Scott Ritter warns that European escalation against Russia has crossed a point of no return
Glenn Diesen interviews former UN weapons inspector and US Marine Corps intelligence officer Scott Ritter about the intensifying drone attacks on Russia and the likelihood of Russian retaliation against NATO member states.
Summary
Glenn Diesen speaks with Scott Ritter about the massive drone attacks on Moscow and St. Petersburg, which Ritter argues could not occur without full Western involvement in terms of technology, intelligence, and manufacturing. Ritter contends that Russia has now crossed a threshold where restraint is no longer strategically viable, pointing to Russia's updated nuclear doctrine — shaped heavily by strategist Sergey Karaganov — which explicitly permits nuclear responses to conventional strikes on Russian strategic infrastructure enabled by nuclear-armed states. Ritter argues that Russia is likely to respond decisively, potentially eliminating Kiev and striking a Baltic state as an example, before the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum opens. He sees Putin's meeting with Xi Jinping in Beijing as potentially analogous to the February 4, 2022 meeting that preceded the special military operation — a signal that China is being briefed on what is about to happen.
The conversation also covers the rhetoric and escalation around Kaliningrad, with Ritter warning that any attack on the enclave would result in swift and total Russian military retaliation against the Baltic states, exposing NATO's Article 5 commitments as effectively meaningless. Ritter introduces what he calls the "Karaganov fallacy" — while respecting Karaganov's intellectual framework, he argues that nuclear weapons once used cannot be contained, and that any Russian nuclear strike would eventually trigger a general nuclear exchange, making Karaganov's thesis that Europe will capitulate without further escalation an untestable and potentially civilization-ending gamble.
Regarding the Latvian defense minister's resignation, Ritter is cautious about definitive conclusions but suggests it reflects the embarrassment of covert policy exposure — a plausible deniability arrangement that became untenable once Ukrainian drones over Estonian and Latvian territory were publicly acknowledged. Both Ritter and Diesen express deep concern that European leaders are celebrating the drone attacks without comprehending the retaliatory logic they are triggering, and that the only remaining diplomatic off-ramp may depend on China briefing Trump and the EU after Putin's Beijing visit, or on Trump pressuring Europe to stand down — a prospect neither finds reassuring given Trump's weakened political position following the Iran situation.
Key Takeaways
FULL TRANSCRIPT
Western involvement in the drone attacks on Russia
Glenn Diesen: We are joined today by Scott Ritter, a former UN weapons inspector, a US Marine Corps intelligence officer, and a prolific author. Thank you very much for coming on the program. We appear to be entering very dangerous times. The attacks on Russia are now intensifying. We saw massive drone attacks on Moscow over the weekend, and before we logged on I saw that drones were also entering the space around St. Petersburg — very far away from Ukraine, I would add — to the extent that they had to shut down many of the flights going out of Pulkovo. To what extent is the West involved in these attacks?
Scott Ritter: Let's make it absolutely clear: if it wasn't for Western involvement, these attacks would not be taking place. The technologies being used are developed by the West for Ukraine. The intelligence information is provided exclusively by the West for Ukraine. The manufacturing is done outside of Ukraine to avoid Russian interdiction. This is not an example of Ukraine escalating against Russia. This is the collective West escalating against Russia. This is a reflection of the reality that NATO nations are actively engaged in combat operations against Russia — operations that are basically achieving an existential threat to the survival of Russia.
Glenn Diesen: In Europe there's a lot of talk about the need to bring the war to Russia, and a lot of talk about mass producing long-range weapons to strike Russia. When do they cross the point where, for Russia, doing nothing is more dangerous than hitting back? Because we seem to be crossing that threshold — if we haven't already.
Scott Ritter: It's been crossed a long time ago. You have major Western nations — Germany, France, Great Britain and others — openly articulating the necessity to engage Russia in open armed conflict by the end of this decade, 2029 to 2030. We now have Pistorius, the defense minister of Germany, openly saying that Russia is our enemy and we need to prepare to go to war. And now they're preparing the weapons of war specifically to conduct long-range strike missions inside Russia.
I'm not a Russian leader, and there's a good reason why I'm not — A, I'm American, and B, you wouldn't want me to be your leader, because we'd be at war with Europe right now. I'd be launching preemptive strikes. I'd be taking out production facilities. I'd be destroying decision-making centers. And I'd be implementing in full effect the Karaganov doctrine.
Glenn Diesen: It's very strange. If you listen to the rhetoric four years ago, there was caution and something that sounded like rational arguments — concern about being participants in the war. Where the rhetoric is now is very far apart from that. A lot of these attacks on Russia now evidently have gone through the Baltic states. We've seen especially Estonia and Latvia involved. Of course they have to transit through Lithuania as well if this is going to work. We also heard statements from the Russian foreign intelligence services arguing that Ukraine is preparing strikes on Russia from Latvian territory. Once the Russians make these statements, aren't they committing to something? Because if they say "we know it's happening from Latvia" but then do nothing, that seems like an impossibility.
Scott Ritter: Yes, I think it's gone beyond the concept of a possibility to a probability, and maybe even an absolute certainty. I think Latvia is being marked for death.
I don't pretend to know everything, but I do know Sergey Karaganov. He is a serious man. He is a rational actor, not an irrational actor, and he is somebody whose voice has influence. Karaganov and others like him, who advise or whose opinions are heeded by the Ministry of Defense and Russian leadership, have articulated a very sound, rational case for decisive Russian military intervention.
I don't believe these people who speak of Russian military intervention are playing the game of managed escalation. I think we're beyond that.
Russia's strategic patience and the crossing of red lines
The reason why we're where we're at — and I don't blame Vladimir Putin, he was a genius and he still is a genius — is that he has been managing the escalation ladder in perfect form. Never once, prior to this most recent era of this war, did Ukraine pose an existential threat to the security of Russia. It was always the potential. But we know that the West has been articulating in favor of the strategic defeat of Russia since the beginning of the special military operation. We know this. And we know that they have been pushing Russia, pushing Russia, pushing Russia. Russia sets a red line, it gets crossed. Russia resets the red line, it gets crossed. Russia resets it again for a reason — because the crossing of the red line was done by design to get a Russian overreaction, so that the West could mobilize and solidify support on behalf of Ukraine. It was Russia's goal and objective to keep the West from being able to do that. So you don't overreact. You allow the red lines to be crossed, because at the end of the day it didn't change the ultimate calculation. Russia still prevailed on the battlefield.
Russia is still prevailing on the battlefield today. The special inspector general of Operation Atlantic Resolve has published a report recently that says Russia is dominating across the battlefield. So all those pro-Ukrainian social media platforms — stick it in your ear. The United States has spoken. And even that report is very conservative in terms of giving credit to Ukraine and NATO that simply isn't reflected by reality. But their conclusions are: Russia maintains operational and strategic dominance across the spectrum of this conflict. That's what Russia has been seeking — to wear not just Ukraine down, but the collective West down through a war of attrition. And they're still succeeding.
But what's happened is that because Russia allowed the collective West to cross red lines, they've now crossed the ultimate red line. In the past, the West always said, "We want to avoid being categorized as an active participant in the conflict. We always want to create that air of ambiguity." There's no more ambiguity. They're just straight up doing it. Straight up saying it.
Karaganov's doctrine and Russia's nuclear posture
And now we come to Sergey Karaganov. We should probably do a good job of introducing him to a Western audience. This is one of the premier political-military analysts in Russia — a man who has advised Russian presidents from Boris Yeltsin to Vladimir Putin. In 2023, he articulated in writing and in spoken word the need for the West to be decisively countered by Russia. He was in favor of the preemptive use of nuclear weapons — that when the West articulates a strategy calling for the strategic defeat of Russia, Russia has a duty and responsibility to respond and nip this in the bud before it manifests itself in something that does real harm to Russia. He famously said that his calculation is that no American leader will trade Boston for Poznań — meaning Russia could take out a Polish city with a nuclear weapon and Europe will do nothing. It'll intimidate Europe, and the United States will do nothing because they don't want to trade Boston for Poznań.
Vladimir Putin came out immediately and said, "No, I don't agree with Sergey Karaganov. That's not who we are. That's not what we do." But in 2024, as the West continued to push, he appointed Sergey Karaganov to head the review process for the Kremlin's strategic nuclear posture review. In 2025, the Russians published a new strategic nuclear posture that was basically the Karaganov doctrine — saying that if nuclear powers provide conventional military capability to a non-nuclear power, and that capability is used to strike into the strategic depth of Russia and threatens Russia's strategic infrastructure, then Russia is empowered to use nuclear weapons in response. They can treat this as a nuclear attack.
That's exactly what's happening. People need to understand that this doctrine was published last year. It was covered. We talked about it. Everybody talked about it. Everybody knew this. And yet the West is now doing something that flagrantly crosses that red line, because they believe Russia is bluffing.
And so now they've crossed the red line, and Ukraine is doubling down because Ukraine smells blood. Ukraine is dying, and for the first time Ukraine is going, "Wait a minute, we're doing real harm here. Let's keep doing it. Let's keep doing it." Because they want NATO to become engaged. That's their goal. That's their salvation. And so Ukraine is just doubling down, throwing caution to the wind.
In a week and a half, the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum opens up. This is the premier event — it's bigger than Davos. Everybody in the West knows Davos. St. Petersburg International swamps it. More participants, more money, more everything. You think the Russians are going to let Ukrainian drones come out of the Baltics and threaten this? No, not at all.
I see nothing but bad things, bad tidings. I think the West has gone too far. I think there will be hell to pay. I don't know if Russia limits it to Latvia. If I were the Russians, I would take out the production facilities in England, in Germany, in Denmark — all identified production facilities associated with the FP-5 and other drones. I would take out German companies involved in guidance and control. I would even threaten to take out Ramstein — where the intelligence is gathered and disseminated. But the West has to be struck a blow. And I would eliminate Kiev once and for all. I think it's time to find out what a dozen Oreshnik missiles can do to downtown Kiev. And I think it's time to show the Ukrainians that that's the fate of all of your cities if you want to continue this war.
Vladimir Putin said on May 9th that he wants this war to wrap up. A lot of people went, "Oh, that's a sign of Russian weakness." No, it's a sign of Russian recognition of their strength, and it's time to flex their muscles. The day of restraint, I believe, is over. I believe we're moving to a very dangerous period, because now we get to answer the question: what will the United States do when Russia strikes a NATO country? How will Article 5 be treated?
Glenn Diesen: I spoke to Karaganov last week on this program, and he made the point that in the past he was representing a small minority who said it's time to retaliate directly against the Europeans, but now he says he represents the overwhelming majority. So you already had all this pressure building up on the Kremlin — they had to choose a different path. Do they retaliate against NATO and risk going up the escalation ladder, or do they look the other way and risk emboldening NATO? They always went with the second option, but now the pressure was mounting so much. And just at this point, when all this pressure is mounting on Putin to take a harder line, we see these massive drone attacks and just uncontrolled celebrations in Europe. It's so concerning. It's as if they don't see what's coming next.
They use all these terms like "bad for Russia means good for us." The people online — the pro-Ukrainian bloggers or social media activists — these people are destroying Ukraine. If Ukraine had implemented the Minsk agreement or done anything like that, which they always opposed, Ukraine would be intact. My concern is what the Europeans are celebrating now — that the attacks on Russia are having a growing impact on Russian security, and seem to be making a significant dent in Russian energy. If this is the case, that means the Russians can't afford to look the other way anymore. How are you assessing the attacks on Russian energy security?
The damage to Russian energy infrastructure
Scott Ritter: Last November I was in Moscow and I interviewed somebody affiliated with the Russian State Duma, involved in the committee on the protection of energy infrastructure from drone attacks. I was surprised by the frankness of his conversation. I actually published it on the Russia House. I think many people ignored it at the time because people don't like to dig deep into fact-based reality — they like to live in their little fantasy worlds. I'm going to republish it and ask people to listen to it, because it's important what he said at the time. He said that these attacks were taking place, but that the real damage done was minimal — that Russia was able to mitigate the damage and then repair the facilities and bring them back into order. So the strategic impact was not significant.
That's not why Karaganov's arguments became more prominent. I don't believe Vladimir Putin responds to pressure from Sergey Karaganov or anybody else. That's not how the game plays. Sergey Karaganov has taken a stance, and Vladimir Putin said, "No, the damage being done doesn't rate an overreaction." But now that damage equation has changed.
It's not that Karaganov's arguments have pressured Putin into changing his mind. Putin is a pragmatic guy. He's looking at the damage being done now to Russian energy infrastructure, and it's real. It's not easily mitigated and it's not easily repaired — meaning that when you do this damage, it's long-term. Russia can't afford long-term damage.
There are things that happen in Russia that we're not aware of. I believe Russia probably has strategic reserves just like everybody else, and I believe they're able to ride this out — because you see a lot of people talking about Russia's export volumes not having dropped significantly. But the potential for the production of refined products for export is being impacted, and at some point the reserves run out. If you haven't brought production capacity back up, you're going to have a gap, and it's going to be meaningful. It's not Vladimir Putin's job to allow Russia to get to the point where you have meaningful impact. His job is to prevent that from happening.
I believe that between 10 and 20% of Russia's export production capacity has been damaged to an extent beyond what it was in November. This damage will take months to repair. And if Russia doesn't nip this in the bud now, by the time they repair it and bring it back online, the reserves that are currently carrying them through this process will be depleted, and then you're going to have a real and significant impact. That's why Russia needs to act now.
And I also think the Ukrainians are becoming more and more emboldened. We know what the consequences of an attack on the Kremlin would be — fatal for everybody. But if you're Russian, you don't want the Kremlin attacked. You don't want to wait for that to happen. You see the Ukrainians moving in that direction. This is the direction they are heading. It's inevitable. You see the West backing them up. You see the rhetoric, and the damage is being done. This is the moment of decision right now. If you wait, you allow the Ukrainians to do significant, meaningful harm of an existential nature. Right now Russia has the capacity to absorb, repair, and move on — if the threat could be terminated. So now is the moment of decisive action.
Putin's May 9th messaging and the Beijing summit
I can't speak on behalf of anybody — these are assessments, and assessments can be wrong. But I have to say: on May 9th, the whole scene around Victory Day was different. I've been watching this for four years since the special military operation began. This was a May 9th of deadly seriousness. At the embassy, the ambassador spoke incessantly about unconditional surrender. Unconditional surrender. Unconditional surrender. Linking Nazi Germany and the Ukrainian government in a way that had never been done before. They spoke of Germany as a permanent enemy — not as a former enemy, but as the enemy today. This was the language.
Dmitry Medvedev, who has always been sort of the bad crazy cop to Putin's good sane cop, wrote an article in RT. What's the importance of RT English? It's an article written for the West to read. It's designed for Western consumption. But it's an article that speaks with the force of the Russian government. This is Russian state media. This isn't Medvedev putting a social media post out on X. This is RT Russian state media publishing a major article written by a man who used to be the president of Russia, used to be the prime minister of Russia, and currently is number two on the national security council. And the article is devastating for Europe. It pretty much endorses the Karaganov doctrine. Karaganov the day before had another interview that basically hammered home the same points.
The sense I get, having watched and monitored Russia, is that Russia has reached the point of decision. And unless something fundamentally changes — such as the unconditional surrender of Ukraine today — I think we're going to see decisive action before the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum begins, to preempt any potential attack.
I'd be curious to be a fly on the wall — although that's an insult to the Chinese, I'm sure their sanitation is such that there are no flies on the wall — in the conversations between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping about this. Because China was extraordinarily tough on Trump about Taiwan. And the Chinese know that Ukraine is as important to Russia as Taiwan is to China.
The Financial Times, playing their MI6 stupid mind games, putting out this stuff about how Xi Jinping told Trump that Putin overstepped — the simplistic stupidity of this. Andrei Ilnitsky, former lieutenant general, adviser to Shoigu when he was minister of defense, and the author of the concept of mental warfare — this isn't mental warfare. Mental warfare is carefully crafted, designed to get in there, latch in, and rip. What the British did here was just crude and stupid. And you could immediately see all the corrupted social media outlets jumping on and saying, "Aha." Just brain-dead people.
No, that's not the case at all. I do believe this is a very important meeting, and that this meeting may go down in history as the modern-day version of the February 4th, 2022 meeting, where Vladimir Putin flew to Beijing, met with Xi Jinping on the eve of the initiation of the special military operation. I have a feeling that there will be conversations had that at least allow the Chinese to be positioned for what is about to happen.
Glenn Diesen: That's what I was thinking as well, because Trump just left and Putin has arrived in Beijing. I'm assuming if the Russians are now planning to dramatically change their posture in this war, they would discuss this at length with the Chinese first. Because there is no status quo which they can hold on to — it's not just where they are today with the drone attacks, but the Russians can see exactly what direction this is going. The Chinese can see this. The hatred of Russia in Europe has blinded them completely to what will come next. This is so predictable — the war we're walking into — and yet no debate, no discussion, no dissent, not a squeak. It's extraordinary.
I did want to get your thought on something: the defense minister in Latvia resigned after Ukrainian drones were scrambled and hit some targets within Latvia. What do you make of this situation?
The Latvian defense minister's resignation and Baltic corridor
Scott Ritter: It's hard to know unless you have access to the totality of information. I think what happened is there's embarrassment. There can be no doubt that implausible deniability is the coin of the realm when it comes to the official face of governance, but militaries and intelligence services often engage in covert relationships that are supposed to be deniable. I think they got caught with their pants down, and it's an embarrassing situation. He paid the price — he was relieved of his position — but the policy is not changing.
They're saying these are drones that were redirected by the Russians using electronic warfare. The Russians are saying these drones were in their airspace. I think people have been tracking the drones and they see there's a definite Baltic corridor — that's not an invention, that's not imagination. Whether the Russians were clever enough to take control of drones and target Baltic oil production is another thing. But if the Ukrainians weren't using a Baltic corridor, then the Russians wouldn't have to do this. I think what we're seeing is that there are political ramifications for being caught in failed covert policy.
Glenn Diesen: When the Russian Baltic coast was struck, the main argument was, "Well, they didn't use the Baltic airspace — this is Russian propaganda." But now they've kind of turned the page on this, because they've admitted that there were Ukrainian drones over Estonia, Ukrainian drones over Latvia. Then also Russian drones over Lithuania. So they're recognizing now that they are using this corridor, but the new narrative appears to be, "Oh, we haven't permitted it and we oppose it." But that doesn't make any sense to me.
Scott Ritter: Just as was the case when the CIA helped the Ukrainians try to attack Vladimir Putin in December of 2025 during his famous phone call with Donald Trump — drones are brought down intact, and the guidance package is recovered intact, and Russian intelligence is able to extract data that proves everything about the targeting. When Ukraine launches the number of drones it does — yes, the Russians are shooting down a lot of drones — but we know that electronic warfare, for instance, if the Russians can take a drone and redirect it to a target, they can take a drone and land it. There's no doubt in my mind that the Russians have recovered intact a number of these drones and have reverse-engineered the guidance. They understand exactly the path flown by the drones. And by evaluating the data, they can tell where the data came from — what intelligence sources were used, etc.
I believe the Russians have a very full picture of what's going on, which is why when Naryshkin publishes very pointed intelligence, we have to respect the fact that it's probably fact-based, not just rumor, speculation, or disinformation.
Kaliningrad and Baltic escalation rhetoric
Glenn Diesen: Just as you know, they couldn't get more reckless — we see that out of Lithuania, they're making comments that we should now put more pressure on Kaliningrad. This is the enclave, severed from the rest of the Russian Federation, but it still hosts a million Russian civilians. They also host nuclear weapons. Earlier we had the US general Dungh making the point that "oh, we can take Kaliningrad." All of this rhetoric is essentially about attacking Russia. And this is happening at the same time as the British are trying to lead a naval group to confront the Russians, and it's quite predictable that they want to, if not put a full blockade, at least harass Russian ships in the Baltic Sea. We see escalation at every level. Do you see Kaliningrad possibly being a flash point?
Scott Ritter: I publicly cautioned General Dung — not that he would listen to me — but I said the quickest way to ensure that you end up being marked with a stone at Arlington is to attack Kaliningrad, because the Russians will instantly kill you, your command staff, and everybody affiliated with this attack. It's just stupid.
The Estonians making similar statements, the Latvians threatening — I tell you, the quickest way to make Kaliningrad not an enclave is to attack Kaliningrad, because we're going to see the Baltics become Russian again, and they'll become Russian overnight. That's just the reality of it. If that's the game they want to play, Russia doesn't want to do this. But Russia's not going to yield on this point. And if it does become a flash point, it's a flash point that marks the total eradication of the Baltic states — which will be interesting, because then what will NATO do? Nothing. They can do nothing.
The Baltics have always been this exposed appendage. Is Sweden now going to commit suicide and come in to save the Baltics? Are the Finns going to make an attack on the Kola Peninsula and Vyborg to save the Baltics? No, because that would be the end of Finland and the end of Sweden. These nations joined a failing military alliance that has no political viability and zero military capacity to meaningfully project power.
Where is the commander of NATO forces telling the military council to tell the yappy Baltic Chihuahuas to shut up? Because the rhetoric is fatal to NATO. If you want NATO to totally collapse, show that Article 5 is absolutely meaningless. And the best way to show that Article 5 is absolutely meaningless is to provoke the Russians. What does the British fleet think they're going to do besides sink? They all believe Russia is bluffing. They misunderstand patience and pragmatism for weakness.
Glenn Diesen: I also heard the argument that Medvedev is just putting on a show, same as Karaganov — that they're really deterred by NATO. But I don't think this is all for show. I've been in Karaganov's office one-on-one before 2022, when he made the point that he doesn't believe the US would risk New York for Tallinn. So it's not going to happen. I think this overconfidence — that the Russians can be deterred, that they wouldn't dare — I think they were cautious because it would be a reckless thing to attack a NATO country. But they've kind of put the Russians in a position where it's even more reckless not to do anything.
You mentioned that the Russians could take the Baltic states. I'm thinking a little bit about George Kennan, who gave this interview with the New York Times back in '98, when he made the point that all the people pushing for NATO expansionism — at some point the Russians are going to have to push back. And he made the prediction that at that point, the NATO expanders will essentially say, "Ah, look, the Russians have always been imperialist, that's just how they are." He was making the point that this is flawed — they will respond to what we're doing now. That was his main argument.
I feel now it's the same thing. The Baltic states, for the past four years, have been saying, "Oh, the Russians might march on Paris after they're done with Ukraine, they'll invade Latvia." I always made the point that that's ridiculous — no one in Russia wants to go into Latvia. But it doesn't look so ridiculous anymore. I don't think they want to annex that territory — sounds like a mess — but I do think that they will strike it. I think we've crossed that boundary as well. There's no coming back from this.
Scott Ritter: Which one of the republics has the large Russian population — Estonia or Latvia?
Glenn Diesen: They both have a significant Russian population — I think around 20% — but they also have the strictest laws where ethnic Russians or Russian speakers can't hold government office and don't get voting rights. So they're kind of second-rate citizens. The whole argument when they were joining NATO and the EU in 2004 was, "Oh, Russia should be happy because the EU and NATO stand for human rights, so now the Russians should be reassured that the Russian minority will get rights." But we're now 22 years later and nothing has been done. There's a higher concentration, I think, in a specific region in Estonia — Narva.
Scott Ritter: I just think they should study the history of the special military operation and understand the difference between Russkie and Rossiyane — between Slavic Russian people and the Russian nation — and understand that in Estonia it's both Russkie and Rossiyane, and you're playing with fire. You're giving the Russians the excuse to do something that otherwise they wouldn't do.
I'm nervous. I don't know about you, but I'm a little nervous. I don't want to test Karaganov's thesis. I don't want to test it, because I believe I know the outcome. I believe Karaganov is right that the United States will not sacrifice Boston or New York for Poznań or another city. But the United States can't allow Russia to create a new paradigm of nuclear deterrence where you have one power not only possessing nuclear weapons but having demonstrated the capacity to use them. The other power can't sit there passively and be the same way. They must use nuclear weapons too. And then the United States now has cause to use nuclear weapons against Iran. And we will, because the precedent has been set by Russia. And once we begin these exchanges, it doesn't stop until there's a general exchange and we're all dead.
This is the flaw. I call it the Karaganov fallacy. I don't want to test it. Sergey Karaganov is a man I respect — his intellectual capacity is prodigious and somewhat intimidating sometimes. I don't want to claim that I'm smarter than he is. But on the issue of nuclear war and nuclear weapons, I am experienced, and my gut feeling — and as an experienced analyst you sort of go with your gut feeling on occasion — is that there's no containing nuclear weapons once they're used. Once they're used, whether it takes months, years, or a decade, eventually we're going to have a general nuclear exchange that takes out all of humanity. And I'd prefer that not to happen.
Which means I'd prefer no Russian conventional strikes. I'd prefer peace. I'd prefer sanity and rationality. But the West has basically punted on that one. So here we are.
Glenn Diesen: I always make that point as well. What's going to kill us all is the delusion of escalation control. Once we're doing what we're doing now — the belief that "we can just escalate a little bit more, a little bit more, and if the Russians don't care for it, maybe we'll take a little step back and then push forward again" — I think this is the dangerous illusion. We're going to lose control over this very quickly. And that should be the lesson of Iran as well — you can't go back to the status quo.
The risk of uncontrolled escalation and the Iran parallel
Scott Ritter: Marco Rubio needs to learn that lesson. I wish we could go back to Barbara Tuchman's book — was it The March of Folly that she wrote, or The Guns of August? I think The March of Folly — about basically the summer of 1914, where nobody believed it was uncontainable. They all believed you could just have a little conflict with Serbia, it wasn't going to be a big deal, don't worry about it. Next thing you know, you have a world war that just got out of control.
And I think that's where we're at right now. Trump is in a desperate position. One of the problems we have here is that Trump is not a rational actor, and he's already been humiliated by Iran. Can he really withstand another humiliation? These are theses I don't want tested. But unfortunately, I think we're going to test them.
Glenn Diesen: Assuming it's very likely, if not guaranteed now, that the Russians will retaliate — how do you see them going up this escalation ladder? Will they go with incrementalism, or go in very hard? Because they could do something from plausible deniability — sending in Ukrainian drones essentially down before they do a conventional strike. I mean, they can do a tactical — I don't think a tactical nuke is far up the escalation ladder. But how do you see them retaliating? What would you expect? There's no single Russian playbook. But what do you think might be possible escalation strategies?
Scott Ritter: I have to take off my military hat, because my military hat says: if you're going to do this, do it decisively. I do believe that Putin will allow for escalation management. But the initial blows will be decisive. I think that Kiev will be eliminated, and I believe that a Baltic state will be struck decisively. The decision-making centers have already been identified. So I believe that an example will be set of a Baltic state — a decisive example. And then I think there will be very little wiggle room, meaning zero tolerance for Western retaliation. Any effort at Western retaliation will bring the full weight of Russian military response.
I don't believe German factories are going to be hit in the first wave. I don't believe UK factories will be hit in the first wave. I think that will be left for a follow-on wave if necessary. But I do think that Russia will have to put a marker down, and it won't be just one or two attacks. I think if they hit a Baltic state, they will eliminate the Baltic state. Because you have to send a signal. You have to say: there but for the grace of God go you. This is the future of Germany.
And I do think it's time for the Oreshnik to be unmilled in all of its awful, horrific reality. No single attacks anymore. Concentrated Russian attacks the way the weapon was designed — to create nuclear-type devastation in an urban area. And the West needs to see this.
The diplomatic path and Europe's failure to engage
Glenn Diesen: It's so incredibly depressing. Do you think there's any possibility now that we're reaching a point where we're likely going into a direct war with Russia — that Russia will at least retaliate in a big way — and yet there's still a diplomatic path? What do you make of what the EU is doing now? They're discussing: should we talk to the Russians? Who should talk to the Russians? What should we talk about?
Scott Ritter: I don't see any hope in the EU in the short term maturing to the degree necessary for diplomatic intervention to be meaningful at this stage, because at the same time they're speaking of diplomatic intervention, their militaries are talking about war. You need to shut down the war.
I do believe that China provides a very important diplomatic possibility — that after Putin leaves China, China will be able to contact Trump, because there is connectivity there. And China will be able to contact the European Union and put them on notice that this isn't a bluff. This is the real deal. You have no choice but to change the way you're going, or else the consequences will be devastating.
So I do think there's still a window of opportunity. But the United States needs something to jump-start it. Right now we don't have effective one-on-one with Putin. I think if China intervenes, then Trump may call Putin, Putin may call Trump, and pressure could be placed on Europe. I'm hoping that the United States puts Europe on notice that if they continue down this path, the United States will not be there for them. This is their problem and they need to stop it right now. And the United States also needs to basically tell Ukraine: it's over. It's finished. You're done.
Whether Trump could do that — if he had won in Iran, maybe he'd have some political capital to spend. But he's a very weakened man. I don't see him being able to take two defeats at once. But the smart thing to do would be to stop this path towards war, because that's what we're on. We're literally on a path towards the kind of war that I trained to fight as a young Marine. This is the war I trained to fight. And I'm fully aware of what this kind of war means and what the consequences are if we ever cross that line of departure.
Nobody in the military today — unfortunately, they've all aged out. My generation is done. We don't have any real Cold War veterans left. So they don't know what the Cold War was. They don't know what the Soviet Union was. They don't know what it was like to be prepared to fight large-scale ground combat in Europe involving nuclear weapons. We're getting ready to experience that today. And I just wish people would listen.
Glenn Diesen: It's kind of sad that seemingly the only thing that can stop a war now is Trump calling the Europeans and telling them, "If you decide to continue to escalate the war on Russia, you're on your own. They will hit back and we're not going to help you." And if the future of the world is in the hands of Trump, we might all be royally screwed already. This is — I wish we had some more responsible people. That goes for the Europeans as well.
You mentioned the Baltic states. I think the main idea in 2022 was that once they decided to essentially boycott diplomacy and decided weapons would be the path to peace, the EU thought it was a great idea to hand over the car keys to the most radical elements — Kaja Kallas, for example, out of Estonia. It's very hard to walk this back and suddenly demand common sense out of her. I don't know. I'm not very optimistic anymore.
Do you get the impression there's someone in Europe who's understanding the severity of this situation? Because all I see is applause in the media — "Oh look, look how badly they hit the Russians. Yeah, we're winning. Ukraine is winning." And nobody ever defined what exactly winning means in a war against the world's largest nuclear power, which considers this to be an existential threat. No discussion. Just this ridiculous tribalism — the idea that "if they're losing, that means we're winning." This is the extent of their logic. It would be like the goal of defeating America with drone warfare out of Mexico. You don't want to win this war. You don't want to bring too much pain. It's suicide.
Scott Ritter: No, I mean — I'm not religious, but pray for peace. Pray for something. Hope something happens. But also keep doing what you're doing, Glenn, because you are — the interviews you have have a meaningful impact. You're interviewing the right people, you're asking the right questions, you're getting the right conversations, and it's resonating across the intellectual aspect of the worldwide web. We know that independent media that's internet-based often has zero quality control and it brings out the worst in us, but you bring out the best in terms of intellectual development of complex ideas. Just keep doing what you're doing, because you and I can't solve all the world's problems. We don't have the capacity to make decisions. But I can guarantee you that what you say, and maybe what I say sometimes, and what you get other people to say, resonates in certain circles that do have the ability to advise on policy. So don't just pray, because praying is passive. Keep doing what you're doing.
Glenn Diesen: Well, thank you, and I hope it does make a difference. Thanks again for taking the time.
Scott Ritter: Okay. Thanks. Have a good day.