Marandi: And it's alongside actions. We see the genocide in Gaza — ongoing, never ending. The starvation of the people, preventing medicine from getting in as we speak. They're starving kids — kids with special food needs because of their diet. They won't let that sort of food get in. They won't let medicine for those who have cancer get in, so that they would die. And then of course they snipe people, they bomb people at the same time. It's ongoing. So people see Trump's threats and see the reality in Gaza. The bombings in Lebanon — yesterday they murdered eleven Lebanese, all civilians, half of them children. They see how they're openly stealing the assets of the Venezuelan people, and no one in the United States is protesting. So this rhetoric is backed up by genocide and theft. So when he says "we're going to make a lot of money, we're going to take the land, we're going to destroy the country" — people look around and see, well, they've done this before. That's what they're actually doing. So it's even uglier. It's not just that he's talking nonsense. They see it happening.
So the utter destruction of US soft power is something — I mean, if a young twenty-two-year-old person who is now highly critical of the United States were to be taken back in time ten years ago, seven or eight years ago, or during the Obama era — they would be stunned. Because the US soft power — look at the US war on Afghanistan and Iraq and how it damaged the US image really badly across the world. Not like this war, but really badly. Then Obama became president and they whitewashed everything, and Obama received the Nobel Peace Prize before he even set foot in the White House. But now the image of the United States is so devastated that if the United States brings in ten Obamas, it's just not going to reverse it. The devastation is just so extraordinary.
Glenn Diesen: There's a similar problem in Europe, by the way. Take the German case — they backed the genocide in Gaza, they made comments that Israel was doing their dirty work in attacking Iran, they continued this boycott of diplomacy against Russia and pushed for this forever war. And at home they're crushing opposition. The list can go on and on. But they still try to lecture other countries about human rights, democracy, and good governance. And while they still believe they have this authority, you see the rest of the world now starting to reject this idea that states are divided into civilizational teachers and students — and somehow these people are the teachers who are supposed to lecture the world. It's not working anymore. And that was a key component of the hegemonic model of a benign hegemon. A lot was bet on these wars and they're losing all of it. It's quite a shock to see, and they keep doubling down. Anyways, I've already held you too long for a Sunday morning. So thank you very much for taking the time.
Seyed Marandi: Thank you very much for having me. It's always a great pleasure.